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Col. Baillie's situation with Tippoo, near Tuwallum, Sept.r 10th 1780.



MEMOIRS

OF THE

LATE WAR IN ASIA.

WITH A

NARRATIVE

OF THE

IMPRISONMENT AND SUFFERINGS

OF OUR

OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS.

BY

AN OFFICER of COLONEL BAILLIE'S DETACHMENT.

VOL. I.

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TO THE READER.

THE RELATIONS already publiſhed of the late Military Tranſactions in India, compiled chiefly from Gazzettes, are too partial to give an adequate idea of the ſkill and exertions of our opponents, and too general to record the merit and the fate of individuals in our own fleets and armies. It is the object of theſe Memoirs, at the ſame time that they illuſtrate the connection of Military Affairs with politics, the nature and the relations of different actions to one another, and their influence on the general reſult of the war, to deſcribe not only our own, but the valour and addreſs of our enemies, and to particulariſe the merits and the hardſhips of our countrymen and others in our ſervice: for the promotion of their intereſt, if they have ſurvived their ſufferings; for perpetuating their names, if they have not; and, in both caſes, for the ſatisfaction or conſolation of their anxious relations and friends.

Nor is it to theſe only that the fate of men diſtinguiſhed by merit, or ſuffering, or both, will be intereſting. All mankind naturally enter, by ſympathy, into the ſituation of one another; but particularly into that of the generous, the brave, and the unfortunate. The particulars relating to our officers and ſoldiers, who fell at different times into the hands of Hyder-Ally-Khan, and Tippoo-Sultan-Bahauder, communicated by certain of thoſe ſufferers, and for the moſt part by one gentleman, who perſevered in the midſt of the utmoſt danger, in keeping a journal of what paſſed from day to day in the principal priſon of Scringapatam, impreſs the mind with all the force of a deep tragedy:—A tragedy continued by too perfect an unity of time and place, and of *ſuffering*, if not of *action*, for the ſpace of near four years; while death, according to the image of our great claſſical poet, "ſhook his dart over their heads, but delayed to "ſtrike."—It is hoped that no reader of humanity will be offended at the mention of many facts and circumſtances, at firſt ſight, of no conſideration. Though trivial in themſelves, they derive an intereſt from their relation to perſons in whom we are concerned, and to whom they were not indifferent.

The

The Narrative of what happened to our men under confinement with the Barbarians, is not only affecting, but in ſome meaſure inſtructive. As natural convulſions diſcover the hidden ſtrata of the earth and ocean, ſo violent moral ſituations tear up and diſplay the paſſions and powers of the human ſoul. The ſenſibility of our captive countrymen and friends was powerfully excited, and the energy of their minds called forth in moſt ingenious contrivances to beguile the languor of total inoccupation, to ſupply conveniencies and comforts, and, on ſome occaſions, to elude a ſudden maſſacre. The ſtrength of their ſympathy with one another; the relief they found, under ſtrong agitation, in pouring forth, or in adopting ſtrains of affecting though unpoliſhed poetry; the longing of circumciſed Europeans and ſlave-boys, though in the enjoyment of unconſtrained exerciſe and air and all the neceſſaries of life, to join their countrymen in irons and expoſed to aſſaſſination and poiſon; that ſudden impatience under confinement, and vehement deſire of liberty which ſeized on the minds of all the priſoners on the certain and near proſpect of a releaſe; the excitement of their [illegible] of compoſure, and carried to painful [illegible] burſts of gratitude to the man to [illegible] tions they owed their deliverance [illegible]

ment, and their chief conſolation under it; their anxiety to make ſome pecuniary recompenſe to ſuch of the poor natives as had treated them with kindneſs, &c. Theſe are no unintereſting ſubjects of obſervation, nor leſs pleaſing that they exhibit human nature in an amiable light.

In the priſons on the coaſt of Malabar, particularly that of Seringapatam, we ſee the condition of human nature, as it were, inverted. Man, with unbounded liberty, and the world for materials, becomes acquainted with the qualities and relations of things, and advances in the arts by ſlow degrees. Our countrymen, immured in a narrow priſon, with a very limited command of inſtrumentality and matter, ſupplied the deficiency of theſe by knowledge and invention.—But that which to the contemplative reader of the narrative will perhaps ſeem, amidſt a variety of incidents and ſituations, the moſt worthy of attention, is, the impreſſion that was made on the minds of the priſoners, after ſo long a confinement in the gloomy jail, by external objects, and the fair face of nature,



memorials, or from men of ſtrict honour, who were ſpectators of the tranſactions, or actors in the ſcenes deſcribed. If, after every endeavour to inveſtigate, and with the ſincereſt deſire to ſtate the truth, any error ſhall have been inſerted prejudicial to any man, neither means nor inclination is wanting to make due reparation.—All repreſentations on this head, left for the Writer of the Memoirs at the Publiſher's, ſhall meet with proper attention.—For though neither the compiler of theſe memorandums, nor the gentlemen who have furniſhed them, have prefixed their names, it is not their wiſh to ſhun reaſonable inquiry and explanation.

MEMOIRS

OF THE

LATE WAR IN ASIA.

THE difficulties under which Great Britain laboured at the commencement of 1780 in the weſt, begun by the exerciſe of power over a kindred nation, continued by inteſtine diviſion, and prolonged by the incapacity of Commanders in Chief, exciting at once the hopes and the revenge of her enemies in the eaſt, united the diſcordant Marratta ſtates, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, the Rajah of Berar, and almoſt all the leſſer powers of Hindoſtan, in a confederacy againſt the Engliſh. This formidable aſſociation, which was encouraged by emiſſaries from France, and confirmed by military ſuccours from the

French iſlands of Mauritius and Bourbon, was a ſource of great danger and alarm to our government in Aſia, as well as of ſuffering to individual Britiſh ſubjects: for hence the devaſtation of the Carnatic, the exciſion or capture of three armies, and the impriſonment, torture, and aſſaſſination of more of our officers and ſoldiers than had ever before fallen into the hands of our eaſtern enemies. But the genius of one man, contending againſt fluctuating counſels at home, and the oppoſition and errors of his colleagues in office abroad, reſtored peace and proſperity to the Britiſh ſettlements in India, and liberty to the numerous captives diſperſed in different jails on the coaſt of Malabar, in conſtant apprehenſion of thoſe murderous attacks that had been made from time to time, by regular and fixed gradations, on their unfortunate fellow-priſoners and countrymen.

The territories of the Marrattas, if we except that which was lately uſurped by Hyder-Ally-Cawn, extend from Travancore, near Cape Comorin, at the ſouthern extremity of the peninſula of Hindoſtan, to the

the river Paddar, which diſcharges itſelf in the Gulph of Scindy, and which divides Guzzarat from the dominions of Perſia.—On the eaſt, they are bounded by the Carnatic, the Company's northern Circars, and the dominions of the Nizam-ul-Muluck, the Soubah of the Deccan-Bazalet Jung: but the province of Catac ſtretches in a winding courſe to the Bay of Bengal.

The Marratta ſtates in the Deccan are the only people of Hindoſtan who were never effectually ſubdued, and who never unanimouſly acknowledged themſelves fiefs to the throne of Delhi. The great Aurengzebe himſelf, unable to conquer the Marrattas, found it prudent, for the ſake of peace, to yield to them the ſovereignty of the Deccan. They even carried the terror of their arms into the heart of Delhi, whence they carried off vaſt treaſures; and they continued their depredations, firſt in the country around that ſeat of empire, and then in the kingdoms of Bengal, Bahar, and Orixa; until, in conſideration of the ceſſion of Catac, and an annual tribute of twelve lacks of rupees, they concluded a treaty of peace

with

with Alverdi Cawn, who had uſurped the ſoubahſhip of Bengal, in 1750.

Their natural faſtneſſes and inacceſſible mountains, which conſpired with their native bravery to preſerve the Marrattas from the Mogul yoke, account for their predatory habits, their neglect of agriculture, and invincible love of arms. Among this race of warriors that generous hoſpitality, both towards ſtrangers and each other, which in former time ſo eminently characterized the manners of the eaſt, is ſtill obſerved with ſacred, and even ſuperſtitious exactneſs.

The Marrattas, like the other nations of Hindoſtan, were originally governed by princes diſtinguiſhed by the title of Rajah *, whoſe throne was eſtabliſhed

* The nominal Prince of the Marrattas, from the laſt Kings who actually reigned, SAHOOO or SOU, and RAM, is in popular language ſometimes called among that nation SOU, and ſometimes RAM-RAJAH. There were among the Hindoos other titles of ſovereignty; as Ranah, Rajah. Subordinate characters were known by the names of Paiſhwa, Surdar, Zemindar, Polygar, &c.—The titles of Vizier, Soubah, Nizam, Nabob, Omrah, &c. were introduced by Mahomedans.

at

at Setterrah. United under this head, they were always powerful and invincible; but, in proceſs of time, each ſubordinate chief aſſuming the prerogatives of an independent prince, and one link of that chain which united them being broken, they were ſeparated into a number of petty ſtates; yet they ſtill continued to yield a kind of tacit allegiance to the Ram-rajah, who had a power of aſſembling the chiefs, and ordering out their troops as often as any public cauſe required their ſervice.

The Marratta revenues were originally very great. Before the uſurpations of Hyder Ally Cawn, in the kingdom of Myſore and around it they amounted to about ſeventeen millions of Britiſh pounds. It is computed, that their annual revenue is equal ſtill to twelve millions.

Their military eſtabliſhment, which is compoſed of cavalry, is yet about three hundred thouſand: but theſe are not to be conſidered as regulars, or permanent troops, but as an eſtabliſhed militia. In judging

of the Marratta force, we are alſo to obſerve, that it is an invariable cuſtom among the troops, when an expedition is concluded, to retire with what plunder they may have ſeized to their reſpective abodes, leaving with the chiefs only what may be called their body-guards.

The Sou, or Ram-rajah, exiſts now but in name. The actual adminiſtration of government, as well as the ſovereign authority, is poſſeſſed by a family of the Bramin caſt, under the title of Paiſhwa, or Chancellor: and, in caſe of infancy, the ſtate is governed by a Regent, who is generally the neareſt of blood. Nana-row ſeized at the ſame inſtant the reins of goverment and the perſon of the Ram-rajah, whom he confined in a fortreſs near the metropolis, Setterah This uſurper dying, left behind him two ſons, Mada-row and Narain-row; the firſt of whom, being the eldeſt, ſucceeded him in the aſſumed office of Paiſhwa. Ionogee-Booſla, or Bouncello, the father or immediate predeceſſor of Moodaje-Booſla, Rajah of Berar, was one of the

the pretenders to the throne of Setterah, as neareſt of kin to the confined Ram-rajah; at the ſame time Roganaut-row, called alſo Ragobah, was a pretender to the office of prime miniſter, even during the life-time of his nephew; for which Mada-row kept him under confinement.

But the Paiſhwa feeling in himſelf the ſymptoms of decay, and forſeeing his approaching diſſolution, was moved with fraternal tenderneſs towards Narain-row, his young brother and lineal ſucceſſor; whoſe youth and inexperience expoſed him to the machinations of his crafty and intriguing uncle, though in priſon.

Had Mada-row, on this occaſion, obſerved the cruel policy of the eaſt, he might by a hint or a nod have removed the cauſe of all his fears concerning his brother; but he was a man of a humane diſpoſition, and his mind was purified from all ideas of poiſon or aſſaſſination by the near approach of death. Divided between humanity towards his uncle, and affection for his bro-

ther, he embraced the generous reſolution of effecting a reconciliation between the objects of his tenderneſs and that of his compaſſion. He cauſed Roganaut-row to be releaſed; and, having made ſuch arrangements as he thought the moſt likely to remove all uneaſineſs or diſſatisfaction from the minds of both parties, he placed the hands of the youth into thoſe of his uncle, and, ſhedding tears of joy, tenderly embraced them; "I intruſt," ſaid he, "the young man to "your care: I recommend him to your "protection. Give him your advice in "the adminiſteration of government; guard "him from the ſnares and plots of his "enemies. He never adviſed your con-"finement; he was always an advocate "for your enlargement: let all remem-"brance of former grievances, on either "ſide, die with me." The young man, it is ſaid, and even Roganaut-row, on this occaſion, diſſolved in tears.

Mada-row died in November 1772; and Narain-row in the September following, when he was in the twenty-third year of his

his age. The cauſe and circumſtances of this young man's death, were theſe: Gopincabow, the mother of Madah and Narain-row, had diſguſted her eldeſt ſon by a diſſolute and vicious life; in conſequence of which, ſhe withdrew to Benaras, in the dominion of Oude, then hoſtile to the Marratta government, and at a vaſt diſtance from Poonah. Juſt before his death, Madah-row expreſſed a deſire to ſee her, which ſhe refuſed with contempt; therefore, dreading her influence over the unformed mind of his brother Narain-row, he earneſtly cautioned him to beware of her artful councils. Some circumſtances having appeared in the conduct of Roganaut-row, creating ſuſpicions of a foul deſign upon his nephew, the rumour thereof reached Benaras, whence Gopincabow wrote to her ſon, cautioning him againſt the arts of his uncle, and even recommending to confine him again, as his brother Madah-row had found it neceſſary to do for his own ſecurity, if he ſhould not chuſe to anticipate his deſigns by an obvious ſtroke ſtill more deciſive. This letter in its way fell into the

hands

hands of Roganaut-row's adopted ſon, then under the care of Moodajee Booſla, in Berar, which he conveyed to his father in Poonah. Roganaut-row inſtantly determined to ſecure his own freedom and life, together with the adminiſtration of the government, without a competitor, by one blow; as neither of the brothers had children, nor was it then known that the wife of Narain-row was pregnant. Two Soubadars of the Durbar guard he made choice of for the accompliſhment of his purpoſe. Simmer-ſing and Mahomet Iſſouff were conſulted; who, after ſome conſideration, engaged, for two lacks of rupees, and two ſtrong forts for their future protection, to perform the horrid deed. An occaſion offered to at-tach a third to their plot. Tulajee, a fa-vourite ſervant, had been raiſed by Narain-row to the command of a troop of horſe near his own perſon. That young man having committed an act of violence on a Soubadar of rank and condition, upon complaint thereof, Narain found it neceſ-ſary to degrade and confine the favourite; however, upon application, he was not only

only releaſed, but reſtored to rank and favour; but the diſgrace ſunk into his ſpirit, and he ſecretly menaced revenge. The conſpirators aſſociated him in their deſign, and fixed the day, place, and manner of carrying it into execution. On the 18th of Auguſt 1773, after the Paiſhwa had withdrawn to his retirement as uſual in the evening, he was alarmed by an uproar and information that a body of armed men were forcing themſelves into the apartments. He inſtantly ſuſpected that his uncle meditated his death; and he flew into the apartment and arms of Roganaut-row, imploring him to take the government and ſpare his life. Ragobah was moved with great compaſſion; and he ſpoke to the Soubadars: but the matter had gone too far to be receded from with ſecurity. Tulajee ſeized Narain-row's legs, and a ſepoy diſengaged his arms which embraced his uncle. Tulajee ſtruck the firſt blow, which was followed by Simmer-ſing and Mahomet Iſſouff.

The office of paiſhwa, which was not only a tempting object of ambition, but which,

which, to the unfortunate Ragobah ſeemed neceſſary to his liberty and perſonal ſafety, he did not long enjoy. During an expedition which carried him to a diſtance from his capital, the council, which conſiſted of Bramins, formally depoſed him, charging him with the aſſaſſination of his nephew, and announcing the pregnancy of Narain's widow, who was ſoon after delivered of a ſon. In theſe circumſtances Roganaut-row fled to Bombay, where, in conſideration of certain territorial conceſſions, he obtained protection, and a promiſe of ſupport in his pretenſions to the throne of Poonah. The aſylum thus granted to Roganaut-row, incenſed the Marrattas on the one hand; while, on the other, it amuſed the Engliſh with a proſpect, not only of a valuable acceſſion of territory, but of the uſual ſpoils which Indian revolutions preſent to the views of ſucceſsful European allies.

Hoſtilities having quickly commenced, the marine of Bombay ſuſtained, with the bravery of Britiſh ſeamen, the troops in the reduction

reduction of the iſland of Salſette, which was effected not without conſiderable loſs to the aſſailants; while that of Baroach coſt the life of General Wedderburn, one of the beſt and braveſt officers that belonged either to the Company's ſervice or the Britiſh army. The Company felt his loſs ſoon thereafter, in the defeat of the Bombay army under Colonel Keating.

Such was the ſituation of the Company with regard to the Marratta ſtate, when the new government, compoſed of Mr. Haſtings, General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, Mr. Barwell, and Mr. Francis, commenced in October 1774. The treaty with Ragobah having been concluded, whether from inadvertence or deſign, without the ſanction of the Governor-general and Council, was diſavowed. The newly arrived members, General Clavering, Colonel Monſon, and Mr. Francis, forming a majority in the ſupreme council, availed themſelves of that ſuperiority which the act of parliament gave them, in certain caſes, over the other preſidencies, and ſent an officer of rank, Colonel 1774.

Upton,

Upton, to negotiate with the Marratta court a peace on almoſt any terms: which was at length concluded and ratified, on the firſt of
1776. March 1776. This peace is known by the title of the Poorunder Treaty, and ſometimes by that of the Treaty of Poonah. It was ſigned, on the part of our government, by Colonel Upton; and, on the ſide of the Marrattas, it was authenticated by the ſeal of the paiſhwa, an infant of about two years old, and by the ſignature of his two miniſters, Saccaram-bappoo and Nana-furneze.

By this treaty, Salſette, Baroach, and other diſtricts in the Guzzarat provinces, were ceded to the Company: they were to be paid twelve lacks of rupees at three fixed terms, to defray the charges of the war; as a ſecurity for which they got poſſeſſion of ſeveral pergunnahs in mortgage, and an extent of territory of the annual value of three lacks, adjoining or near to Baroach.

On the other hand, it was ſtipulated, that Roganaut-row ſhould be provided for according to his rank in a private ſtation; that he

he ſhould withdraw immediately from Bombay; and that no protection or aſſiſtance ſhould be given to him, or any other ſubject or ſervant of the Marratta ſtate who might excite any diſturbance or rebellion in that country. But this proviſion for Ragobah was granted on the expreſs condition that he ſhould reſide in the heart of the Marratta dominions, with a guard appointed by the Poonah miniſters themſelves, for his ſtate and ſafety. This clauſe in the treaty, which left Ragobah wholly at the mercy of his enemies, having naturally alarmed his fears, he fled a ſecond time to the preſidency of Bombay, and claimed the protection of that government for the ſecurity of his perſon.

While Roganaut-row, under the protection of the government of Bombay, fomented diſſenſions in the government of Poonah, and, deceived in all probability himſelf, magnified both the numbers and the power of his partizans among the Marrattas, the enemies of that unfortunate chief gave open countenance to agents from France and Auſtria. 1777.

Auſtria. Formal engagements, if common report could be truſted, had paſſed between a majority of the Marratta chiefs and the French agent St. Lubin. The object of theſe, it was evident, whatever it might be, muſt, if attained, prove deſtructive to the trade of the Engliſh Company, and to the Britiſh influence in India. Thus a foundation was laid for jealouſies on both ſides. The Marrattas ſuſpected that the Engliſh ſtill entertained the deſign of raiſing Ragobah to the adminiſtration of Poonah; and the Engliſh, that the Poonah miniſters had entered into an alliance with the French, for the purpoſe of ſubverting the Britiſh power and authority in Aſia.

1778. The ſuſpicions entertained of the miniſters of Poonah were ſoon confirmed by authorities of unqueſtionable credit, and by a ſeries of facts of public notoriety. The Chevalier St. Lubin, who had made his appearance at Poonah, and was received with great honour, in the public character of a miniſter from the court of France, ſolemnly engaged to Nana-Furneſe, the grand enemy

enemy of Ragobah, to bring two regiments and an hundred French officers, to be landed at Choule, a Marratta port on the coaſt of Malabar, the poſſeſſion of which would enable his nation to form an arſenal, and collect military ſtores. The date of this tranſaction was May 1777. 1778.

The Governor-general, who had uniformly been of opinion that the meaſure now adopted was the only way by which the French could ever hope to regain their authority and influence in India, or to diminiſh ours, never doubted but the Preſidency of Bombay, who were nearly concerned in its immediate operation, would take ſome ſteps in order to render it abortive. Nor would this have been a difficult matter.—The jarring members of the council at Poonah, poſſeſſed little authority as a body, and for whatever conſequence they enjoyed as individuals, they depended entirely on their own vaſſals. The Preſidency of Bombay had long diſcovered an ardour to revive the pretenſions of Ragobah: and the ſlighteſt movements made by them in his

1778. favour would have ſhaken and ſubverted that feeble power with which they had to contend, and eſtabliſhed their own influence in the Marratta ſtate on its ruins. But Mr. Haſtings, reluctant to renew hoſtilities with the Marrattas, and anxious to unite the peace of India with the ſafety, the proſperity, and the honour of the Engliſh Eaſt-India Company, formed a treaty for the purpoſe of counteracting the French influence at Poonah, and remedying all the defects of that concluded in 1776 by Colonel Upton; of which not ſo much as one Article had been hitherto carried into execution.

This new treaty was laid before the board of Calcutta, with a long explanatory minute, on the 23d of January, 1778. Whilſt this minute lay for conſideration on the table, a letter was received from Bombay, dated the 12th of December, 1777, informing the Supreme Council that a propoſal had been ſecretly made to the Governor and Council, through their agent at Poonah, by a party which had been formed againſt Nana-Furneſe, conſiſting of Saccaram Bappoo, who had

had ſigned the treaty, and other conſiderable 1778.
men, with a powerful Rajah, Tuckajee Holkar, to aſſiſt them in the deſign of reinſtating Ragobah in the chief adminiſtration of the Marratta ſtate; and that they had agreed to join in it, requiring only, as a preliminary condition, a written application to the ſame effect, under the hands and ſeals of the confederates. On the receipt of this letter, the Governor-general and Council reſolved to ratify what they had done, to authorize them to proceed, and to ſend them, for the purpoſe of carrying their plan into execution, an extraordinary ſupply of ten lacks of rupees. It was alſo reſolved, to aſſiſt them with a military force.

The conſiderations that moved a majority in the Supreme Council to form theſe reſolutions were as follow.

1ſt, In the event of a rupture with France, which was daily apprehended, the connection formed by Nana-Furneſe with St. Lubin, and the engagement which he had entered into, to land two regiments of Europeans

1778. with military ſtores at Poonah, might, if carried into effect, be productive of the moſt dangerous conſequences to the Company's influence, and their poſſeſſions in India. This could be prevented only by the removal of the party ſo cloſely connected with our natural enemy; and Rogonaut-row was the inſtrument for this purpoſe.

2dly, To authorize the gentlemen of Bombay to take part with Ragobah, was a ſtrict compliance with the orders of the Court of Directors, who, in a letter dated the 5th of February, 1777, declare that Ragobah's pretenſions to the ſupreme authority, either in his own right or as guardian to the infant Paiſhwa, appear to them better founded than thoſe of his competitors; and therefore, if the conditions of the treaty of Poonah have not been ſtrictly fulfilled on the part of the Marrattas, and if, from any circumſtances, the Governor and Council ſhould deem it expedient, they would have no objection to an alliance with Ragobah, on the terms agreed upon between him and the Governor and Council of Bombay.

3dly,

3dly, The reſtoration of Ro-anaut-Row would have been attended by an acceſſion of territory upon the Mal-bar coaſt to the amount of the annual expences of the Preſidency of Bombay; by which means no farther drains would have been made from our treaſury in Bengal. 1778.

4thly, The reſtoration of Ragobah was not a breach of the treaty of Poonah, becauſe that treaty was ſigned by Saccaram-Bappoo and Nana-Furneſe only: now Saccaram, the firſt miniſter in rank, with the principal officers of the Marratta ſtate, joined in the propoſal to the Preſidency of Bombay for his return to Poonah.

The plan then propoſed by the opponents of Nana-Furneſe for the reſtoration of Ragobah, having received the ſanction of the Governor-general and Council, it was reſolved to aſſiſt the Preſidency of Bombay both with money and a conſiderable reinforcement, in order to carry it effectually into execution. On the 23d of February, 1778, orders were iſſued for forming a de-

1778. tachment of ſix batallions of Sepoys, one company of native artillery, with a regular proportion of field artillery, which were afterwards joined by the firſt regiment of cavalry and five hundred of the Vizier's Candahar horſe. The whole of theſe troops amounted only to ſix thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty-ſeven; yet, ſuch is the influence of climate and cuſtom! this ſmall army, though under the auſpices and direction of Europeans, was, of neceſſity, accompanied by a ſuit of thirty-one thouſand ſeven hundred and twenty-nine ſervants and ſuttlers. This numerous body, under the command of Colonel Matthew Leſlie, in the month of May began their march, acroſs a country of immenſe extent *, and very imperfectly explored, abounding in faſtneſſes, interſected by defiles and navigable rivers, and inhabited by numerous and hoſtile natives.

It was now the wet ſeaſon, and torrents of rain overflowed the country, deſtroying

* Fifteen hundred miles.

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the roads, and rendering even ſmall rivers and brooks ſometimes impaſſable. On the firſt day's march from Calpee, the effect of the heat was fatally experienced by the troops and their numerous attendants: for either through the ignorance of their conductors, or the obſtinacy of the commander, they moved out of their right courſe; and through fatigue and want of water, ſeveral perſons died raving mad, and among theſe Captain Crawford an amiable man, and gallant officer. About ten ſubalterns happily recovered from dangerous illneſſes.—Our army, notwithſtanding all their difficulties, after a ſlight and ineffectual oppoſition from Ballajee Pundit, the chief of the Marratta territories dependant upon Calpee, croſſed the Jumna the latter end of May. 1778.

The orders given to Colonel Leſlie, when he was appointed to the command of this force, were, to march directly to Bombay, by the ſhorteſt route he ſhould judge moſt practicable, and, in all his operations, to obey the commands of the Preſident and

1778. Council of Bombay. The very report of the deſtination, anſwered in ſome meaſure the end of this detachment. The partizans of Roganaut-row at the court of Poonah, animated by the ſpirited meaſures of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, ſuddenly aſſembling their forces, deprived Nana-Furneſe of his authority, and appointed Moraba-Furneſe in his ſtead.—This eaſy revolution, effected without bloodſhed or conteſt, proved, at once, the weakneſs of the Marratta Government, and the facility with which the plan offered to the Preſidency of Bombay might have been executed, if there had been a coincidence of movements between the Britiſh forces on the coaſt of Malabar and thoſe under the command of Colonel Leſlie, and a perfect correſpondence of ſentiments and inclinations between that officer and the gentlemen of Bombay on the one hand, and the Governor-General and Council on the other. But neither were the counſels of Bombay, nor the actions of Colonel Leſlie, in uniſon with thoſe of Mr. Haſtings. When the

the gentlemen of Bombay firſt heard of the 1778.
march of the Bengal detachment, they ſent orders to Leſlie to halt. A few days after this, they ordered him to proceed on his march, but without ſpecifying any object, or propoſing any plan of operations. The fluctuating councils, and indiſtinct orders of the Preſidency of Bombay, ſeemed to afford ſome pretext for the remiſſneſs of Colonel Leſlie, who had not advanced above an hundred and twenty miles from Calpee, when he died at Chatterpore, on the 3d of October 1778.

Chatterpore, the capital of Bundlecund, the country of diamonds, is ſituated near the weſtern confines of that province. Its diſtance from Calcutta may be computed at twenty days journey for a native courier. Here Colonel Leſlie had lain near three months, committing, as has been ſaid by ſome, not a few depredations; but, according to the more favourable account of others, employing his time in ſettling the family diſputes of the Bundella chiefs.—Whatever was the cauſe of his delays in Bundlecund, he was recalled from his command

1778. mand on the 7th of October: but by his death Colonel Goddard had ſucceeded to the chief command of the army before the letter containing the order for his recall reached the Camp. The power that had been delegated to the Preſidency of Bombay, of commanding the movements of the detachment was revoked, and Colonel Goddard was to be directed only by orders from the Supreme Council.

Mr. Haſtings, from the extreme fluctuation and irreſolution viſible in the government of Bombay, judging the cauſe of Ragobah to be deſperate, in order to accompliſh the end which the ſupport of that chief was intended to promote, had recourſe to other means which were more within the compaſs of his own direction. When the Supreme Council determined to ſend a detachment to the other ſide of India, the Governor-general applied to the Rajah of Berar to grant the Engliſh troops a free march through his territories, with ſuch aſſiſtance as they might require on their way. This requeſt was readily granted. The Rajah ſent an intelligent and confidential agent

to

the banks of the Narbudda with a ſupply of grain for the ſubſiſtence of the detachment, and orders to attend it through his country, of which he adviſed Colonel Leſlie, inviting him to take that route, and aſſuring him of a moſt friendly reception. As the Rajah had in this manner manifeſted a diſpoſition to act in concert with the Engliſh, ſo he poſſeſſed power and pretenſions which, if exerted in their cauſe, might greatly promote their intereſt. The nominal ſovereign of the Marratta ſtate, the Rajah Ram-Rajah, after languiſhing long in an honourable confinement at Setterah, died in December, 1777, without children. The prince who had the faireſt pretenſions to the office of Paiſhwa, as above mentioned, was Moodajee Booſlah, Rajah of Berar, being lineally deſcended from the antient Ram-Rajahs, and the adopted ſon of Sahoo Rajah, the predeceſſor of the late Rajah Ram-Rajah, though deprived of his right by the artifices of Ballajee, who was the Paiſhwa when Sahoo Rajah died. 1778.

For theſe reaſons, Mr. Haſtings judged Moodajee

1778. Moodajee Booſlah to be a proper perſon to ſupply the place of Ragobah in the plan offered to the Supreme Council for overturning the French influence with the Marrattas. He poſſeſſed wealth, power, and a territory extending from the borders of Bengal almoſt to Poonah, and from the Narbudda, its northern boundary, to the confines of the Deccan. Ragobah enjoyed not the advantage of either dominion or treaſures, and depended ſolely on the precarious and fluctuating favour of the Preſidency of Bombay. The Governor-general, who wiſhed and expected the propoſal of an alliance to come from Moodajee, ſent the Rajah's vakeel, Beneram Pundit, an intelligent and well informed man, with whom he had held frequent converſations on this ſubject, to Naigpore for that purpoſe. Theſe general and diſtant motions had been made by Mr. Haſtings towards an alliance with the Maha-rajah, when an event happened which determined him to preſs a negotion with that ſovereign prince, and to bring it, if poſſible, to a ſpeedy and happy concluſion.

On

On the 7th of July, 1778, undoubted in- 1778.
telligence was received from Cairo that war had been declared between Great Britain and France; at Paris on the 18th, and in London on the 30th of March. A French fleet, conſiſting of ſeven ſail of the line, with 4000 regular troops on board, beſides frigates, lay ready for ſailing in the harbour of Breſt, under the command of the Count D'Eſtaign, deſtination of which was naturally imagined to be Bombay: a ſuppoſition which was ſtrongly confirmed by the firſt advices that were received from England. The Chevalier St. Lubin was ſtill at Poonah, and held frequent conferences with the miniſters of the Paiſhwa, who was hoſtile to Rugobah and the Engliſh; for a ſecond and unexpected revolution had taken place at Poonah on the 16th of June, and Moraba-Furneſe, with his principal adherents, was impriſoned. In theſe circumſtances, which demanded deciſive counſels and prompt execution, the Supreme Council, regardleſs of all perſonal conſequences, inſtantly took poſſeſſion of all the French ſettlements in Bengal, and of their ſhips in

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1778. the river. They earneſtly recommended to the Preſidency of Fort St. George, immediately to commence the ſiege of Pondicherry, and, if poſſible, to ſecure the friendſhip of Hyder Ally. It was alſo reſolved to quicken the negotiation that had been commenced, on the grounds already mentioned, with the Rajah of Berar. The whole ſervice of the Company could not have afforded a more proper agent than Mr. Elliot, who was diſpatched on an embaſſy for this purpoſe to Naigpore the capital of the Maha-Rajah: but the Governor-general's hopes were ſuddenly blaſted by the untimely death of that young man; of whom it is not too much to ſay, that he was one of the moſt amiable characters as well as elevated ſpirits that ever dignified human nature. All who knew him were his friends: even ſtrangers, to whom report alone afforded an oppurtunity of admiring his talents and virtues, mourned for the death of Mr. Elliot. He fell a martyr to genuine patriotiſm and fidelity to the Eaſt India Company. Afflicted with a diſorder peculiar to the Eaſt, which orginates in bilious

bilious obſtruction, and the cure of which 1778.
requires a copious application of mercury, his duty prevailing over every other conſideration, he undertook a long and fatiguing journey, in the rainy ſeaſon, without any proſpect of enjoying ſuch accommodations as might be neceſſary to his ſtate of health.

After leaving the Company's territories, he diſcovered, that Governor Chevalier, who had ſecretly eſcaped from Chandernagore, was purſuing the ſame route before him. Knowing the political abilities and addreſs of Chevalier, as well as the ambitious deſigns of the court by whom he was employed, and the accurate knowledge he had acquired of the politics of India, he ſtrained every nerve to ſeize his perſon, dreading that his liberty and arrival in France might be attended with the worſt conſequences to the Company's affairs, and the views of Great Britain. He puſhed onward by forced journies, ſtill tracing and approaching M. Chevalier. Unfortunately, juſt when he had the chace in view, his progreſs was obſtructed by a ſudden overflow of the waters

1778. waters of one of the large rivers of Catac. Regardleſs of the ſtate of his health, and the medicines he had taken, by an extraordinary exertion of activity and ſtrength, he encountered the rapid ſtream, and ſwam acroſs the river with a few of his attendants and Sepoys. He found M. Chevalier at the metropolis of Catac; and, although eſcorted only by a few Sepoys, he claimed the perſon of Governor Chevalier with ſuch ſenſible arguments and manly eloquence, that the Rajah ſurrendered him.

As Mr. Elliot had but a ſmall eſcort, and the longeſt and moſt dangerous part of his journey was yet to be performed, he could not, without ſacrificing the object of his commiſſion, return a guard to conduct M. Chevalier and his companion M. Moneron to Calcutta; wherefore he engaged their paroles in writing, to ſurrender themſelves priſoners of war, within a limited time, to the Governor-general. M. Chevalier and M. Moneron performed their engagements. Mr. Elliot purſued his route to Berar; but died a few days thereafter.

The

The Governor General did not ſuffer the deep ſorrow which he felt at this ſudden and melancholy event to overcome the firmneſs of his mind, but by means of other agents, and letters to Moodajee-Booſlah himſelf as well as to his prime miniſter Dewagur Pundit, continued to purſue his object. 1778.

The nature and end of the correſpondence between the Governor-general and the Rajah of Berar, is clearly diſcovered by the following letter of the Rajah's to the Governor, dated the 5th of December, 1778, and received the 2d of January, 1779, which for good ſenſe, as well as delicacy of ſentiment and taſte, will bear to be compared with the moſt approved compoſitions of the antients or moderns.

"Your friendly letter of the 19th Ramzam (11th October), informing me of your having received advice of the death of Mr. Elliot, in his way to Naigpore; your concern at that event, and at the unavoidable ſuſpenſions of the negociations which that gentleman was to have

1778. " conducted with me on the part of your
" government; and the delay in the eſta-
" bliſhment of a ſtrict and perpetual friend-
" ſhip between the Company's ſtate and
" mine, (concerning which you had exerted
" yourſelf ſo warmly), by reaſon that the
" preſent ſituation of affairs would not ad-
" mit of the delay which muſt attend the
" deputation of another perſon from thence
" without injuring the deſigns in hand; but
" that in your conviction of my favourable
" diſpoſition, from the knowledge that my
" intereſts and the Company's are inſepa-
" rably connected; and in the zeal of Be-
" neram Pundit, whom, during the long
" period he reſided with you, you found ſo
" deſerving of your confidence, &c. &c:
" That the plan propoſed, and what you
" have written, is to promote our common
" advantage, not for the intereſt of one party
" only, being convinced, that no public al-
" liance or private friendſhip can be firmly
" eſtabliſhed without reciprocal advantages:
" That it is on theſe principles you had
" long ago planned an alliance with me,
" the time for the accompliſhment of which

" is

" is now come; for you conceive it to be 1778.
" equally for my intereſt as for yours, our
" countries bordering on each other, and
" our natural enemies being the ſame: That,
" in a word, you required nothing but the
" junction of my forces with yours, by
" which, though each is ſingly very power-
" ful, they will acquire a ten-fold propor-
" tion of ſtrength: That the delay of the
" progreſs in the detachment intended for
" Bombay, had not ariſen from the oppoſi-
" tion of an enemy, but from other cauſes
" improper to mention; but that it will
" now ſhortly arrive in my territories; and
" its operation be determinded by my ad-
" vice: That you have given directions to
" Colonel Leſlie, to co-operate with the
" forces which I ſhall unite with his: That
" as you offer me the forces of your Circar
" to promote my views, you in return re-
" quire the aſſiſtance of mine to effect your
" purpoſes; with other particulars which
" I fully underſtand, reached me on the
" 26th Shawand (16th November), and
" afforded me great pleaſure. I alſo re-
" ceived duplicate and triplicate of this let-

1778. " ter.—In the latter part of it you expreſs,
" that as you have made me acquainted
" with your views, it is neceſſary that I alſo
" communicate to you, without reſerve, the
" ends which I look to for my advantage in
" this union: That the good faith of the
" Engliſh to every engagement they con-
" tract, ſo long as it is obſerved by others,
" is univerſally known; and that it has
" been the invariable rule of your conduct,
" to ſupport this character in all acts de-
" pending on you, and never to relinquiſh
" any deſign of importance formed on good
" and judicious grounds, but to perſevere
" ſteadily to its completion: That having
" thus explained to me your ſentiments and
" views, you wait only to know mine; and
" on the knowledge of theſe, you ſhall form
" your ultimate reſolution.—

" It is equally a maxim of ſincere friend-
" ſhip and good government, ſteadineſs,
" magnanimity, and foreſight, that a plan,
" formed on good and judicious grounds,
" ſhould be conducted in ſuch a manner as
" to end happily. You deſire to learn my

" ſentiments

" ſentiments and views; and deferring to 1778.
" form your ultimate reſolutions until you
" had heard further from me, is the ſame
" thing as if you had conſulted me primarily
" on your firſt deſigns.

" Since, after the ſtricteſt ſcrutiny and
" reſearches into diſpoſitions and views of
" the multitude, it has been determined,
" on proofs of mutual ſincerity and good
" faith, that a perpetual friendſhip and
" union be eſtabliſhed, it will, like the
" wall of Alexander, for the happineſs of
" mankind, continue unſhaken until the
" end of time.

" The having cauſed a tranſlation to be
" made into Engliſh of the Hindoo books,
" called the Shaſter and Poran, and of the
" hiſtory of former kings; the ſtudying theſe
" books, and keeping the pictures of the for-
" mer kings and preſent rulers of Hind, Dec-
" can, &c. always before your eyes, and from
" their lifeleſs ſimilitude to diſcover which
" of them were or are worthy of rule,
" and poſſeſſed of good faith; from which

1778. " to determine with whom to contract en-
" gagements, and what conduct to obſerve
" to them reſpectively;—alſo, the endea-
" vour to preſerve the bleſſing of peace, un-
" til forced to relinquiſh it;—the ſupporting
" every one in his hereditary right; and re-
" venging the breach of faith and engage-
" ments; but on the ſubmiſſion of the of-
" fenders, the exerciſe of the virtues of cle-
" mency and generoſity, by pardoning, and
" receiving him again into favour, and re-
" ſtoring him to his poſſeſſions;—the not
" ſuffering the intoxication of power to re-
" duce you into a breach of faith;—and the
" giving ſupport to each illuſtrious houſe in
" proportion to its reſpective merits, and in
" matters which required a long courſe of
" years to bring to perfection;—the form-
" ing your conduct on mature deliberation,
" and the advice of the Company and Coun-
" cil,—are the ſure means of exalting your
" greatneſs and proſperity to the higheſt
" pitch.——The intention of all this is to
" recommend univerſal peace and friendſhip
" in the manner following: The Almighty
" diſpoſes of kingdoms, and places whom-
" ſoever

" ſoever he chuſes on the ſeats of power 1778.
" and rule; but makes their ſtability to de-
" pend on their peaceable, juſt, and friend-
" ly conduct to others.—It is not every one
" who is equal to the taſk of government,
" on the plan deſigned by the Almighty
" Ruler, and of enſuring his ſtability by
" a wiſe and juſt conduct.—Hind and
" Deccan poſſeſs, at preſent, very few en-
" lightened, but a great multitude of weak
" and ignorant men: The Engliſh chiefs,
" and you in a ſuperior degree, poſſeſs all
" the virtues above recited, who coming
" from diſtant iſlands by a ſix month's voy-
" age on the great ocean, by their magnani-
" mity and fortitude, gained the admiration
" of many Soubahs on this continent. It
" is eaſy to acquire a kingdom; but to be-
" come a king over kings, and chief of
" chiefs, is a very difficult matter. The
" attainment of this is only to be effected
" by the means of friendſhip, by which
" the univerſe may be ſubjected. My con-
" duct is framed on theſe principles. The
" reſidence of Beneram Pundit at Calcutta,
" was ſolely to effect the eſtabliſhment of

1778. "the moſt intimate friendſhip; and by the "bleſſing of God it has taken ſuch deep "root, that through your means it has "reached the ears of the Company and "King of England: and our connection "and correſpondence, carried on under the "veil of the vicinity of our dominions, "has been diſcovered by the Poonah mi-"niſters, and by the Nabob Nizam-ul-"Dowla; yet, though they form various "conjectures and doubts, and have ſent a "truſty Vakeel, and written repeated let-"ters, to endeavour to find out the motives "of our union, yet they remain a myſtery, "as I make the plea of our ancient ties, and "junction of our territories.

"I was impatiently expecting the arrival "of Mr. Elliot, who being endowed with "an enlightened underſtanding, and inveſt-"ed with full powers from you to conduct "the negociations, and determine on the "meaſures to be purſued, would have eſta-"bliſhed the ties of a perpetual friendſhip, "and have ſettled every matter on the firm-"eſt baſis. It pleaſed God that he ſhould

"die

" die on the journey; and the grief I felt 1778.
" at his unfortunate loſs, who would have
" been the means of ſettling all points be-
" tween us, to our mutual content, and by
" his negociation with me, giving ſatiſ-
" faction to the Paiſhwa and Nabob Nizam-
" ul-Dowla; all which have been by his
" death thrown back many months; my
" grief is not to be deſcribed, and only
" ſerves to add to your affliction. I have
" not yet recovered the ſhock which that
" event gave me, as you will learn more
" fully from Beneram Pundit. There is no
" remedy for ſuch misfortunes, and it is
" in vain to ſtrive againſt the decrees of
" Providence. Had Mr. Elliot arrived,
" ſuch ſtrokes of policy would have been
" employed, that the Poonah miniſters
" would have adhered more ſcrupulouſly
" than before to their engagements; the
" French, who are the natural enemies of
" the Engliſh, would have been theirs
" likewiſe; and their ſuſpicions from ap-
" henſions of ſupport being given to Roga-
" naut-row, which never was, nor is de-
" ſigned by the Engliſh chiefs, as I learn
" from

1778. "from Beneram, who had it from your own
"mouth, and which has cauſed them great
"uneaſineſs, would have been entirely re-
"moved by Mr. Elliot and my joint ſe-
"curity.

"The Nabob Nizam-ul-Dowla—who
"wrote you repeatedly on this ſubject,
"and received for anſwer, that you had no
"idea of aiding or ſupporting Roganaut-
"row; that your enmity was ſolely pointed
"againſt the French; and that whoever
"aſſiſted the French were your enemies—
"would likewiſe by theſe means have been
"thoroughly ſatisfied, and your detach-
"ment would have reached Bombay, with-
"out meeting the ſmalleſt interruption;
"and had the Poonah miniſters then acted
"a contrary part, I ſhould have withdrawn
"myſelf from their friendſhip. But by the
"death of Mr. Elliot, all theſe deſigns have
"fallen to the ground, and muſt be ſuſpen-
"ded until another opportunity, and the
"knowledge of your ſentiments. It is a
"proverb, 'that whatever is deliberately
'done, is well done.' In reply to what you
"write

" write reſpecting your framing your ulti- 1778.
" mate reſolutions I have communicated to
" Beneram Pundit whatever I judge proper
" and eligible, and which may promote
" them in ſuch a manner as may not be
" ſubject to any change from the viciſſi-
" tudes of fortune. For thoſe points which I
" fixed on, after minute deliberation, as the
" moſt eligible that can be adopted, I refer
" you to the letters of Beneram Pundit.
" If, notwithſtanding, you have any plan
" to propoſe for the reciprocal benefit of
" our ſtates, be pleaſed to communicate it
" to me.

POSTSCRIPT.

" To your letter reſpecting the ſending of
" an army to overawe the French, and to re-
" inforce the government of Bombay; and
" ſetting forth, that the Poonah miniſters
" having broken the treaty with the Eng-
" liſh, and in oppoſition to the rights of
" friendſhip received an envoy of the
" French king, and granted the port of
" Choul to that nation; thereby enabling

" them

1778. " them to form an arſenal, and collect mili-
" tary ſtores; and of their having written
" to their officers, to permit the French
" ſhips to enter their ports; and that it
" being therefore incumbent on you to take
" meaſures to contract their deſigns, you
" had determined to ſend a ſtrong detachment
" for the reinforcement of Bombay, by the
" route of Berar; and that in conſideration of
" our ancient friendſhip, and the vicinity of
" our dominions, you requeſted, that on its
" arrival in my neighbourhood, I would
" cauſe it to be inſtructed in the route, and,
" providing it with proviſions and neceſ-
" ſaries, have it conducted in ſafety through
" my territories, and join a body of my forces
" with it, which would increaſe and cement
" our friendſhip; and that you have, at the
" aſſurance of Beneram, fixed on this route
" for its march in preference to any other:
" In reply to this letter, actuated by its dic-
" tates of the ſincereſt friendſhip, I waited
" not to take the advice of any one, but
" without heſitation wrote you, That where
" a ſincere friendſhip exiſted, the paſſage of
" troops through my country was a matter

" of

" of no moment; that they ſhould proceed 1778.
" immediately through my country. I
" likewiſe informed Coloñel Leſlie of the
" difficulties and dangers he would meet
" with in the way, from dangerous moun-
" tains, extenſive rivers, &c. and alſo diſ-
" patched Lalla Jadda Roy, with a chief of
" note, to the banks of the Narbudda, to
" ſupply the detachment with proviſions as
" long as they were in my territory, and to
" treat them with all the duties of hoſpitali-
" ty; where he waited in expectation of their
" arrival for ſix months to no purpoſe.—
" They loitered away their time in the Bun-
" dlecund countries, contrary to every rule
" of policy. At that time all the Poonah
" miniſters were ſeparately employed in their
" own private affairs, or in the war with
" Hyder Naig, inſomuch that they had no
" time to turn their attention to the con-
" cerns of other parts, and the march to
" Bombay might have been effected with
" the greateſt eaſe. The time is now paſt.
" The arrow is ſhot and cannot be recalled.
" As I have repeatedly written to the Poo-
" nah miniſters, with whom I keep up a
" corre-

1773. "correſpondence on the ſubject of their en-
"couraging a French envoy, and breaking
"their faith with the Engliſh chiefs, acts
"highly inconſiſtent with honour and po-
"licy; the anſwer I have received from
"them, I have communicated to you.—
"The ſubſtance of what they ſay in their
"own juſtification is this: That the French
"Vakeel came for the purpoſe of traffic,
"not to negociate; yet, for the ſatisfaction
"of the Engliſh, they gave him his diſmiſ-
"ſion: That the account of the grant of
"the port of Choul, and an arſenal, is en-
"tirely without foundation; and that they
"have not the leaſt indiſpoſition towards the
"Engliſh: That I will therefore write to
"Calcutta, that you may be perfectly ſatis-
"fied reſpecting their diſpoſition.—My letters
"did not produce the effect of ſatisfying you
"on the ſubject of the Paiſhwa, but your
"doubts ſtill remained. And, actuated by
"wiſdom and prudence, you determined to
"ſend Mr. Elliot to me; and wrote to me,
"that on his arrival at Naigpore, after he had
"and interview with me, and learned my
"ſentiments and views, he would, in con-

"junction

" junction with me, form a plan for our 1778.
" mutual honour and benefit, and give di-
" rections to Colonel Leſlie in conſequence,
" who would be guided thereby.—The
" event of this gentleman's deputation is
" too well known; and Colonel Leſlie like-
" wiſe, after engaging in hoſtilities with
" the Paiſhwa's officers and Zemindars of
" theſe parts, and collecting large ſums
" of money, died. Colonel Goddard ſuc-
" ceeded to the command, and purſued the
" ſame line of conduct, with reſpect to the
" Talookdars, as his predeceſſor; and ar-
" riving at Garawale and Garaſur in the
" territory of the Afghans, whither he was
" obliged to march with the utmoſt caution,
" being ſurroundded with a Marratta army,
" who conſtantly ſeized every opportunity
" to attack him, wrote me from thence,
" that he ſhould ſhortly reach the Narbud-
" da, where I would be pleaſed to cauſe
" grain and other neceſſaries to be prepared,
" and a party of my forces to be ready to
" join him.—I wrote him in anſwer, That
" Lalla Jadda Roy, and Shao Baal Hazaile,
" were waiting on that ſide the Nar-
" budda

1778. "budda which is within my territories,
"and that the Gaut where the troops
"ſhould croſs was two coſs from hence,
"under Haſſingabad; that Janojee Booſlah
"forded it with his army at that place, on
"his expedition to Malawa, and that I did
"not doubt but it was now fordable; that he
"ſhould therefore croſs his army there, and
"repair to Haſſingabad: That Lalla Jadda
"Roy would exert his utmoſt aſſiduity
"in ſupplying him with grain and other
"proviſions, and treat them with every de-
"gree of hoſpitality; but that, as the road
"forward was very difficult and dangerous,
"and thouſands of the Balha Caſtes were
"concealed in the holes in the mountains;
"who though not able to oppoſe him open-
"ly, yet would do it by ambuſcade and ſtra-
"tagems, and cut off his ſupplies of provi-
"ſions; and that, beyond that he would
"enter the Soubahſhip of Barhampore, de-
"pendent on the Paiſhwa: That near 4000
"of Scindiah's cavalry were waiting at the
"fort of Aſſur, for the arrival of the Eng-
"liſh on the banks of the Ganges; 10,000
"more were under the command of Bagarut
"Sundiab;

" Sundiab; Scindiah himſelf with the chiefs 1778.
" in readineſs at Poonah, waiting to hear of
" the approach of the Engliſh; and more-
" over in Berar, in which the Nabob Nizam-
" ul-Dowla poſſeſſes a ſhare with me, all
" the Jaghirdars were in readineſs with
" powerful armies; and although the Eng-
" liſh poſſeſſed the greateſt magnanimity in
" battle, yet as every ſtep they took would
" be juſt into the mouth of danger, and all
" the above-mentioned chiefs would ſet
" themſelves to cut off and deſtroy his pro-
" viſions, and take every opportunity of at-
" tacking him when they ſaw an advantage,
" and of harraſſing him night and day, con-
" ſtantly ſurrounding his army with their
" numerous forces, the junction of a body
" of my forces with his would avail nothing
" in the face of ſuch large armies, but
" would only involve me in the greateſt loſſes:
" That it neither was adviſeable for him to
" return, which would diminiſh the awe and
" reſpect in which he was held; that I
" would therefore write the particulars ex-
" plicitly to Calcutta, and that whatever you
" ſhould think proper to intimate to him and

1778. "me in reply, it would be adviſeable to "abide by, and act accordingly. All which "time I would recommend that he conti- "nued at Hoſſingur.—That I have received "letters from Calcutta, filled with the "warmeſt friendſhip and confidence to the "following purport: 'That the detach- "ment ſhould come into my neighbourhood, "and be guided in its operations by my ad- "vice: That it is incumbent on every chief "who enjoys the confidence of another, to "give ſuch advice as may be moſt advan- "tageous to the party repoſing truſt, and "moſt conſiſtent with the faith of engage- "ments; and that with ſuch conduct the "Almighty is well pleaſed.' That I had "alſo written to the Poonah miniſters my "advice on the ſituation of affairs, to this "purport: 'That Mr. Elliot was deputed "hither to negociate with me, but dying "in the journey, all the negociations in- "truſted to him were ſuſpended; that had "he arrived at Naigpore, I had determined, "from principles of attachment, to have re- "moved from the minds of the Engliſh the "doubts and apprehenſions which had ariſen

"by

" by reaſon of the ſuppoſed encouragement 1778.
" of the French envoy at Poonah, and the
" agreement to ſupport that nation, who
" were the inveterate enemies of the Eng-
" liſh, which had given riſe to the quarrel
" between the two ſtates, by proving to
" them under the ſanction of ſolemn oaths,
" and becoming myſelf guarantee, that all
" thoſe reports were groundleſs, and that the
" Poonah miniſters were ſteady and zealous
" in their engagements with the Engliſh,
" and on ſeveral accounts highly obliged to
" them. And I would have taken from Mr.
" Elliot, engagements, that the Engliſh had
" no idea of affording ſupport to Roganaut-
" row, but were reſolved to maintain their
" treaty inviolate; and that their apprehen-
" ſions related to the French; and that
" when I gave the Engliſh ſatisfaction re-
" lating to the French, and became guaran-
" tee, all his doubts would be removed; and
" that if it was requiſite, a freſh engagement
" ſhould be executed, to which he would
" be a guarantee: That, in brief, each party
" entertained a reaſonable doubt; the Eng-
" liſh, that the Poonah miniſters would join

1778. " with the French; and the Poonah mini-
" ſters, that the Engliſh ſupport Roganaut-
" row: That when theſe ſuſpicions no long-
" er remained, all cauſes of diſpleaſure would
" of courſe ceaſe; and that they could have
" no objection to a detachment of Engliſh
" forces, ſent for the reinforcement of Bom-
" bay, and to overawe the French, not for
" the ſupport of Roganaut-row, repairing
" thither; and to oppoſe them would in ſuch
" caſe have been highly improper." &c. &c.

SECOND POSTSCRIPT.

" Baboo-row, the Paiſhwa's vakeel, has
" obſerved to me in the courſe of converſa-
" tion, that his maſter has not the ſlighteſt
" idea of failing in his engagements with
" the Engliſh, or of contracting any friend-
" ſhip with the French; but that the treaty
" forbids the march of Engliſh forces
" through the Paiſhwa's dominions; that
" therefore the appearance of the detach-
" ment now on its march, is an infringe-
" ment of the treaty."

THIRD

1778.

THIRD POSTSCRIPT.

" Although it may appear improper to repeat the ſame thing over again, yet the importance of the ſubject may plead in my excuſe. On either part, a doubt ſubſiſts. The Poonah miniſters ſuſpect that the Engliſh forces on their march to Bombay, though oſtenſibly for the purpoſe of oppoſing the French, are in reality intended for the ſupport of Roganaut-row; and that the Engliſh at Bombay, who were not included in the treary with the Paiſhwa, which was concluded through the government of Bengal, with the advice of the chief at Calcutta, are deſirous of breaking with the Paiſhwa, and ſupporting Roganaut-row; and that the detachment had been ſent at their requiſition. They alledge, that the chief of Calcutta writes to them, that he is firmly reſolved to adhere to the treaty with the Paiſhwa; and that the detachment he has ſent to Bombay, is ſolely to awe the French, without the leaſt deſign to aſſiſt Roganau-

1778. " row; and that ſince it is forbidden in the " treaty to diſpatch troops over land, the " march of the troops is a breach of it: " That if it is neceſſary to ſend troops to " Bombay to awe the French, they ought to " be ſent by ſea.

" The Engliſh on their part ſuſpect the " Poonah miniſters of joining the French, " in conſequence of having received a French " vakeel. As the Paiſhwa formerly wrote " me, that he had no idea of failing in his " engagements with the Engliſh, and that " he had given no encouragement to the " French vakeel, who came for the purpoſe " of traffic, and that he had diſmiſſed him, " therefore requeſted that I would ſatisfy " you in that reſpect; I, in conſequence, " formerly wrote you all theſe particulars. " As I have a voucher in my hand from the " Paiſhwa, that he has no connection with " the French, and is ſteady to his engage- " ments with the Engliſh, I am able, by " this voucher, to give you complete ſatis- " faction on this head; but I have no " voucher, or intimation, from you, by

" which

" which I may be able to give ſatisfaction 1778.
" to him.

" As he pleads a prohibition in the treaty,
" to the march of forces over land, and like-
" wiſe complains reſpecting the money col-
" lected by Colonel Leſlie in his territories,
" what anſwer can be made thereto?

" As the time requires that a reconcilia-
" tion take place with the Poonah miniſters,
" you will conſider and determine what re-
" ply ſhall be given to theſe two points of
" which they complain; and by what means
" they may be ſatisfied; and communicate
" your reſolution to me, that I may write
" conformably thereto, and remove all
" doubts."

The obſervation made, in this letter, by the Maha-Rajah, on the impolicy of our army waſting their time in the Bundlecund countries, at a time when the Poonah miniſters were ſeparately employed in their own private affairs, or in the war with Hyder-Naig, a juncture when the march

1778. of the Bengal detachment to Bombay might have been effected with the greateſt eaſe; while it vindicates the conduct of the Supreme Council, and arraigns, in all the ſimple ſeverity of common ſenſe, that of the Preſidency of Bombay, ſerves, in ſome meaſure, to explain the Rajah's own views, and to reconcile the readineſs with which he aſſiſted the Engliſh at one period, and the earneſtneſs with which he vindicates the Paiſhwa from the charge brought againſt him by the Company's ſervants, offering his own mediation to bring about a perfect reconciliation between his own countrymen and the Engliſh, at another. For by this time Morabah-Furneſe, with the other adherents of Ragobah, were under confinement in ſeparate priſons; the intrigues and aſſurances of aid from France had made an impreſſion on Hyder-Ally and the Marratta adminiſtration; and a treaty, which was afterwards concluded at Poonah, had been ſet on foot by the Nizam, for an alliance between himſelf, the Marrattas, and Moodajee Booſlah.

The

The Maha-Rajah was not drawn into this alliance by any hatred of the Engliſh, to whom his profeſſions of friendſhip, if we may judge by his actions, were ſincere and cordial; but by the neceſſity of the times, and that of chuſing a party: for in the conteſt that had ariſen between his countrymen and the Eaſt-India Company, a perfect neutrality on the part of the Rajah was impracticable. Advanced in years, the firſt wiſh of his ſoul was peace; and to obtain this he offered, as has been already mentioned, and warmly preſſed his mediation. The intrigues of the French with the Marratta chiefs and Hyder-Ally-Cawn, their reports of the general combination againſt the Britiſh empire in Europe and in America, of the misfortunes that had befallen, and the calamities that aſſailed and threatened to overwhelm us, joined to their aſſurance of powerful ſuccours by ſea and land, ſpread a general opinion throughout India, that all the crowns that centered in the King were now tottering on his head, and that ſome of them had already fallen. The latent ſparks of ambition and of revenge 1778.

1778. venge which the power and proſperity of Great Britain had ſmothered, began now to ſmoke, and to threaten an eruption. For a combination was formed among all the other leading powers of Hindoſtan againſt the Engliſh.

The prince who took the lead in the formation of this confederacy was Nizam-Ally-Cawn, the Soubah of the Deccan, reputed the moſt ſubtle politician, after the death of Nundocomar, in India. The dominions of this prince are of ſmall extent, his revenue is ſcanty, his military ſtrength inſignificant, nor was he ever, at any period of his life, diſtinguiſhed for perſonal courage, or the ſpirit of enterprize. But he was highly reſpectable on account of his rank and deſcent; and this reverence for his perſon conſpired with a natural inſinuation and addreſs to gain an aſcendant over the minds of his countrymen. It ſeems to have been his conſtant and ruling maxim, to foment the incentives of war among his neighbours, to profit by their weakneſs and embarraſſments, but to avoid being a party himſelf

himſelf in any of their conteſts, and rather than expoſe himſelf to the dangers of the field, to ſubmit to humiliating ſacrifices. 1778.

The Preſidency of Fort St. George having concluded an alliance with his brother, Bajalet Jung, by which they acquired poſſeſſion of the Guntoor Circar, the Nizam was moved with a ſpirit of revenge, and a jealouſy was awakened in his breaſt of the ambitious views of that and the other Engliſh governments in Aſia. Theſe ſentiments he alſo excited without difficulty in the mind of Hyder-Ally, who felt diſguſt at our acquiſition of that Circar, and conſidered the preſent juncture as a fit opportunity of revenging the attacks that had been made on his country by the Engliſh in the preceding war, at the inſtigation of the Nabob of Arcott. The Rajah of Berar, ſollicited to join this confederacy, and apprehenſive of the dangers which threatened him, if, in the general combination againſt our countrymen in the Eaſt, he alone ſhould ſtand forth in the character of their avowed friend, adopted that plan of conduct which was naturally ſuggeſted

1778. ſuggeſted to his imagination by his love of peace, his apprehenſion of danger, his unwillingneſs to break with the Engliſh, and the natural ſubtlety and ſimulation of Aſiatic climates and forms of government. He formally, and to appearance, acceded to this grand alliance againſt the influence and authority of the Engliſh nation in the Eaſt, while, at the ſame time, he determined ſecretly to befriend them. Had the Preſidency of Bombay, with that deciſion of counſel and promptitude of action which are for the moſt part neceſſary to the execution of great deſigns, ſeized the proper time for raiſing Roganaut-row to the regency of Poonah, by an armed force, their deſign would in all probability have ſucceeded.—While the friends of that chief were in poſſeſſion of the ſupreme authority of the Marratta ſtate, Moraba having been veſted with the dignity of Paiſhwa, in the ſtead of Nana-Furneſe; while the Marratta chiefs were either taken up with their own private concerns, or entangled in a war with Hyder-Ally; and a ſtrong detachment from Bengal had croſſed the Jumna, with orders to march

march directly to Bombay by the ſhorteſt 1778.
route that was practicable; had a vigorous effort been made for the reſtoration of Ragobah, as it might have been, and the Governor-general intended, by a co-operation and coincidence of movements between the forces from Bombay and the detachment under Colonel Leſlie; Moodajee-Booſlah would not even have made a ſhew of joining the quadruple alliance above mentioned, but have openly eſpouſed the cauſe of the Engliſh. But "the arrow was ſhot, and "could not be recalled." While Colonel Leſlie loitered away his time in Bundlecund, *the country of diamonds*, and the Preſidency of Bombay ſeemed to heſitate concerning the expediency of meaſures on which they had appeared, before the march of the Bengal army, to be bent and determined, a ſecond and unexpected revolution was, on the 16th of June, effected at Poonah, by which Morabah-Furneſe, with his principal adherents, was impriſoned; the intrigues of St. Lubin at Poonah, Choul, and Mangalore, had prepared the minds of the Marrattas and Hyder-Ally to join in a project for

1778 for expelling the Engliſh from India; and a confederacy had been formed by the Soubah of the Deccan for that purpoſe. To make a ſhew of joining the confederacy, for theſe reaſons, appeared to Moodajee Booſlah the ſafeſt courſe for himſelf; and he determined to unite, if poſſible, as already mentioned, his own ſecurity with that of the Britiſh in India. Whether we ought to aſcribe this reſolution in favour of our countrymen to a natural partiality or predilection, to a regard to the political balance in India, or, as the iſſue of the war was doubtful, to the advantage of having ſome degree of merit to plead with whatever party ſhould prove victorious; or, in whatever manner and proportion theſe ſentiments and views were blended together, certain it is, that this Marratta was drawn into the confederacy againſt the Eaſt-India Company with infinite reluctance, and that, although the circumſtances of the times deterred him from taking part with the Engliſh, and even conſtrained him to aſſume the maſk of hoſtility, it was his purpoſe to communicate friendly intelligence to the Engliſh, and to abſtain

abſtain from all hoſtile actions, as long as 1778.
he might do the former with ſecrecy, and the latter with ſafety.

In this ſituation of affairs, which appeared ſo little favourable to the cauſe of Ragobah and of the Engliſh, the Preſidency of Bombay reſolved to urge his pretenſions to the throne of Poonah by force of arms.—This chief, like other men of rank among the Hindoos, as well as the Perſians, Tartars, and other adjoining nations, who have inhabited Hindoſtan ſince it was conquered by Timurbeg or Tamerlane, poſſeſſed in an eminent degree the qualities of politeneſs and addreſs, as well as the virtues of affability, hoſpitality, and liberality of diſpoſition. His engaging manners, with the remains of his wealth, it is ſaid, which he found means to ſave when he fled from Poonah, and which he diſtributed with a liberal hand, procured him not a little favour among the ſtrangers with whom he ſojourned as a refugee and exile. Ragobah, on field days, and at reviews, uſed to walk in the front of the lines, on which occaſions he received,

and

1778. and with inexpreſſible grace returned, the common military compliments. His perſon was tall and ſlender; his countenance manly and expreſſive. His turban and his arms were always loaded with jewels.—When he reſided, under the protection of the Company, in the iſland of Bombay, he had an adopted ſon with him, a young man about fourteen years of age, diſtinguiſhed even among the noble youth of the Eaſt by the comelineſs of his countenance and gracefulneſs of his perſon. He was fond of this lad, even to exceſs; for he has frequently been heard to ſay, that "if his eyes could "behold his ſon in the poſſeſſion of the re-"gency to which he himſelf made preten-"ſions, he would die in peace." Ragobah, beſides troops of his own, Sepoys, raiſed when he was at Bombay a company of Armenians, Portugueſe, Germans, Danes, Dutch, Engliſh, and other nations. Theſe he called his Chriſtian company. He boaſted much of their valour and diſcipline, and placed, or pretended to place, great confidence in their attachment to his perſon.—He had an infinite number of attendants, lived

lived in a magnificent ſtyle, and was very munificent to the officers of his Chriſtian company. 1778.

To place this prince at the head of the adminiſtration of Poonah, an army amounting to three thouſand nine hundred and ten men, officers included, moved from Bombay on the 22d of November, with a great quantity of baggage, and a train of nineteen thouſand cattle. Here it may be neceſſary to inform the European reader, that in India draughts and carriages are performed, for the moſt part, by bullocks: the number of which creatures that is neceſſary to an army is incredible. The conduct of this expedition was entruſted to a committee, conſiſting of Colonel Egerton, Mr. Carnac, and Mr. Moſtyn. The army marched in three diviſions. In Ragobah's diviſion, which formed the van, were a number of huge elephants, with their caſtles mounted on their backs, for the uſe of his wives and his officers; and on one of the largeſt rode Ragobah himſelf. The caſtles, which are fixed on the backs of the elephants by a

1778. kind of harneſs under their belly like the girth of a ſaddle, reſemble tents. Each of theſe will contain eight or ten perſons. In the time of battle they are thrown open, by pulling aſide the curtains, at four different places, whence the people within throw darts, ſhoot arrows, or uſe muſquetry. In the mean time, the creature that ſupports them rages with the fury of war, and is impatient to advance into the midſt of the enemy. If by chance the contending armies ſhould cloſe together, which ſeldom happens, the elephant, by means of a chain which he wields with his trunk, makes dreadful havoc among his enemies with that weapon. The elephants walk ſeemingly with a ſlow pace; but nevertheleſs they make great progreſs, making very long ſteps. This circumſtance of the length of their ſteps, accounts for that rolling motion of which perſons mounted on their backs are ſenſible, and which they compare to the motion of a ſhip. Theſe animals, for the moſt part, outwalked the infantry, and were generally advanced to a conſiderable diſtance before the reſt of the army. Their enormous

mous weight imprinted their footſteps ſo deeply in the wet and ſoft ſoil, that our ſoldiers were incommoded by them in a diſtreſſing manner; for the holes that were made by their feet being preſently filled up with water or mire, could not be readily diſtinguiſhed from the ſurrounding ſurface. Into theſe pits our men frequently plunged, to the great entertainment of their companions, who ſoon afforded ſimilar amuſement in their turn; inſomuch that, during the whole march, while one half of our infantry was kept in a roar of laughter, the other poured forth a never-ceaſing volley of curſes on Ragobah's elephants. 1778.

The report of this expedition excited ſuch an alarm among the miniſters of Poonah, that, by their agent, they offered freſh terms to the Governor before the army had moved far from Bombay. Theſe terms being rejected, our troops proceeding on their deſtination, on the 23d of December aſcended the Gauts, and purſued their march to Poonah. But, on the 9th of January it was determined by the Field-deputies that 1779.

1779. the army ſhould retreat, on account, as they alledged, of a ſcarcity of proviſions, although they had a ſupply for eighteen days, and that after a march of about fifty days, without any hoſtile obſtructionin their progreſs, they had advanced within one day's march of Poonah. The commanding officer, Colonel Cockburn, when conſulted in this matter, ſaid, that he had not a doubt of being able to conduct the expedition to the place of its deſtination, but that our troops had not been uſed to retreat, and that there was greater danger in returning, in the preſent circumſtances, to Bombay, than in advancing to Poonah. The Poonah Committee, however, (ſo the Field-deputies were called) perſevered in their reſolution to retreat. The army, encumbered with baggage, moved off by night. They were attacked by numerous bodies of Marrattas, and defended themſelves not only with the utmoſt bravery, but, for the length and heat of the ſkirmiſhes in which they had been engaged, and the numbers of the aſſailants, with inconſiderable loſs. In the evening of the 16th of January, 1779, application was made

made to Nana-Furneſe and Madajee Schin- 1779.
diah, for an undiſturbed retreat to Bombay: which was granted at Wargaum, on the humiliating condition that Salſette, and every other acquiſition of the Bombay government, ſince the time of Madah-row, ſhould be given up, and that orders ſhould be ſent to Colonel Goddard, to return with his army to Bengal. It muſt not be omitted, that while the Poonah Committee ſubmitted to theſe humiliating terms, they gave an expreſs declaration in writing, that the terms to which they had acceded were not obligatory on the Supreme Council,

This mortifying intelligence was received at Calcutta in the month of February, in a literal tranſlation of a letter to the Nabob of Arcot from Row-Gee, his vakeel at the court of Poonah, dated the 18th of January, 1779, of which the following is a copy.

" 1. I have addreſſed to your Highneſs " ſeveral letters of late, ſome of which I " hope are arrived: I have accounts of " others having been intercepted on the

1779. "road, and ſhall therefore recapitulate "ſome of the moſt important tranſactions "here.

"2. The Engliſh Surdars *, as I have "already wrote to your Highneſs, marched "from Bombay to the paſſes, and fortified "that of Kodtichully, Roganaut-row took "poſſeſſion of two forts which were in the "road, and joined the Engliſh army, which "I hear conſiſted of ſeven hundred Euro-"peans, eight battalions of Sepoys, forty "pieces of cannon, mortars, and a quantity "of powder and military ſtores; they had "beſides four lacks of rupees in money.

"3. Siccaram Pundit and Nana-Furneſe, "two Marratta Surdars, joined their forces, "and ſatisfied the diſcontented chiefs Schin-"diah and Holkar, by giving them money, "jaghires, and other preſents.

"4. All the chiefs having met to con-"ſult what was to be done in the preſent "ſtate of affairs, they all with one voice "agreed, that if Roganaut-row came with "his

* Or chiefs.

" his own forces alone, they ſhould receive 1779.
" him, and give him a ſhare of the power
" as formerly; but ſince he came with an
" army of Engliſh, who were of a different
" nation from them, and whoſe conduct in
" Sujah Dowla's country, the Rohilla coun-
" try, Bengal, and the Carnatic, they were
" well acquainted with, they unanimouſly
" determined not to receive Roganaut-row;
" as otherwiſe, in the end, they would be
" obliged to forſake their religion, and be-
" come the ſlaves of Europeans. Upon this
" they exchanged oaths; and Nehum-row,
" Apagee Pundit, and Schindiah, were ſent
" with an army of 15,000 horſe, beſides
" foot, to the Gaut of Tulicanoon, and were
" followed immediately after by Siccaram
" Pundit and Nana-Furneſe, with 40,000
" horſe.

" 5. It has been for ſome time the fixed
" determination of the Engliſh Surdars to
" give their aſſiſtance to Roganaut-row, in
" replacing him at the head of the govern-
" ment; an army was ſent from Calcutta,
" who made an alliance with Booſlah (Ra-

1779. "jah of Berar), and they were greatly en-
"couraged by the news of the ſurrender of
"Pondicherry.

"6. Mr. Moſtyn, who went from Poo-
"nah, made them believe, that many of
"the Marratta Surdars were in their inte-
"reſt, and that as ſoon as their army ſhould
"arrive at the Gaut, Holkar would join
"them with all his forces.

"7. The Engliſh, truſting to this,
"marched their army to the Gaut, and
"waited impatiently for a whole month,
"but no one appeared to join their ſtand-
"ard. The Engliſh army marched for-
"ward from the Gaut, and were ſo much
"harraſſed by the Marrattas, as not to be
"able to proceed more than two coſs * a
"day, during which time they loſt a great
"many of their men by the fire kept upon
"them by the Marrattas. When they came
"to Chockly, which is about fourteen coſs
"from the paſs, they were obliged to halt;
"Captain Stewart, one of their Surdars,
"was killed at this place.

"8. On

* A coſs is five Engliſh miles.

" 8. On the 21ſt of January, the Euro- 1779.
" pean army arrived at Tulicanoon (ſeven-
" teen coſs from the paſs); Mr. Carnac, ſe-
" cond of Bombay, was with them. Sic-
" caram ſent a body of horſe to Tulicanoon
" to harraſs them; twenty-five Europeans,
" amongſt whom was an officer, and one
" hundred Sepoys, were killed on the firſt
" day; the Marrattas had two hundred men
" killed.

" 9. On the ſecond day the Engliſh were
" ſurrounded on all ſides by the Marrattas,
" and all ſupplies of proviſions cut off from
" them. Seeing themſelves in this ſitua-
" tion, they determined, if poſſible, to re-
" turn by the Gaut, and conſulted upon the
" means to effect their retreat. Roganaut-
" row hearing this, ſent privately to the Mar-
" ratta chief, Schindiah, telling him, that if
" he would attack the Engliſh, he would
" join him with his two battalions of Sepoys,
" and ſix hundred horſe. The Engliſh, it
" would appear, had intelligence of this;
" for, on the 13th of January, they ſudden-
" ly marched ſecretly from Tulicanoon,
" taking

1779. "taking Roganaut-row with them, and "leaving their baggage and tents ſtanding, "under the protection of two hundred Eu- "ropeans and one battalion of Sepoys, with "eight pieces of cannon, to make the Mar- "rattas believe that their whole force was "at Tulicanoon—Siccaram, however, got "private intelligence of their retreat; and, "with Nana-Furneſe, Schindiah, and Hol- "kar, went to cut off their march. At "the ſame time he ſent a body of horſe to "Tulicanoon, where the reſt of the Engliſh "were encamped. The Marrattas as uſual "fell upon the plunder, and a ſmart en- "gagement enſued between them and the "Engliſh. The detachment, who had "marched with Roganaut-row, but had not "proceeded far, returned to the aſſiſtance "of thoſe in their camp. A heavy can- "nonade was kept up by the Marrattas "from midnight till four o'clock the next "day; the Engliſh were not able to march "one foot of way, and all their firing took no "effect; one hundred and fifty Europeans, "with many of their officers, and eight hun- "dred Sepoys, were killed. The Marrattas

"ſur-

" ſurrounded them, and kept patroles going 1779.
" all night, to prevent any from eſcaping.
" On the 14th, the Marrattas commenced
" their cannonading again: fifty Europeans
" and four hundred Sepoys were killed. The
" Engliſh ceaſed firing, ſeeing that it had
" no effect. In the evening of that day,
" the ſervant of Roganaut-row, and that of
" Mr. Carnac, brought a letter to Madah-
" row, acquainting him, that they would
" ſend a truſty perſon to confer with him
" upon ſome matters, if leave was given.
" The Surdars read the letter, and ſent an
" anſwer by the ſame perſon, that they were
" willing to ceaſe hoſtilities, until a perſon
" was ſent. They, however, took care to
" keep a ſtrict patrole round the Engliſh
" camp all night. On the 15th, the Mar-
" ratta Surdars went to the trenches, and
" began firing again; but it was not an-
" ſwered from the Engliſh camp. Soon
" after, Mr. Farmer (a gentleman who was
" ſome time ago at your Highneſs's court)
" came from the Engliſh camp, and the
" fire of the Marrattas immediately ceaſed.
" The Marrattas ſent for him into the pre-
" ſence,

1779. "ſence, and Mr. Farmer ſaid to them, 'We are only merchants.—When diſputes "prevailed with you, Roganaut-row came "to us, and demanded our protection. We "thought he had a right to the govern-"ment, and gave him our aſſiſtance. No-"thing but ill fortune attends him, and we "have been brought to this miſerable ſtate "by keeping him with us. You are maſters "to keep him from us. We ſhall hence-"forth adhere to the treaties that have for-"merly taken place between us. Be plea-"ſed to forgive what has happened.'

"The miniſter anſwered, 'Roganaut-"row is one of us. What right could you "have to interfere in our concerns with him? "We now deſire you to give up Salſette and "Baſſeen, and what other countries you "have poſſeſſed yourſelves of; as alſo the Cir-"cars, thoſe of the Pergunnahs of Baroch, "&c. which you have taken in Guzzarat: "adhere to the treaty made in the time of "Bajalee-row, and aſk nothing elſe.'— "Mr. Farmer heard this anſwer, and re-"turned to his camp. While this negoci-

"ation

" ation was carrying on, 15,000 Marratta 1779.
" horſe were ſent againſt ſome out-poſts
" where the Engliſh had entrenched them-
" ſelves, and ſet fire to them, putting every
" one they met with to death. They did
" the ſame at the fort of Choul, where the
" Engliſh had fortified themſelves. I heard
" all this from Nana-Furneſe; whether it
" be true or falſe, I am not certain.

" On the 6th, at noon, Mr. Farmer re-
" turned, and told Schindiah that he had
" brought a blank paper, ſigned and ſealed,
" which the Marratta chiefs might fill up
" as they pleaſed. Schindiah told the mi-
" niſters, that although they had it in their
" power to make any demands they pleaſed,
" it would not be adviſeable to do it at this
" time. " For our making large demands
" would only ſow reſentment in their hearts,
" and we had better demand only what is
" neceſſary. Let Roganaut-row be with us,
" and the treaty between us and the Engliſh
" will be adhered to. Let Salſette and the
" Pergunnah in Guzzarat, &c. be given
" back to us. Let the Bengal army return
" back.

1779. "back. For the reſt, let us act with them
"as is ſtipulated in the treaty with Bajalee-
"row; let the jewels mortgaged by Roga-
"naut-row be reſtored, and nothing de-
"manded for them. Let all theſe articles
"be wrote out on the paper which they
"have ſent.' Which was accordingly done.
"It is likewiſe conditioned, that till this
"treaty is returned, ſigned and ſealed by
"the Governor of the Council and Select
"Committee, under the Company's Seal,
"and till Salſette and the other countries be
"given up, the nephew of Captain Stewart,
"and Mr. Farmer ſhall remain in the Mar-
"ratta camp, as hoſtages for the due perfor-
"mance of the articles of this treaty.'

"The Engliſh ſoldiers who have eſcaped
"with their lives, faſted for three days, and
"are now in a miſerable condition. The
"Europeans and Sepoys have all grounded
"their arms.—On the 17th the treaty was
"ſent to the Marratta camp. The articles
"were written in Perſian, Marratta, and
"Engliſh, ſealed with the Company's Seal,
"and ſigned by Mr. Carnac and ſeven offi-
"cers.

"cers. After this the Marratta Surdars ſent 1779.
"them victuals, which they needed much.
"The Engliſh marched out, *eſcorted by two*
"*thouſand Marratta horſe*; but Roganaut-
"row, not finding a lucky hour, did not
"go to the Marratta camp, but will go af-
"ter twelve o'clock to-morrow."

Whether the act of perfidy imputed in this letter to Roganaut-row was real or fictitious, may admit of ſome doubt. It is perfectly conſonant to the ſubtlety and artifices of eaſtern policy, to ſuppoſe that this charge was artfully inſinuated to the Nabob of Arcot's vakeel with a view of undermining Ragobah in the favour of the Engliſh. But the following particulars relating to this Marratta have been admitted on authority that is unqueſtionable. While our army lay encamped on the fields of Tulicanoon, Roganaut-row, who had a camp of his own ſeparate from ours, ſent notice to Mr. Carnac, the grand field-deputy, who controlled all matters in this expedition, that he had diſcovered three men in his camp, who, he had reaſon to believe, had a

deſign

1779. deſign on his life, and deſired to know how he might be permitted to diſpoſe of them. Mr. Carnac returned for anſwer, that he was at liberty to diſpoſe of them as he ſhould think proper. Whereupon Ragobah puniſhed one of theſe miſerable creatures with the loſs of his eyes; another, with that of his tongue; and the third he deprived of both his legs by amputation. The laſt unhappy ſufferer ſoon died through loſs of blood. Ragobah aſſigned ſome fanciful reaſons why one of theſe victims ſhould be deprived of the power of ſpeech; another, of that of walking; and a third, of the ſenſe of ſight.

The failure of this expedition may be aſcribed in general to that fluctuation and indeciſion which uſually characteriſe thoſe counſels and meaſures, which are directed not by the energy of one preſiding mind, but by the jarring opinions and views of different and unconnected individuals. Had the Bombay army marched towards Poonah either ſooner or later, had they either advanced to that ſeat of government in the favourable

favourable circumſtances already deſcribed, 1779.
or waited for the junction of the army from Bengal, ſucceſs would have been certain.—Even under all the diſadvantages which oppoſed themſelves to the expedition from Bombay in November 1778, there is reaſon to believe that the end for which it was moved would have been completely anſwered, had not the Commander in chief been circumſcribed in his deſigns and operations by the appointment of Field-deputies: a meaſure, the bad effects of which have been conſtantly ſhewn by experience.—Debate and execution are in their nature incompatible. The ſucceſs of military operations depends very much upon unity of command, without which there can neither be deciſion, nor prompt and timely execution.

Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, for Mr. Moſtyn, the other member of the Poonah Committee, died on the march, having reſolved that our forces ſhould be reconducted to Bombay, ſent a letter, bearing date the 11th of January, 1779, to Colonel

1779. Goddard, ordering him not to continue his march to Poonah, but to return to Bengal, or to remain on the borders of Berar. In this letter the intended retreat to Bombay was not mentioned. The Colonel, after mature reflection, notwithſtanding this order, and that a vakeel from the Marratta miniſters had arrived in his camp with a copy of the humiliating convention of Worgaum, determined to purſue his deſtination. He denied that the Poonah Committee had any authority over him, and declared his reſolution to execute his orders, from the Supreme Council, to march to Bombay for the ſecurity of the Company's poſſeſſions againſt the deſigns of the French.

When Colonel Goddard ſucceeded to the chief command of the Bengal detachment, he received a charge to renew the negociation with Moodajee-Booſlah, on the principles of Mr. Elliot's inſtructions, with full power to conclude a treaty. And the Governor-general, in proſecution of the ſame views, wrote the following letter to the Maha-

Maha-Rajah's prime miniſter, dated at Cal- 1779.
cutta the 23d of November, 1778.

" In the whole of my conduct I have
" departed from the common line of
" policy, and have made advances when
" others in my ſituation would have waited
" for ſolicitations; as the greateſt advan-
" tages to which I can look, cannot in
" their nature equal thoſe to which the
" proſperous iſſue of our meaſures may
" conduct the ſtate of the Maha-Rajah's
" government. But I know the charac-
" ters to which I addreſs myſelf. I truſt
" to the approved bravery and ſpirit of your
" chief, that he will ardently catch at the
" objects preſented to his ambition; and to
" your wiſdom, of which, if fame reports
" truly, no miniſter ever poſſeſſed a larger
" portion, that you will view their impor-
" tance in too clear a light to hazard a
" loſs of them, by attempting to take an
" advantage of the deſire which I have ex-
" preſſed for their accompliſhment. This
" intimation is not ſo much intended for a
" caution to you, as for an explanation of

1779. "my conduct to thoſe who may be leſs able "to penetrate the grounds of it."

Agreeably to the deſigns of the Governor-general, Colonel Goddard, with the detachment under his command, in the beginning of January 1779, croſſed the Narbuddah and encamped on the ſouthern banks of that river within the territory of Berar, where he was furniſhed with caſh, proviſions, and draft-cattle for his artillery, and where he waited to be informed of the final reſolution of Moodajee-Booſlah. He deputed Lieutenant Weatherſtone to Naigpore, in order to preſs the Rajah to conclude the propoſed treaty and immediately to enter on its execution. But that prince, influenced by the conſiderations above-mentioned, remained inflexible: for which reaſon, Colonel Goddard, finding all his attempts to draw the Rajah into an alliance ineffectual, advanced by quick marches towards Poonah. But, on receiving the letter above-mentioned from Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, he moved with his detachment from Brahampore on the 6th of February,

bruary, and, about the 20th of that month, 1779.
he arrived at Surat, without having met with any oppoſition, or ſo much as ever ſeeing an enemy. For the Marrattas had called in all their troops to oppoſe the army from Bombay, and the convention with Mr. Carnac at Worgaum, until it was diſavowed in Bombay, had lulled them into an opinion that they were now in the poſſeſſion of ſecure proſperity.

An extreme fluctuation in the councils of Bombay had induced Mr. Haſtings to conſider the cauſe of Roganaut-row as almoſt deſperate. That ſome chief ſhould be placed at the head of the Marratta regency, who ſhould conduct the government on the ground of alliance and friendſhip with the Engliſh, was a meaſure which the preſent juncture of affairs rendered highly expedient; but that a military force ſhould be ſent from Bengal to ſupport the government of Bombay, at all adventures, in oppoſition to the power and machinations of our enemies both in Europe and Aſia, ſeemed neceſſary to the preſervation of the

1779. Britiſh ſettlements in India. An embaſſy was therefore ſent to incline the Rajah of Berar to unite his forces with ours, and to become a candidate for the ſovereignty of the Marratta Empire. But, whether he ſhould accede to this propoſal, or chuſe to remain inactive, the Engliſh commander was ordered in general to march acroſs the peninſula of Hindoſtan, for the ſupport of our friends on its weſtern ſhores, in all events, againſt all their enemies. While the iſſue of the negociation entered into with the Mahah-Rajah was uncertain, to have intruſted the deſign in his favour to the Preſidency of Bombay, could not have produced any good effects, but might have been attended with bad ones. The perſonal friends of Ragobah would have been alarmed and diſguſted, and new occaſions of doubt and delay would have been preſented to men who had already ſhewn but too many ſymptons of irreſolution. If the Rajah of Berar ſhould graſp at the objects preſented to his ambition, there was nothing at Poonah to oppoſe plauſible and juſt pretenſions, ſupported by the united power of the Rajah and the Engliſh;

liſh: if he ſhould not, the efforts of the gentlemen of Bombay in favour of Ragobah, however deſultory they might be, ill timed, or unſucceſsful, would yet, in proportion to their extent, occaſion a diverſion of the Marratta forces, and faciliate the expedition under the command of Colonel Goddard. It is in this manner that ſuperiour acquire and maintain an aſcendency over inferior natures, and without even beſtowing their confidence which might be abuſed, convert them into inſtruments of their deſigns, merely by a ſagacious anticipation of the courſe of conduct they will be moſt likely to purſue in given ſituations.—The views of Mr. Haſtings, in this complicated affair were not more judicious and manly than fortunate. If the expedition from Bombay to Poonah tarniſhed, in ſome meaſure, the honour of the Britiſh name, the ſafe arrival of Colonel Goddard at Surat, ſerved to retrieve it. 1779.

The Governor-general, and Supreme Council, which the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote in Bengal on the 27th of March had

1779. made complete, at the firſt aſſembly of the Board, reſolved, if poſſible, to conclude a laſting peace with the Marrattas upon the ground of the Poorunder treaty in 1776.— The perſon who was judged the fitteſt miniſter on our part, in a negociation for this purpoſe, was Colonel Goddard, now raiſed to the rank as well as the command of a General. Having received inſtructions to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to effect a reconciliation, and communicated the powers with which he had been inveſted to the miniſters of Poonah, they deputed a vakeel to Surat with plenipotentiary powers for the negociation of peace. In the mean time, Ragobah, making his eſcape from the officers of Scindiah, who had charge of his perſon, and were conveying him to a place of confinement, fled to Surat, where he arrived before the vakeel from the Marrattas. General Goddard, at the ſame time that he informed the Marratta government of this unexpected event, agreed to afford this fugitive prince perſonal protection. The Marratta meſſenger returned from Surat to Poonah, and promiſed to ſend back a categorical

gorical anſwer to our propoſals within the ſpace of three weeks. This period being elapſed, the return of the vakeel to Surat made known the only terms on which the Marratta chiefs would conſent to conclude a peace, namely, "That the Engliſh ſhould "deliver the perſon of Roganaut-row into "the hands of their vakeel, and make "immediate reſtitution of the Iſland of "Salſette." 1779.

The negotiation for peace was now at an end: and General Goddard immediately prepared for the proſecution of war.

The ancient kingdom of Guzzarat is bounded on the north by the river Paddar, which divides it from the the dominions of Perſia. It extends from the ocean on the weſt, and where the land is indented by the Gulphs of Cambait and Scindy, eaſtward to the confines of Malva and Chandeiſh. It is watered by three large rivers which receive many tributary ſtreams, the Mahi, the Narbuddah and the Tapti. On the firſt of theſe, where it falls into the Sea, ſtands the city of Cambait,

1779. Cambait, on the ſecond Baroach, and on the third Surat: but the two laſt, at the diſtance of a few leagues from the ocean.—This fertile province, ſo admirably fitted for commerce, and eſpecially the town of Surat, has, from the earlieſt times, carried on a moſt advantageous as well as extenſive trade in cotton, indigo, wheat and other grain, and alſo various manufactures.

Guzzarat had been governed for ages by a ſucceſſion of native princes, when, in the reign of Acbar, it was reduced into the form of a province of the Mogul Empire. The Mahommedan capital of Guzzarat is Ammedabad, the work of Achmed and his ſucceſſors, who enlarged, beautified, and raiſed it to ſplendour out of the ruins of the antient Hindoo cities, Chappaneer and Narválla. In Ammedabad we ſee, at this day, the Moſque and tomb of Achmed its founder, built entirely of ſtone and marble, and of ſuch exquiſite workmanſhip as to remain uninjured by the hand of time, although it has ſtood for four centuries. Ammedabad is ſituated upon the eaſt bank of a ſtream, though

though ſmall, yet pleaſant, wholeſome, and 1779.
conſtant. The walls, which ſtill remain, are about ſix miles in circumference, and there is a very wide and deep ditch carried all around them. Beſides this ditch, new works have been ſince conſtructed, where the original defences, either from decay or ſituation, were judged inſufficient. There are twelve gateways, by which you paſs in and out of the city. Theſe gateways, and other parts of the walls, appear to have been adorned, at regular diſtances, with towers and cupolas, which in the days of its ſplendour muſt have equally contributed to ſtrength and magnificient appearance.—Within the city, and upon the banks of the river, which is called the Sabremetty Nuddy, there is an extenſive encloſure diſtinguiſhed by the name of the Budder, which was formerly the royal reſidence. This place has in former times been ſtrongly fortified: and its ſituation was ſuch as to command the principal Buzars or market places, courts of Juſtice, and the ſtreets including the palaces of the chief nobles. But at this day, ſo greatly has Ammedabad declined from its

1779. its original ſplendour, that not more than a quarter of the ſpace within the walls is inhabited. Without the walls, the ſuburbs, as is evident from infallible veſtiges, muſt have extended to the diſtance of three miles round. Such was the flouriſhing condition of the capital and whole province of Guzzarat under Mahommedan princes, ſo late as the reign of the great Aurengzebe, who, towards the end of the laſt century, extended his dominion over the whole peninſula of India within the Ganges.

The influence of climate and ſoil, with other phyſical cauſes, have a more ſteady and fixed influence on the characters of nations, than forms of government, laws, religion, or any thing that depends for its efficacy on a mere appeal to our moral nature. In two or three generations, it is obſerved, the progeny of the Tartarian and Perſian conquerors of the plains of Hindoſtan, are ſubdued by an enervating climate, and ſink down with the effeminate aborigines of the country into ſloth and ſenſuality. The vigour

vigour of Aurengzebe ſuſpended for a ſpace of thirty years, the fatal effects of luxury on the name and power of the Mahommedan conquerors of Hindoſtan. But the imbecillity of his ſucceſſors, conſpiracies and civil wars in the centre of the empire, and a total relaxation of government in all its remote and extended provinces, univerſally encouraged the ſubordinate and tributary princes to aſſert their independence on the Emperor; nor was the Soubah of Guzzarat found more loyally attached to the Sovereign Lord of India within the Ganges than the other chiefs, who in the time of Aurengzebe had exerciſed only delegated power. 1779.

The ſtrength of the Mogul Empire being broken by diſmemberment and ſeparation, and habits of indolence having taken place of that vigour of character which had eſtabliſhed the power and domination of different Mahommedan leaders, the Marrattas, under the conduct of Rajah Sahoo-row, iſſuing from the mountains of the Deccan, and ſpreading ſlaughter and deſolation wherever they directed their deſtructive ſteps, revenged on the

1779. the effeminate ſons the calamities inflicted by their warlike fathers. Some, unable to ſtem the torrent, abandoned all to its reſiſtleſs fury. Others ſought to purchaſe preſent relief, and a precarious reſpite from utter ruin, by pecuniary tribute and territorial conceſſion. In the province of Guzzarat, which fell at this time under the power of the Marrattas, we find, accordingly, ſome veſtiges of the Mahommedan dominion at Surat and Cambait. Theſe places are ſtill under the government of Mahommedan princes, who ſtyle themſelves Nawabs; but their authority is confined within the walls of the cities, and even the ſcanty revenue of this limited domain, they are obliged to ſhare liberally with the Marrattas. The loſs of the capital Ammedabad, which, after a vigorous reſiſtance was betrayed into the hands of the Marrattas, was followed by an inſtant and complete diſſolution of the Mogul authority.

The deſcendants of the Nawab Cummaul-ul-dien, the family which was then diſpoſſeſſed of the government, now reſide in obſcurity,

obſcurity, upon a ſmall eſtate allowed them 1779.
in the neighourhood of Pattan, under the protection and vigilant jealouſy of Futty Sing, repreſentative of the family of Guicowar, to whom the greater part of Guzzarat was tranſmitted by hereditary ſucceſſion from Pillajee their original founder. This chief, the grandfather of Futty Sing Guicowar, the preſent reigning Prince, was eminently diſtinguiſhed by his political as well as by his military talents. His important ſervices in the field to Sahoo-row, Rajah of Setterah, were rewarded with the rich and extenſive kingdom of Guzzarat, the greateſt part of which he had himſelf conquered from the Mahommedan princes who at that time governed it in the name of the Mogul Emperors or Kings of Delhi. But after the death of Pillajee, his ſon and ſucceſſor Damajee, having repaired, for the purpoſe of accommodating certain differences with the Marratta government, to Poonah, was treacherouſly confined, compelled to make a partition of his province with the reigning Paiſhwa, and to enter into ſuch other engagements as that Prince choſe

1779. choſe to preſcribe, before he could obtain his freedom.

General Goddard, who was happily entruſted with the whole conduct of the war, in the formation of plans as well as in their execution, reſolved to commence the campaign by the ſettlement of ſuch an order of affairs in Guzzarat, as ſhould ſecure on our ſide its importance to the general iſſue of the conteſt. Such an arrangement it was particularly neceſſary to make, previouſly to the approach of the Marratta forces, leſt their preſence ſhould intimidate and draw over to the ſide of the Paiſhwa, the Prince Futty Sing Row Guicowar, whoſe inclination at the beſt could only be ſuppoſed to be wavering between the two parties, in the cauſe of one or other of which he muſt, of neceſſity, be involved. This object was to be accompliſhed only by one or other of the following modes: Either to make an union of intereſts with Futty Sing, or to reduce him under our power by the force of arms. To have adopted the laſt

of

of thoſe meaſures would have combined 1779.
the prince in a common cauſe with the Marratta government, and their united ſtrength, preſenting full ſcope to all our exertions, would have ſo confined our operations, and exhauſted our reſources, as to render all hopes of any acquiſition of revenue, or other public advantages, abortive. No preſent proviſion could have been made for the future proſecution of the war: the Province of Guzzarat muſt have been laid waſte and deſtroyed; or, if we ſhould have been able to protect any part of it from utter deſolation, it muſt have been expoſed to the conſtant inroads of a predatory enemy. On the eve of engaging in a war with the moſt powerful ſtate in Hindoſtan, unſupported by any friend or ally, and uncertain of the real deſigns of thoſe powers that then profeſſed themſelves neutral, to conciliate and attach to our cauſe ſo powerful a chief as Futty Sing, was an object of the firſt importance, and abſolutely neceſſary for enabling us to commence hoſtilities with any probable proſpect of ſucceſs.

1779. The General, influenced and actuated by theſe views, determined, if poſſible, to adjuſt the ſettlement of Guzzarat with Futty Sing in an amicable manner, although certain unpromiſing circumſtances naturally excited in his mind an apprehenſion that but little confidence was to be placed in any promiſes or declarations that the Rajah, in the preſent juncture, might be induced to make, however friendly and ſpecious in appearance. That Prince was repreſented, by ſome individuals at Bombay, as a character naturally inſincere and perfidious: and he, on his part, had but too juſt cauſe of retorting the charge of perfidy on the Engliſh. In the year 1775, when the forces from Bombay were in the field in ſupport of the pretenſions of Roganautrow, the Rajah, after a long negociation, carried on through the mediation of the Engliſh commander, and under the faith of the Company, was prevailed upon to riſque an interview, when he was forcibly made priſoner by Ragobah, compelled to agree to the payment of a large ſum of money, and not ſuffered to return to his capital

capital until he had ſent for his daugh- 1779.
ter, a child of ſix or ſeven years of age, and delivered her up as a ſecurity for the performance of his engagement. The fear of meeting with a treatment ſimilar to what he had before experienced, might well excite a doubt on the part of Futty Sing of our proffered friendſhip. Theſe conſiderations, joined to that dread which the Rajah muſt naturally be ſuppoſed to entertain of the power and vengeance of the Marrattas, preſented ſuch difficulties as would have diverted a ſpirit leſs vigorous and ardent than General Goddard, from the purſuit of his object. To this, however, the General continued to bend all his efforts with an addreſs, as well as an aſſiduous zeal, which fully proved the diſintereſted views which governed his conduct,

The excluſive conqueſt of Guzzarat, and the ruin of Futty Sing, were tempting objects to private rapacity and ambition: General Goddard preferred to both, the ſatisfaction of procuring a ſolid and per-

1779. manent advantage to the patriotic. The General, to patriotic virtue, added great political addreſs as well as military ſkill and proweſs. Senſible of the good effects which the rapid movements and approach of the army would produce on the counſels of Futty Sing, he carried on the negociation with that prince, without interrupting the progreſs of the march. Vakeels conſtantly paſſed between the Engliſh army and Barodah, the capital of Futty Sing, a city recently founded upon the banks of the Biſwamuntry Nuddy, and ſituated betwixt the Mahi and the Narbuddah, about twelve miles ſouth of the former. The Rajah was at length gained over to our views, and agreed to an alliance with the Company on the terms propoſed to him. It was ſtipulated, that Futty Sing ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of a country to be conquered from the Marrattas, northward of the river Mahi, in exchange for an equal portion of lands to the ſouthward: an arrangement by which the territories of the Rajah, as well as our own, would be rendered compact, and united in one regular chain

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chain of contiguous tracts of land, towns, and garriſons. This treaty was finally concluded on the 26th of January 1780; at a village called Condeala, about four miles from Barodah, and half way between that capital and our encampment. By this compact the peace of Guzzarat was ſecured on the moſt ſolid foundations; an immediate reſource of revenue was provided, and leiſure was afforded to turn our arms to new and more neceſſary, though, perhaps, to leſs beneficial conqueſts. The General, then, who had been ſtrengthened by a ſmall detachment of troops from Bombay, and taken the field in December 1779, having in his route to Guzzarat concluded a treaty with Futty Sing-row Guicowar, by which that extenſive province was equally divided between him and the Eaſt India Company, in conformity to his engagements to put that prince in poſſeſſion of the Marratta territories to the north of the Mahi, marched from the neighbourhood of Barodah, and advanced towards Ammedabad, the capital of that part of Guzzarat which was in the poſ- 1780.

1780. ſeſſion of the Marrattas. This place, which was garriſoned by ſix thouſand Arab and Sindia foot, and two thouſand horſe, was carried by a ſtorm after a gallant and deſperate reſiſtance, in the morning of the 15th day of February. Four hundred of the beſieged were killed in the aſſault. The greateſt part of theſe loſt their lives in the ditch and one of the gateways. The preſſure and confuſion of the diſtracted multitude ſhut the gate againſt themſelves, and drove them in heaps upon one another. In that helpleſs ſituation, their amunition being blown up in their cartouche boxes, all of them periſhed. No act of mercy which diſciplined humanity could extend to the unarmed and unreſiſting was omitted. The priſoners, among whom were ſome Arab officers, were treated with the utmoſt clemency and indulgence. The wounded were received into our hoſpitals, uſed with all poſſible tenderneſs and care, and, afterwards in due time releaſed. The ſound policy, as well as humanity of this indulgence to the conquered in war, was exemplified, ſoon after this, by the active gratitude of an Arabian Jemmadar

madar in the ſervice of the Marrattas. An officer of the Bombay eſtabliſhment, belonging to a ſmall party of Sepoys employed in the Concan, having fallen into the hands of the enemy, was ſet at liberty through the interceſſion of this Arab, who declared that he had no other motive of mediation than a grateful ſenſe of the humane treatment his countrymen had met with from the Engliſh commander at the ſiege of Ammedabad. 1780.

On the 26th of February, Ammedabad, with its dependencies, was formally tranſferred to Futty Sing. That this place might appear as important an acquiſition in the eyes of the Rajah as poſſible, every precaution was uſed to prevent a general pillage; although the valour, and indeed the diſciplined moderation of our men, was rewarded by a prize that fell into their hands without the knowledge of the General. But indeed the greateſt part of the property belonging to the inhabitants had been conveyed to places of ſecurity previouſly to the ſiege: and almoſt the whole of what remain-

1780. ed was the property of people connected with the new ſovereign.

The General, leaving a garriſon for the ſupport of Futty Sing, advanced on the 2d of March to meet the forces of the Marrattas, aſſembled to the number of forty thouſand, for the moſt part horſemen, who, being ignorant of what had happened, were on their march to the relief of Ammedabad under the conduct of Scindiah and Holkar. The Engliſh army croſſed the Mahi on the 6th of March, and on the 8th encamped on the Biſwamuntry Neddy, about two miles from Barodah. The Marrattas, who had deſcended from the Gauts and were advancing to that capital, moved off to the eaſtward, about fourteen miles from this place, and nearly the ſame diſtance from Powan-Ghurr, a very ſtrong fortreſs belonging to the Maha Rajah Scindiah, the moſt powerful of the Marratta chiefs, ſituated upon a lofty and almoſt inacceſſible mountain, which ſeparates the province of Guzzarat from that of Malva. While the oppoſite armies were encamped at theſe different

ferent ſtations, Meſſrs. Farmer and Stewart, 1780.
who had been left with Madajee Sciandiah, as hoſtages for the faithful performance of the convention of Worgaum, arrived on the 9th of March in our camp with letters from that chief and Holkar, containing general expreſſions of their friendly ſentiments, and of their inclination to live on terms of amity with the Engliſh. As a proof of the ſincerity of their profeſſions they had liberated the Engliſh hoſtages, and conjoined thoſe gentlemen in a commiſſion with Abajee Shabajee, to make ſuch a repreſentation of affairs to General Goddard as might prepare the way for the re-eſtabliſhment of peace. The General, on his part, endeavoured by every aſſurance and argument in his power, to impreſs the mind of Scindiah with a juſt conviction of the ſincere deſire of the Engliſh for peace, repreſenting at the ſame time the ſentiments of particular and perſonal regard which his nation entertained for Scindiah himſelf, of which they were ready to give him the ſtrongeſt and moſt convincing teſtimonies. He ſuggeſted ſome conditions of mutual advantage,

on

1780. on which the Engliſh were deſirous of uniting with that chief in ſettling the adminiſtration of the Marratta empire on a baſis that ſhould be ſolid and permanent. But ſhould his attempts to eſtabliſh an union between his nation and Scindiah, which ſeemed to him not more deſirable to both parties than natural and eaſy, prove abortive, he alſo expreſſed an inclination to enter into alliance with the preſent government upon ſuch terms as the Engliſh had a right to expect, and to which they were ready to accede.

While the General indulged the hopes that naturally aroſe out of theſe friendly and promiſing appearances, Abajee Shabajee returned with propoſals from his maſter, more humiliating to the Engliſh than thoſe that had been made before by the miniſter himſelf Nana-Furneze. He required not only that Ragobah's perſon ſhould be delivered into his hands but alſo that of Badje-row his adopted ſon. Ragobah was to reſide at Jancy, on the allowance which Scindiah had before ſettled for his ſubſiſtance, in a private ſtation. The adminiſtration was in future to be conducted by Scindiah in the name of Badje-row, who

was

was to be veſted with the dignity of Dewan 1780.
to Madah-row the Paiſhwa an infant. There was not, in return for theſe conceſſions, any mention made of the ſmalleſt advantage to the Engliſh. On the contrary, the intentions of Scindiah were, that we ſhould adhere to the convention of Worgaum.

Terms that were judged diſhonourable previouſly to the campaign, in the midſt of our preſent ſucceſſes would have been juſtly deemed diſgraceful. Pacific meaſures were of courſe interrupted, and military operations renewed. Theſe, on the part of the Marratta chief, conſiſted in endeavours to avoid, and on that of the Engliſh in exertions to bring on an engagement. General Goddard, having twice advanced with the whole army, and encamped on the ground from which the enemy had precipitately retreated, on the 2d of April, left his main army in camp, and, at the head of two hundred European infantry, ten companies of grenadier Sepoys, three battalions of Sepoys, two twelve and ten ſix-pounder pieces of artillery, and the firſt regiment of cavalry,

with

1780. with the Candahar horſe, amounting together to about ſeven or eight hundred, formed and atttempted a plan to ſtorm the Marratta camp. With this ſmall force he advanced with great rapidity, yet in good order, and having paſſed their principal guard, which conſiſted of ſix thouſand men, he immediately fell on their main army, drawn up to receive him in order of battle. The effect of our artillery amongſt their numerous cavalry was prodigious. Within an hour after the commencement of the action they retreated with conſiderable loſs: and ſo completely were they routed, and ſo great the conſternation that had ſeized them, that not a ſingle horſeman appeared to moleſt our little detachment in their return to the camp.

The ſucceſs of this party, ſo greatly inferiour in numbers to the troops that retreated before the Marratta army the preceeding year, proved how much diſcipline and mutual confidence excel the deſultory and ill directed force of the moſt numerous battallions of untrained barbarians, and how much the

ASIATIC

the fate of armies and nations ſometimes 1780.
depends on a ſingle mind. The calm and well-directed courage of General Goddard was diffuſed throughout the whole of the officers and ſoldiers under his command, and every action of this campaign was glorious to the Britiſh arms. It is impoſſible, without ſwelling theſe memoirs beyond the limits propoſed, to do juſtice to the gallantry of every individual who ſignalized his valour in this expedition. Many and various are the brave actions that might be recorded, but a ſelection is neceſſarily to be made of ſuch as are not only meritorous in reſpect of the ſpirit from which they flowed, but important in the effects which they produced. Captain John Campbell, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, who had been detached with a foraging party to a conſiderable diſtance from our camp, on his return with a large convoy of proviſions, was attacked by Madajee Scindiah, at the head of twenty thouſand men, the flower of the Marratta army. This officer immediately drew up his ſmall force, which conſiſted of two battallions of Sepoys, and four field pieces, in the

1780. the beſt form that the time, the place, and diſpoſition of the enemy would admit. The Marrattas were repulſed with the loſs of near ſix hundred men, a great part of whom were killed by the fire of the companies which flanked our line. Captain Campbell, after this remarkable action, joined General Goddard, with his convoy perfectly entire, and without the loſs of a ſingle man.

Lieutenant Welſh, of the Bengal eſtabliſhment, at the head of the firſt regiment of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, was detached, on the 3d of May, to ſurprize a body of Marrattas ſix thouſand ſtrong.—The Lieutenant, when he had performed half his march, found, by calculating the time, that if he waited for the arrival of his infantry, he would not be able to reach the enemies camp before break of day. He therefore adopted the ſpirited reſolution of advancing with the cavalry only. With this force he entered the Marratta camp, ſeized the enemies cannon, which he turned upon them in their flight, and put them to a complete

complete and general route. In this encounter the commanding officer and a great number of the Marrattas were ſlain. The conquerors became maſters of the flying army's artillery, ammunition, and proviſions. The victory was deciſive; and the reduction of two forts by the ſame party, ſoon after, with the defeat of ſeven thouſand Marrattas by Major Forbes at the head of two battalions of Sepoys, completed the conqueſt of Guzzarat. The two armies continued on the confines of Guzzarat and Malva until the month of May, when they ſeparated, on account of the approaching monſoon. The Marrattas marched off to Ugein, the capital of the territories of Scindiah, ſituated in the high lands of Malva on the river Zepra, which falls, about two leagues from Mandoo, into the Narbuddah. The Engliſh army returned to Surat, where they arrived in the beginning of June. Thus terminated the firſt campaign of what has been called the ſecond Marratta war, in which General Goddard, having ſucceeded in every attempt, reduced under the power of the Eaſt India Company a territory 1780.

1780. territory yielding an annual revenue of thirty lacks of rupees.

The brilliant ſucceſſes of this campaign diſplayed, in the moſt ſtricking manner, the ſuperiority of our arms over thoſe of our enemies in the eaſt, and effectually effaced the ſtain they had contracted from the late diſaſter at Worgaum. Theſe, indeed, were the only advantages that could poſſibly be gained over an enemy that would not hazard an engagement, and who, there is reaſon to believe, had nothing more in view than to draw our force from the defence of our new conqueſts, and to exhauſt our ſtrength in an unprofitable purſuit of the Marratta army in the hilly regions of Malva. This ſyſtem of military operations, an inſtance of that prudence and ſagacity which, in the affairs of both war and peace, mark the character of Madajee Scindiah among the Marratta chiefs and the other princes of India, and which, expanded and directed according to circumſtances, is one day to ſubvert the domination of Europeans in Aſia, would not only have laid open our late

late acquiſitions in Guzzarat to hoſtile inva- 1780.
ſion, but even endangered the ſafety of the preſidency of Bombay itſelf, which, at this time, was threatened with an attack from France. And, even on a ſuppoſition that our arms had penetrated to the very centre of Malva, and reduced under our power Scindiah's capital, Ugein, they could not have obtained any advantage that might compenſate the riſque incurred by ſo bold an attempt, nor have produced any event that might decide the general iſſue of the war.

The defence of Guzzarat was committed to a detachment of our own troops, and a proportionable number of cavalry to be furniſhed by our ally Futty-Sing. The rainy ſeaſon being over, hoſtilities with the Marrattas were renewed. And the reduction of the iſland and fort of Baſſeen, with that of Tarrapore, Danow, and other places of ſtrength, ſituated on the ſhores of the Concan, ſecured to the Engliſh, at the cloſe of 1780, an extent of ſea-coaſt from Cambait to the mouth of the river Pen, which diſ-

1780. charges itſelf into the harbour of Bombay, a ſpace upwards of three hundred miles.

The ſpirited exertions of General Goddard, were, in the mean time, ſeconded with alacrity and with vigour, by the Governor-general of Bengal, who, finding it impracticable to reconcile the Marrattas, on proper terms, to peace, continued to purſue their humiliation by policy and by arms. The principal revenues of the Marrattas ariſe from the annual tribute paid by the Rajahs of Oudepore, Joudpore, Zeynagur, Bopaul, Narva, Bundlecund, and other Hindoo princes interſperſed through the province of Ajmeer, and to the northward of Malva. Theſe chiefs, who embrace every opportunity of evading their payments, had now a favourable opportunity of aſſerting their independence. And, accordingly, the Governor-general endeavoured to unite them, under the auſpices of England, into a combination againſt their oppreſſors. This plan, which was founded on common ſenſe, and ſeemed the more ſolid that it had nothing in it complicated or refined,

refined, nevertheleſs failed of ſucceſs. Had 1780.
this failure been confined to one or two of theſe chiefs, the diſappointment of the Governor-general's hopes might be aſcribed to ſome of thoſe ſecret motives which influence the minds and hearts of men, and which are not ſo much objects of concluſive reaſoning, as of ſpeculation and conjecture. The extent of the effect prompts an inquiry into an adequate cauſe.

Unity and conſiſtency, in almoſt any ſyſtem of operation, whether military or political, are preferable to the moſt artful ſtratagems and profound views, now adopted and now abandoned. On this ground it will readily be admitted, that in the fluctuation of the Britiſh councils, in the ſeparate views of our different preſidencies in India, in the diſcordant intereſts and paſſions of the individuals of which theſe were compoſed, and that want of due ſubordination and ſyſtem which might be expected in a political corporation ſo new in its origin as the Eaſt-India Company, and formed into its preſent complexion and appearance by ſo

1780. many ſingular accidents and wonderful events; the man to whoſe lot it fell to take the lead in the conduct of affairs in Aſia, while his nation was engaged in a general and complicated war, had to contend with difficulties of unuſual magnitude. The meaſures of the Governor-general were embarraſſed by the miniſtry at home, and by his colleagues in office abroad. Exaggerated reports of our diſtreſſes in America and Europe, diſſenſions in our councils in Aſia, which loſt the ſeaſon of action by official conteſts, and an opinion, induſtriouſly ſpread over all India *, of the inſtability of the Britiſh adminiſtration in the eaſt, while they prepared a train for every ſpark of ambition and diſcontent, had a direct tendency to damp every attempt to ſecure the public intereſt, by alliances as well as

* Ever ſince the eſtabliſhment of the Supreme Council in 1774, at Calcutta, the native princes of India pay the utmoſt attention to the political changes in great Britain, ſo far as theſe may be ſuppoſed to affect the politics of that country: and their Vakeels at the different Preſidencies have orders to ſend them all the news, from time to time, on that ſubject.

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by arms. It is in theſe circumſtances that 1780.
we are to ſearch for a ſolution of the problem here ſtated. Under an immediate expectation of a change of men and meaſures in our counſels, and of fortune in our affairs, the Rajahs dependent on the Marrattas declined the opportunity which was ſo well fitted to operate on a ſenſe of injury, as well as on ambition: and the military and political operations of our countrymen, in this part of the country, were confined to an alliance with the Ranah of Gohud, and the recovery of his territories from the domination of the Marrattas.

The firſt of theſe objects being eaſily effected, Major Popham, in order to accompliſh the laſt, was ſent to the aſſiſtance of the Ranah at the head of two thouſand Sepoys, forty European artillery, a body of one hundred and twenty horſe, and four field-pieces. With this ſmall force, the Major, in the ſpace of a few months, drove the enemy, to the number of fifteen thouſand, out of the Ranah's country, purſued this advantage, and compleated, by the reduction

1780. duction of ſeveral forts, the conqueſt of one of their provinces, producing an annual revenue of ſix lacks of rupees. Nor was this the only, or the chief ſervice, performed on this occaſion, by this enterpriſing and brave officer.

The fortreſs of Gualior, in the dominions of Gohud, had been for ages deemed impregnable, and here, as in a ſecure and inacceſſible aſylum, the Mahommedan conquerors of Hindoſtan, in the days of their magnificence and power, had confined, as priſoners of ſtate, the vanquiſhed rivals of their greatneſs. In a country where the authority of Great Britain depends upon the opinion entertained by the natives, not only of the ſuperior genius of our countrymen for war, but alſo of their good fortune, the conqueſt of Gualior, it was evident, would be equal to the moſt deciſive victory in the field. This place, which was ſo ſtrong both by nature and by art, could not be taken but by regular approaches: but the profound ſecurity derived from this circumſtance, might expoſe the garriſon to ſurprize.

prize. It was thus that Gibraltar fell into 1780.
the hands of our nation; and thus, too, it is poſſible to be taken out of them. Never was there a conjuncture in which the reduction of ſuch a fortreſs as Gualior could be of more advantage to the conquerors, nor any in which a fitter inſtrument was preſented to a mind that could make a diſtinction between difficulties and impoſſibilities, of attempting it.

Major Popham, after his detachment had gone into cantonements on account of the rain, in compliance with the repeated ſolicitations of Mr. Haſtings, prepared for an attack on Gualior with equal judgement and ſecrecy; two perſons only being privy to his deſign. Having received ſome important information from a ſmall party who found means to enter the place, one by one, at different times, by night, he wrote to the Governor-general, informing him that the attack was to be made early the next morning, and expreſſing his hopes that, in caſe of failure, Mr. Haſtings would do him the juſtice to declare, that it was

1780. at his deſire he had undertaken an enterpriſe, which, if it ſhould miſcarry, would be denominated raſh and impracticable; but which, if it ſhould be crowned with ſucceſs, would redound as much to the honour of the Governor-general, by whoſe advice it was undertaken, as of thoſe by whom it was carried into execution. Gualior was taken by ſurpriſe on the 4th of Auguſt, 1780, with the inconſiderable loſs of twenty Sepoys wounded. The Britiſh colours planted on the walls of this fortreſs, ſignalized the prudence and the ſpirit of Major Popham, and rendered the Engliſh name an object of reſpect and of dread throughout Hindoſtan. The whole country adjoining to Gualior was immediately evacuated by the Marrattas. Had a detachment been formed in Gohud, previouſly to the reduction of this fortreſs, as General Goddard had repeatedly adviſed, and Mr. Haſtings had propoſed in the Supreme Council, a diverſion of the troops under Scindiah from Guzzarat might have been effected by an invaſion of the province of Malva; and the chiefs with whom we contended, reduced to

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the neceſſity of accepting terms of accom- 1780.
modation. But, this opportunity of humbling the Marrattas being loſt, their hoſtility to our countrymen was confirmed by the ſucceſſes of Hyder-Ally's arms in the Carnatic; and the exertions of Mr. Haſtings were called from ſucceſſes which he had not been permitted to improve, to the reparation of misfortunes which he had not occaſioned.

Hyder-Ally-Cawn was regent of the kingdom of Myſore, a dignity to which he had raiſed himſelf by abilities and by crimes: by valour and policy in arms, by intrigue, by treachery, and by blood. He was the ſon of a Mahommedan ſoldier of fortune, who commanded a fort on the confines of Myſore, and followed, of courſe, the profeſſion of arms. When he firſt entered into the Rajah of Myſore's ſervice he was diſtinguiſhed by the name of *Hyder Naig*, or *Corporal Hyder*. He roſe by degrees to the command of the Rajah's army; and, on the death of that Prince, he ſeized the reins of government, under the title of Guardian

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1780. to the young prince, whom he confined in Seringapatam, together with the whole royal family; exhibiting them only at certain ſtated ſeaſons, in order to ſoothe and pleaſe the people. He poſſeſſed great vigour of body and mind: but his manners were ſavage and cruel; and he frequently inflamed the natural ferocity of his temper by intoxication. Like many other chiefs in India, with whom it is not accounted any diſgrace to be ignorant of letters, he could not either read or write; ſo that he was obliged to make uſe of interpreters and ſecretaries. The method he contrvied for aſcertaining whether his interpreters made faithful reports of the letters they read, and if his ſecretaries expreſſed in writing the full and the preciſe meaning of what he communicated, diſplays, at once, that ſuſpicion which was natural to his ſituation, and that ſubtlety which belonged to his nature. He confined three different interpreters in ſeparate apartments, who made their reſpective reports in their turns. If all the three ſhould make different reports, then he would puniſh them by a cruel death. If

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two ſhould coincide in their report, and 1780
one differ from theſe two, then that one would ſuffer death. But the interpreters, knowing their fate if they ſhould depart in one ſingle inſtance from the truth, explained, as might be expected, the letters committed to their inſpection with the utmoſt fidelity. As to the method by which he diſcovered whether his amanuenſes were faithful or no, he placed three of them, in like manner, in three ſeparate places of confinement, and to each of them apart he dictated his orders. Their manuſcripts he put into the hands of any of thoſe that were about him who could read, from whom he learned whether his clerks had faithfully expreſſed his meaning. When he paſſed ſentence of death, he was on ſome occaſions, like the Dey of Algiers and other barbarian deſpots, himſelf the executioner: for though he affected to conſider his army as his guards, he well knew that he reigned in their hearts not from love, but fear, mixed indeed with an admiration of his ſingular addreſs and intrepidity. The force of this man's mind, ſuch is the advantage of

1780. nature over art! burſt through the prejudices of education and the reſtraints of habit, and extended his views to whatever European improvements he deemed the moſt fitted to ſecure his government, to extend his empire, and to render his name immortal. He invited and encouraged every uſeful and ingenious manufacturer and artiſan to ſettle in his dominions, he introduced the European diſcipline in his army, and laboured, not altogether without ſucceſs, for the formation of dock-yards, and the eſtabliſhment of a navy.

At the ſame time that he was ſublime in his views, he was capable of all that minute attention which was neceſſary for their accompliſhment. His ends were great; his means prudent. A regular œconomy ſupplied a ſource of liberality, which he never failed to exerciſe, whenever an object, which he could render in any ſhape ſubſervient to his ambition, ſolicited his bounty. He rewarded merit of every kind, but he was particularly munificent to all who could bring important intelligence. He had his

eyes

eyes open on the movements of his neighbours, as well as on every part, and almoſt on every perſon within his dominions.—Hence he knew where to anticipate hoſtile deſigns, and where to take advantages; where to impoſe contributions without drying up the ſprings of induſtry; and where to find the moſt proper inſtruments for his purpoſes, whether of policy or war. He inſpected, in perſon, every horſeman or Sepoy that offered himſelf to his ſervice: but with every officer of any note, he was intimately acquainted. He made a regular diſtribution of his time: and, although he ſacrificed to the pleaſures of life, as well as to the pomp of ſtate, in buſineſs he was equally deciſive and perſevering. 1780.

With regard to the perſon of Hyder-Ally, for every circumſtance relating to ſo diſtinguiſhed a character becomes intereſting, he was of a middling ſtature, inclining to corpulency, his viſage quite black, the traits of his countenance manly, bold, and expreſſive: and, as he looked himſelf with a keen and piercing eye into every human face

1780. face that approached him, ſo he judged of men very much from their phyſiognomy, connecting in his imagination a baſhful, timid, and wandering eye, with internal conſciouſneſs of guilty actions, or pravity of intention; but a bold and undaunted look, on the other hand, with conſcious innocence and integrity.

With ſuch qualities, and by ſuch arts as theſe, Hyder-Ally-Cawn raiſed a ſmall ſtate into a powerful empire; and converted into a race of warriors, an obſcure, peaceable, and timid people. By alluring to his ſtandard military adventurers, of all nations and tribes, but chiefly Europeans, whenever it was in his power, and by training through their means his Myſorean ſubjects to the uſe of arms, he extended his dominions, which were bounded on the eaſt and the ſouth by the Carnatic, and the plains of Combitore, and on the weſt and north, by the Malabar regions, and the country of Ghutta and Bednore, acroſs the peninſula to the territories of Palnaud and Ganjam,

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on the coaſt of Coromandel, and, on the Malabar ſea, as far north as Goa. 1780.

The population of Hyder's dominions has not been calculated on any principles, by which it could be aſcertained with any tolerable preciſion. It is computed, that he could raiſe an army of three hundred thouſand men, and that his annual revenue was not leſs than five millions of Britiſh pounds. Emboldened by internal proſperity, as well as continued ſucceſſes in the field, Hyder ventured to encounter not only the Marrattas, but the Engliſh. His wars with whom, though not ſo productive of advantage and triumph as his conteſts with other Indian powers of inferior conſequence, yet improved him in the art of war, and nouriſhed in his breaſt a paſſion for conqueſt.

The court of France very naturally conſidering the year 1778 as a fit criſis for recovering their influence, and extending their commerce in India, diſpatched M. St. Lubin, as has been already mentioned, on an embaſſy to Hyder-Ally, with an offer of the

1780. the alliance of the French nation, and their co-operation with him againſt the Engliſh. This St. Lubin was a perſon without any viſible fortune, who, by a long unſettled reſidence in India, had acquired an uncommon knowledge of the cuſtoms, manners, policy, trade, languages, ſituations, and diſpoſitions of the ſeveral powers of that country, both native and European. From the ſtation of a private ſoldier in the iſland of Mauritius, by genius, activity, addreſs, fluency of ſpeech, and a neceſſary ſhare of aſſurance, he roſe to the confidence and favour of the French miniſter, M. de Sartine, through whoſe influence he was dignified with a military order, and inveſted with the ſole direction of two large trading ſhips on the coaſt of Malabar: a ſtation which afforded a plauſible pretext for intercourſe with Hyder; the oſtenſible object of which was commerce.

The Chevalier carried out ſome merchandize with him, as well to ſerve for a blind, as to ſupply immediate neceſſaries.—But the bulk of his lading conſiſted in arms

arms and ammunition of all kinds, proper both for the field and fortifications. In one of his veſſels, named the Sartine, of eight hundred tons, mounting thirty guns, and which was more elegant, and had more accommodations than any ſhip, perhaps, that was ever built, the Chevalier St. Lubin frequently entertained Hyder-Ally, ſome of the principal Marratta Chiefs, and certain Malabar Princes, in ſtate; exhibiting, on thoſe occaſions, the colours of the Marrattas, and other powerful nations in India, provided for this purpoſe in the city of Bourdeaux. 1780.

The maſters of the ſhips under the direction of St. Lubin had orders to pay implicit obedience to all his commands.—And ſo much was this adventurer in the good graces of Hyder, that this prince ſometimes diſplayed the French flag, in return to the compliment of St. Lubin, on the walls of Mangalore, his principal fortreſs. Hyder, influenced by the repreſentations, and encouraged by the hopes of military ſuccours from the French, was not unwilling to avail

1780. himſelf of the ſcattered ſtate of the Company's troops, the reduction of the Nabob of Arcot's army, and the impoveriſhed ſtate of his finances and country, in order to gratify his inveterate reſentment againſt the nabob, revenge former hoſtilities and infractions of treaties, and recent injuries as well as acts of contempt on the part of the Preſidency of Madras *. But ſtill there was room for heſitation.

The Engliſh government in India, inſtead of ſhrinking from the dangers of war, had attacked the French among their other enemies in that quarter, even before hoſtilities, though announced, had actually commenced in Europe. Chandernagore had yielded to the Engliſh arms in Bengal; and Mahee on the coaſt of Malabar; Pondicherry, notwithſtanding the exertions

* In addition to the ſeizure of the Guntoor Circar, already mentioned, and the detaching of a force towards Adoni, the capital of Bajalet Jung, for the defence of that chief againſt the reſentment of his brother, the Nizam, and Hyder-Ally, that force was directed to march through a territory belonging to Hyder, although by a ſmall circuit his country might have been entirely avoided.

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of Mr. Bellecombe in the Carnatic. The ſhips of the French were ſeized, and their fleet, under Monſieur de Tronjolly, put to flight by the Britiſh ſquadron commanded by Sir Edward Vernon *. The diſgrace at Worgaum 1780.

* On the 8th of Auguſt, 1778, the Madras army, under General Munro, encamped on the red hills, a league diſtant from the back of Pondicherry. On the morning of the 9th General Munro ſummoned General Bellecombe to ſurrender the town and fortreſs of Pondicherry to the troops which he commanded. Upon this, Monſieur Bellecombe immediately ſent orders to Monſ. Tronjolly to weigh, and attack the Britiſh ſquadron, an order which was forthwith obeyed with great alacrity. The Engliſh ſquadron, conſiſting of five ſail, including the Cormorant Sloop of War, appeared working up from the northward: that of the French, conſiſting of an equal number of ſhips, but larger, having a ſuperiority of thirty-ſix guns, and ſeven hundred men, ſtood to the ſouthward in order to preſerve the weather-gage, and anchored at the diſtance of two leagues from the ſhore. An action commenced on the 10th, which was continued, with great heat, for ſeventy-four minutes. Three of the French ſquadron, hawling their wind, ran to the ſouthward, full fifteen minutes before the action ceaſed between the capital ſhips. After the whole French ſquadron had, with all their ſails ſet, quitted the field, Sir Edward Vernon's ſquadron remained fifteen minutes on the ſpot where they had engaged, as if deliberating whether to purſue the enemy, or bear away in order to refit. They choſe the latter alternative, having firſt ſpliced their cordage and

1780. Worgaum had been effaced by ſubſequent ſucceſſes, and the Engliſh name was yet an object of dread to moſt nations in India.

In ſuch circumſtances as theſe, Hyder Ally, whoſe characteriſtical caution, it may reaſonably be preſumed, was not diminiſhed

mended their ſails. In this action there happened a very remarkable incident: one broadſide from the Rippon, pierced the hull of the Briſſon in thirteen places with heavy metal.

It is a commonly received opinion, that the Engliſh mode of firing at the hull is the beſt principle of conducting a naval engagement. It is in order that this opinion may be examined without prejudice, by our naval officers, that this intelligence reſpecting the engagement between Vernon and Tronjolly, and particularly what follows, is inſerted. The French ſquadron, flying to the windward, carried every ſail and rope with which they entered into action The Engliſh kept the ſea as victors, but ſo mauled in their ſails and rigging, that for a conſiderable time, they were unable to purſue, or even to ſail before the wind. Had only the quarter-deck, and ſome of the upper guns been levelled againſt the rigging of the enemy's ſhips in the action, they could not have eſcaped. This intelligence was communicated, and obſervation made, by an Engliſh gentleman who happened to be a paſſenger on board the Briſſon, a French ſhip bound from Point L'Orient to Pondicherry, which had caſt anchor in the road of Pondicherry when the action above deſcribed commenced.

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by his advancement in years, was divided be- 1780.
tween doubt and inclination. But in this ſtate of mind he liſtened with fond partiality and pride to the conſtant ſuggeſtions of his eldeſt ſon Tippoo, into whoſe breaſt Hyder had inſpired an early love of glory, and hatred of the Engliſh. The ardour of this youth, who had aſſumed the title of Warrior *, re-acted with energy and with ſucceſs on the ſoil from whence it originally ſprung, and reſtored the vigour of fading nature.— Prudence was quickened by courage, and courage was tempered with prudence.— Whether the quadruple alliance, mentioned above, was firſt propoſed by Nizam-Ally-Cawn, Soubah of the Deccan, as has been here ſtated, on that prince's own authority, or that it originated, as has been affirmed by others, in the court of Hyder-Ally; certain it is, that a negotiation for that purpoſe began to be carried on ſo early as the ſiege of Pondicherry. At this time it was generally believed throughout India, that Hyder meditated an attack on the Carnatic. But that political warrior ſuſpended the execu-

* BAHAUDER.

1780. tion of his deſign until a treaty was framed and ratified, by which, at the ſame time that he ſhould invade the Carnatic, the Nizam ſhould attack the northern Circars; Moodajee Booſlah, Bengal; and the Marrattas, commanded by Madajee Scindiah and Tukajee Holkar, continue the war againſt the Engliſh.

In the month of May, 1779, an invaſion of the Carnatic was determined, and, at Hyder's Durbar, became the ſubject of common converſation. An army was aſſembled in June, 1780, horſe and foot, to the number, as has been computed, of an hundred thouſand. Hyder now made no ſecret of their deſtination, but endeavouring to inſpire into his officers and ſoldiers the ſame vengeance which fired his own breaſt, he talked of the pride and the perfidy of the Engliſh, expatiated on the diſſenſions by which they were torn, and the dangers with which they were threatened, and vowed that againſt the next monſoon there ſhould not be a white face in the Carnatic. Breathing ſuch ſentiments, and uſing ſuch expreſ-

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ſions as theſe, he moved onward, with his troops, to the Ghauts, or Paſſes *, that 1780.

* It is, perhaps, a ſingular appearance, in the natural hiſtory of the world, that the vaſt ridge of mountains, which, extending from Cape Comorin to the Eaſt-India Company's Northern Circars, ſeparate the Coromandel coaſt from that of Malabar, do not gradually culminate, as they recede from the level of the ocean, but riſe on either coaſt abruptly to their greateſt height, and form a ſtupendous baſis to a vaſt plain ſtretching along their top.—They do not, like moſt other ranges of hills, reſemble the roof of one of our houſes, but rather that of an eaſtern palace; and form a natural terrace, undoubtedly the nobleſt in the world. It is not here intended to ſpeak with geometrical exactneſs. In that immenſe plain ſupported by the chain of mountains which divide Hindoſtan, beautiful eminences every where ariſe, covered with Mango and other trees, which are green all the year round: but ſtill theſe bear no proportion to the level ſpace which they diverſify. On this plain, the Marrattas, the Myſoreans, and other nations, that may be, not improperly, termed the Highlanders of Hindoſtan, breed and train up their horſes. In the northern countries of Europe, the ſoil is commonly the more fertile the lower its ſituation; becauſe, in elevated ſituations, the air becomes too cold for vegetation. But in this climate, elevated ſituation is rather favourable to vegetation, at leaſt to moſt vegetable productions: and the plains here deſcribed are for the moſt part as fruitful and verdant as any in the kingdom of Bengal. It is in thoſe high lands that we meet with the moſt warlike tribes in India. Here, as in other countries, if we confine our obſervations to the native powers, the Gods of the hills have generally prevailed, in all conteſts, over the Gods of the plains.

1780. open a communication, on either hand, between the high lands that divide the peninſula of Hindoſtan, and the Low Countries, here and there indenting the hills on the courſes of great rivers, and expanded and united in vaſt plains towards the ocean.—The boundary by which nature had marked the land, recalled to the mind of Hyder all the dangers attending an expedition into the country of ſuch an enemy as the Engliſh. He halted for ſeveral days, and held frequent councils with his chiefs, or cawns, in which he deliberated whether he ſhould enter the Carnatic now, or wait till another ſeaſon, when he ſhould be ſtrengthened by additional forces from France. The chiefs attempted to diſſuade him from war at that time, mixing with the concluſions of reaſon many ſentiments of ſuperſtition. But Tippoo Saib conſtantly urged, in this military ſenate, the ſpirit of the troops, the courage that animates offenſive operations, the advantages of ſurprize, the defenceleſs ſtate of the Carnatic, the difficulties which the Engliſh would find in aſſembling their army, the power of the Marrattas and their

other

other allies, and the obligation of a ſacred 1780.
treaty. With regard to the ſuccours promiſed and expected from France, that advantage would, in all probability, be balanced by ſuccours ſent from Great Britain to the Engliſh. That there was difficulty and danger in the paths they were about to tread he readily allowed; "But when," he aſked, "were they to wage war with their "enemies if they avoided danger?" At this ſentiment, expreſſed by Tippoo with a noble and faſcinating air, which touched every heart, and transfuſed his ardent zeal into the minds of all who ſaw and heard him, Hyder embraced his ſon with tears of joy, in the preſence of the whole aſſembly. He now ordered the laſt letters which he had received from his Vakeel at Madras to be read aloud in the hearing of his chiefs and principal officers, in which he confirmed, with many additional circumſtances, what he had before reported: the diſcordant ſentiments that prevailed among the Engliſh, the rapacity of their diſpoſitions, the ſelfiſhneſs of their views, their unconcern about the public welfare, their diſregard to military

1780. tary preparation, and their boaſts that Hyder-Ally durſt not ſo much as meditate an invaſion of the Carnatic. All were unanimous that the troops ſhould proceed; and, accordingly, this vaſt body poured down into the Carnatic about the middle of July, 1780. After laying waſte the open country, plundering ſeveral towns, among which were Conjeveram and Porto Novo, and reducing ſeveral forts without reſiſtance, he laid ſiege to the town and fortreſs of Arcot.

The Britiſh ſubjects in Madras, as well as the reſt of their countrymen in India, had long waited in anxious ſuſpenſe for the approach of that ſtorm which had broken on the heads of their countrymen in America and in Europe; and the man whom they had deſtined in their imaginations to direct the firſt efforts of its fury, was Hyder-Ally. But week having elapſed after week, and month after month, without any appearance of hoſtilities, a ſupine liſtleſſneſs and unconcern appeared to have fallen on all orders of men, even thoſe not excepted whoſe office it was to be vigilant for the public ſafety: when,

when, on Sunday the 24th of July, 1780, late in the evening, an alarm was given throughout Choultry Plain, that Hyder-Ally's horſe were at the Mount *. Almoſt all the families in the ſuburbs and neighbourhood of Madras moved that night into the fort; and, in the courſe of a few days, not an houſe was inhabited beyond the Iſland, except the Government Garden-houſe, which the Governor gave up to the General, who had it guarded by two field-pieces, with artillery, and a company of Sepoys. Freſh alarms were received every day, and although the Governor, as well as others, endeavoured to conceal the intelligence by which theſe had been occaſioned, the public had good ground of apprehenſion; which was not a little heightened by the ſupineneſs of the Governor, and the indifference and contempt which was entertained by thoſe in power, of Hyder, and all his army. The burning of all the villages between the Mount and Madras, and the 1780.

* An hill, on the ſummit of which ſtands a Portugueze church, about nine miles from Madras.

de-

1780. depredations committed at St. Thomas, did not excite thoſe public exertions which men, anxious for the preſervation of all that is dear to them naturally expected.—It was the faſhion to treat the name of Hyder with ſcorn; and many affected to look on thoſe parties of horſe as mere banditti.

In the mean time, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, at the head of about one hundred thouſand men, having entered the Carnatic and reduced ſeveral inferior forts, had begun to lay ſiege to that which was not only the capital of the province juſt mentioned, but one of the moſt convenient poſts that could be imagined for carrying on various military operations againſt the Engliſh.

The troops which the Preſidency of Madras had to oppoſe to this force, which did not amount to ſix thouſand, happened, at this critical juncture, to be diſtributed in the following manner:—At Fort St. George, one regiment of Europeans, two battalions of Sepoys, and one company of marksmen;

marksmen; at the Mount, the artillery, 1780.
commanded by Colonel James, consisting of three hundred and fifty men with officers, forty-two field-pieces, five cohorns, and four battering cannon: in the fort of Poonah-Mallee, his Majesty's 73d regiment of foot, nearly seven hundred strong, under the command of Lord Macleod: at Pondicherry, under the command of Colonel Braithwaite, one regiment of Europeans, and one of native cavalry, four battalions of Sepoys, and ten field pieces: under Colonel Baillie to the northward at Ellore, two companies of European infantry, three battalions and six companies of Sepoys, with ten field-pieces; and a detachment commanded by Colonel Cosby towards the south, consisting of five hundred cavalry, and fifteen hundred Sepoys with four field-pieces.

The artillery, with a detachment from Madras of one company of European grenadiers, and one battalion of Sepoys, one company of marksmen, were ordered to join the troops at Poonah-Mallee, and an encampment

1780. ment to be formed there, under the command of Lord Macleod. Theſe troops were then ordered to march to St. Thomas's Mount, and there to be joined by the detachment under Colonel Braithwaite.—The forces drawn together at the Mount, and compoſing the main army, were to be put under the command of General Sir Hector Monro, and to march to Conjeveram, where they were to be joined by the detachments under the orders of Colonels Baillie and Coſby.

In purſuance of this plan, Sir Hector Monro, being informed that Lord Macleod had reached the Mount with the troops under his command, and that Colonel Braithwaite had arrived with his detachment from Pondicherry, ſent an expreſs to Colonel Baillie, at this time at Gumeroponda, about twenty-eight miles N. N. W. of Madras, to proceed from thence directly to Conjeveram, and not to the Mount as was at firſt intended; and, on the 25th of Auguſt, in the afternoon, accompanied by Mr. Whitehill, the Governor, Mr. Davidſon,

ſon, a member of the Council of Madras, and the ſecond ſon of the Nabob of Arcot, joined the army, which was ordered to march towards Conjeveram at two the next morning. 1780.

But when the troops were under marching orders, the firſt regiment of cavalry peremptorily refuſed to move without money. On this, Captain Dugald Campbell received, for the payment of this regiment, two bonds from the Select Committee, one payable in one month, and the other in two. But theſe written obligations did not ſatisfy a body of men, who, at the time they were about to riſque their lives in the public ſervice, had, many of them, large families, which they muſt leave behind them unprovided with the neceſſaries of life, and who were not leſs than fourteen months in arrear. They demanded ſome ready money, with intimation that they would not march without it. The firſt regiment of cavalry, therefore, with the exception of the commiſſioned and non-commiſſioned native

1780. tive officers, were made priſoners, and ſent under a guard to Madras.

The main army, then, conſiſting of fifteen hundred Europeans, and four thouſand two hundred Sepoys, with the train of artillery already ſpecified, proceeded from the Mount towards Conjeveram, early in the morning of the 26th of Auguſt.

In this march, two hundred men belonging to his Majeſty's ſeventy-third regiment of foot, overcome by fatigue and the heat of the day, were left lying on the road. On the arrival of our men at Conjeveram, on the 29th, we found the whole town in flames, which had been raiſed before our arrival by the enemy's cavalry, great bodies of which, advancing towards the town ſtill appeared on both their flanks. It was a ſevere mortification to the whole of our little army, to find no appearance, at this place, of Colonel Baillie's detachment from the northward, which, as afterwards appeared, had been detained on the northern banks

banks of a ſmall river, by an accidental fall of heavy rains. In this incident we have a moſt remarkable proof and example of the danger of procraſtination, and on what minute circumſtances and ſudden ſprings of the mind, the fortune and the general iſſue of war may depend. Had Colonel Baillie paſſed over the Tripaſſore, without halting, as ſome adviſed, and encamped on its ſouthern, inſtead of its northern banks, the diſaſter that ſoon followed would have been prevented, and an order of affairs, wholly different from that which in fact took place, would have ſucceeded. 1780.

Hyder-Ally, informed of the movements of the Engliſh army, raiſed the ſiege of Arcot, marched towards Conjeveram, in the neighbourhood of which he encamped, and, in the courſe of ſeveral days, at different times offered battle.

On the 6th of September, he detached the flower of his army under the command of his ſon Tippoo, a manœuvre that did not eſcape the obſervation of the Engliſh army,

1780. to cut off the detachment under Colonel Baillie, who was now encamped at Perambaukum, a ſmall village, diſtant from the main army about fifteen miles, remaining himſelf in the neighbourhood of Conjeveram, in order to watch the motions of Sir Hector Munro. The detachment under Tippoo conſiſted of thirty thouſand horſe, eight thouſand foot, and twelve pieces of artillery.

About ten in the morning a general cannonade was heard from the quarter of Colonel Baillie's encampment, which left not a doubt that the Colonel's detachment was attacked by Tippoo Saib. Upon this, the General inſtantly ordered the troops under arms, and marched them on the Perambaukum road, about two miles to the northward of the Conjeveram Pagodas. In the mean time, Colonel Baillie, with his uſual bravery, repulſed the numerous body that had been ſent againſt him for ſeveral times, in an action that laſted for ſeveral hours, with very great ſlaughter. They ſtill, however, hung upon his party, with an evident intention

intention to renew their attacks whenever they ſhould find a favourable opportunity: ſo that he judged it neceſſary to adviſe the General of his ſituation, and to inform him that he had been ſo harraſſed, and was ſtill ſo cloſely preſſed by the enemy, and ſo much in want of proviſions and ammunition, as to have doubts of his being able to effect a junction. 1780.

Sir Hector Munro, having received this intelligence on the 6th inſtant, ordered, on the 8th, the following detachment to the relief of Colonel Baillie, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher: One grenadier company, commanded by Lieutenant Lindſey; one company of light infantry, by Captain Baird of the 73d regiment; two European companies of grenadiers, the one commanded by Captain Phillips, the other by Captain Ferrier; the native markſmen, amounting to the number of ſixty, under Lieutenant Muat; five companies of Sepoy grenadiers, under Captain Rumley; and five under Captain Gowdie; and nine camels laden with ammunition, together with

1780. the doolies of the army. At half paſt eight in the afternoon, this detachment, leaving the grand army, proceeded on their deſtination. On the 9th, at one o'clock in the morning, they halted for half an hour in order to refreſh the men with a dram and biſcuit.

At this time they were informed by the Hircarrah, or meſſenger, who had come from Colonel Baillie, that ſome of Tippoo Saib's parties were not at a greater diſtance from them than from two to three miles. The gallant Colonel Fletcher, who, to the utmoſt perſonal intrepidity added the ſoundeſt judgment, and quick as well as profound diſcernment and penetration, could not help expreſſing a deſire of making a diverſion in favour of Colonel Baillie on that quarter: but his orders were ſo pointed, that he could not deviate from them.

And here it is natural to reflect on the inconveniences that frequently attend preciſe and peremptory orders, in the complicated and fluctuating ſcenes of military operation.

Con-

Conjunctures may ariſe in which the tranſ- 1780.
greſſion of orders may lead to certain ſucceſs and victory, and in which a rigid adherence to them, on the other hand, would involve certain defeat and ruin. Hence the great advantage of perfect concord and confidence among the principal officers of an army, and the propriety of allowing to the leaders of parties a latitude of acting according to circumſtances *.

* In the Introduction to Cunningham's Hiſtory of Great Britain lately publiſhed, which abounds with new and curious anecdotes, we meet with the following. In the battle of Malplaquet, Colonel James Campbell, Lieutenent to the Earl of Stair, ſignalized his valour in ſight of both the armies; for while the victory was yet doubtful, he ruſhed with great fury againſt the enemy with a party of his men, and cutting all before him, opened a way through the midſt of the enemy, and returned by the ſame way to his friends. The ſucceſsful bravery of this youth, encouraged the confederates, diſheartened the enemy, and contributed not a little to turn the whole fortune of the day. Whether through envy, or from whatever cauſe, the bravery of Campbell was, by ſome of our officers, made an object of cenſure. Prince Eugene, who greatly admired ſo gallant an action, and who conceived that a juncture might exiſt in which tranſgreſſion of rules might be juſtified by emergencies; thought it not ſufficient that Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell ſhould paſs uncenſured, but returned him his thanks for exceeding his orders, on the day after the battle in the face of the army. This was General Sir James Campbell, who loſt his life, in an advanced age, commanding the Britiſh horſe at Fontenoy.

1780. After the action of the 6th inſtant, in which the loſs ſuſtained fell prencipally on Hyder's beſt troops, moſt of his officers adviſed him to retreat, as they feared the advance of the main body of the Engliſh.— But Hyder, who had exact and conſtant intelligence of every thing that was done in the Engliſh camp, determined to purſue offenſive meaſures. He knew the hour that Colonel Fletcher was to march, for the reinforcement of Colonel Baillie, the ſtrength of his forces, and that he had no cannon.— He made a moſt maſterly movement, and muſt inevitably have intercepted Colonel Fletcher's detachment, had not Fletcher, ſuſpecting his hircarrah, changed his route, and taken a ſweep to the right, by which he joined Colonel Baillie without oppoſition.

On the news of this junction, Count Lally, who commanded Hyder's artillery, went to him, and ſtrenuouſly adviſed him to retreat, and croſs the Polaar, repreſenting the inveitable deſtruction in which his army muſt be involved by a contrary conduct.—

Hyder

Hyder liſtened to the arguments of the Count, and appeared to approve of the meaſure he had propoſed, when two hircarrahs came in from Conjeveram, and aſſured him not only that our army was ſtill there, but that they were not making any preparations to move. This appeared ſo extraordinary to Lally that he ſuſpected they were betrayed by their hircarrahs, and ſtill urged the neceſſity of retreating with the infantry, and carrying off his guns. But Hyder, who depended on his information, ordering a body of irregular cavalry to amuſe our army at Conjeveram, determined to advance and attack Colonel Baillie. 1780.

Colonel Fletcher's detachment joined Colonel Baillie on the 9th of September, at half an hour paſt ſix in the morning. The junction of theſe forces inſpired the whole with freſh ſpirits. After the parade in the evening, Colonel Baillie, having previouſly directed that all orders given by Colonel Fletcher ſhould be obeyed without heſitation, gave orders for the whole troops under his command to be in readineſs to march. Accordingly, be-

1780. tween eight and nine o'clock in the evening, our men marched off toward the left, by the way of Subdeverim, the baggage being diſpoſed on the left flank. Colonel Fletcher's detachment was diſperſed in different parts of the line. From the moment they began to march, the enemy played off their rockets, which, from the vigilance of our flanking parties, did but litttle execution.

Nothing of any conſequence happened until a little after ten o'clock at night, when ſeveral guns were obſerved opening on our rear. Captain Powell, who commanded the rear-guard, immediately unlimbered his guns, and informed Colonel Baillie of what had happened. The line was inſtantly ordered to countermarch, the baggage and doolies paſſing through the intervals. After countermarching a few hundred yards, the line was formed with its front towards Perambaukum. The enemy kept up an inceſſant fire, though without any great effect; and, and as they did not diſcover an inclination to advance, Colonel Baillie ordered the troops to face to the right, and march

march into an avenue, the ſame road they had paſſed but a few minutes before. The whole line being now formed in this avenue, a general halt took place. In the mean time, the enemy kept up an inceſſant cannonade, which did great execution. This obliged Colonel Baillie to detach Captain Rumley with five companies of Sepoy grenadiers to ſtorm their guns. There is not a doubt but this party would have accompliſhed the important ſervice on which they were ſent, had not a water-courſe which happened at that time to be unfordable, obliged them, about half paſt eleven o'clock, to return to the line. By the time that Captain Rumley returned, the enemy's guns were heard drawing off towards our front, and a general alarm throughout their camp, owing, as was ſuppoſed, to their having received intelligence of the party that had been ſent to ſtorm their guns. From their noiſe, confuſion, and irregular firing, one would have imagined that a detachment of our men had fallen upon them with fixed bayonets. At that critical moment, had a party of grenadiers been ſent againſt them, they would have 1780.

1780. have routed without difficulty the whole of Tippoo's army. Having, about ten o'clock in the evening, advanced a few hundred yards in the avenue, the detachment remained there in perfect ſilence until the morning.

Colonel Fletcher, being aſked by ſome officers why Colonel Baillie halted, modeſtly anſwered, that Colonel Baillie was an officer of eſtabliſhed reputation, and that he no doubt had reaſons for his conduct. It cannot however be concealed, that this halt afforded an opportunity to Tippoo Saib of drawing off his cannon to a very ſtrong poſt, by which the Engliſh were obliged to paſs, and at the ſame time of informing Hyder of their ſituation, and ſuggeſting to him the expediency of advancing for the improvement of ſo favourable a conjuncture.

On the 10th of September, at five o'clock in the morning, our little army marched off by the right, in ſubdiviſions, having their baggage on their right flank, and the enemy on their left. A few minutes after ſix, two guns opened on their rear, on which the line halted

halted a few minutes. Large bodies of the 1780.
enemy's cavalry now appeared on their right flank, and juſt at the moment when the pagoda at Conjeveram appeared in view, and our men had begun to indulge the pleaſing hope of a reſpite from their toils and dangers, and a ſocial refreſhment in the company of their friends, a rocket-boy was taken priſoner, who informed them that Hyder's whole army was marching to the aſſiſtance of Tippoo. Four guns now opened on their left flank with great effect. So hot was the fire they ſuſtained, and ſo heavy the loſs, that Colonel Baillie ordered the whole line to quit the avenue, and preſent a front to the enemy, and at the ſame time diſpatched Captain Rumley with ten companies of Sepoy grenadiers to ſtorm the enemy's guns. Colonel Fletcher being made acquainted with this order, judged it neceſſary to have a party to ſupport Captain Rumley, and immediately deſired Captain Lucas, with his battalion, to go on that ſervice; but this order, being thought improper, was countermanded by Colonel Baillie.

Within

1780. Within a few minutes after Captain Rumley had left the line, Tippoo's guns, by his appearance, not leſs than by the firing of our artillery, were ſilenced. Rumley's little detachment immediately took poſſeſſion of four of the enemy's guns, and compleatly routed the party attached to them. Captain Rumley, overcome with the exertions he had made, and unable, from bodily fatigue, to carry into effect the ardent reſolution of his mind, ordered Captain Gowdie, the officer next in command, to lead on the party, and take poſſeſſion of ſome more guns, placed a few hundred yards in their front. But as they were advancing for this end, not many minutes after Captain Gowdie had been inveſted with the command, a ſudden cry was overheard among the Sepoys, of Horſe, Horſe! The camp followers, whoſe numbers were nearly five to one of the troops under arms, were driven on a part of our line, by the numerous and ſurrounding forces of Hyder-Ally, who, being informed of the embarraſſing ſituation of Colonel Baillie, had left his cam without ſtriking his tents, with a view to conceal

ceal his march from the Engliſh. A great 1780.
confuſion among our troops was the unavoidable conſequence of this unexpected onſet. The Europeans were ſuddenly left on the field of action alone: and, at that critical moment, a detachment from the advanced guard of Hyder's army preſſed on with great celerity, between our line and Captain Rumley's party. The commanding officer, apprehenſive of being cut off from our little army, judged it moſt prudent to retreat.

Colonel Baillie, when he was informed that an immenſe body of horſe and infantry was marching towards him, and that this was ſuppoſed to be Hyder's main army, ſaid, "Very well! we ſhall be prepared to "receive them." Hyder's whole forces now appeared inconteſtibly in view; and this barbarian chief, who, as was obſerved by the Roman General, of Pyrrhus, had nothing barbarous in his diſcipline, after dividing his guns agreeably to a preconcerted plan, opened from ſixty to ſeventy pieces of cannon, with an innumerable quantity of rockets.

Hyder's

1780. Hyder's numerous cavalry, ſupported by his regular infantry and European corps, driven on by threats, encouraged by promiſes, and led on by his moſt diſtinguiſhed officers, bore on our little army on different quarters without making the leaſt impreſſion. Our men, both Europeans and Sepoys, repeatedly preſented and recovered their fire arms, as if they had been manœuvring on a parade. The enemy was repulſed in every attack. Numbers of their beſt cavalry were killed, and many more were wounded. Even their infantry were forced to give way; and Hyder began to think of a retreat. A movement which Colonel Baillie made to the right, evidently ſhewing that he meant to attack the enemy's artillery, rendered Hyder ſtill more apprehenſive of the iſſue of the battle. He conſulted Lally, who told him that a retreat was then too late, that the Engliſh army from Conjeveram was probably advancing in his rear, and that nothing remained but to endeavour, by their artillery and cavalry, to break the detachment.

Tippoo

Tippoo Saib had by this time collected his party together, and renewed the cannonade. And, at the ſame time that our men were under the neceſſity of ſuſtaining the preſſure of both the father and the ſon, two of their tumbrils were blown up by Hyder's guns, and made a large opening in both lines: they had now no other ammunition than grape: their guns diſcontinued firing, and, in this dreadful ſituation, under a terrible fire, not only of guns but rockets, loſing great numbers of officers and men, they remained from half paſt ſeven till nine o'clock. 1780.

Hyder, perceiving that their guns were entirely ſilenced, came with his whole army round their right flank. The cavalry charged them in diſtinct columns, and, in the intervals between theſe, the infantry poured in vollies of muſketry, with dreadful effect. Mhiar Saib with the Mogul and Sanoor cavarly made the firſt impreſſion. Theſe were followed by the elephants and the Myſorean cavalry, which completed the overthrow of the detachment. Colonel Baillie,

1780. Baillie, though grievouſly wounded, rallied the Europeans, and once more formed them into a ſquare. With this handful of men, he gained an eminence, a ſmall riſing ground on the plain, where, without amunition, and moſt of his people wounded, he reſiſted and repulſed thirteen ſeparate attacks; but freſh bodies of cavalry continually pouring in, they were broken, without giving way. Many of our men, deſperately wounded, raiſing themſelves from the ground, received the enemy on their bayonets.

Captain Lucas's battalion of Sepoys, at the time when our men moved up to a riſing ground, was ſtationed to the right of the European grenadiers, but that corps, ſeeing the Europeans in motion, and miſunderſtanding, perhaps, this evolution for a retreat, broke in the greateſt confuſion.—The Europeans, bravely ſuſtaining their reputation for intrepid valour, remained in this extremity of diſtreſs, ſteady and undaunted, although ſurrounded by the French troops, and by Hyder's cavalry, to the

the number of forty thouſand. They even 1780.
expreſſed a deſire, although their numbers did not exceed four hundred, of being led on to the attack. A party of Topaſſes, who lay at the diſtance of about thirty yards in our front, kept up an inceſſant fire of ſmall arms, with great effect. Many attemps were made by the enemy's cavalry to break this ſmall body of men, but, by the ſteady conduct of both our officers and men, they were repulſed.

Colonel Baillie, finding now that there was no proſpect of being relieved by General Monro, held up a flag of truce to one of the chiefs of Hyder's army. But this was treated with contempt, and the Surdar at the ſame time endeavoured to cut off the Colonel. The reaſon the enemy aſſigned for this, was, that the Sepoys had fired after the ſignal was hoiſted. A few minutes after this, our men received orders to lay down their arms, with intimation that quarter would be given. This order was ſcarcely complied with, when the enemy ruſhed upon them in the moſt ſavage and

1780. brutal manner, ſparing neither age nor infancy, nor any condition of life; and, but for the humane interpoſition of the French commanders, Lally and Pimoran, who implored and inſiſted with the conqueror to ſhew mercy, the gallant remains of our little army muſt have fallen a ſacrifice to that ſavage thirſt of blood with which the tyrant diſgraced his victory.

Hyder, after the action, as he was apprehenſive of being purſued by Sir Hector Monro, leaving many of his wounded men on the field of battle, retreated to a place called the Round Wells, where he had before encamped. Having heard, on his arrival at this place, of the retreat of our army towards Chingliput, he diſpatched his cavalry in purſuit. They returned next day loaded with plunder, and with many priſoners, moſt of them grievouſly wounded. Among theſe was Colonel Baillie, the unfortunate commander of our gallant little army, ſtripped of his clothes, and wounded in three places.—Hyder, intoxicated with ſucceſs, exulted over the Colonel, in terms which our countryman

tryman retorted, with ſuch ſpirit and con- 1780.
tempt, that Colonel Aſſan, a French officer in the ſervice of the barbarian, who witneſſed this ſcene, and who declared this with other particulars relative to the courſe and the iſſue of the battle to the Portugueze Governor of Goa, was apprehenſive that the inſolent conqueror would have been provoked to an act of fatal barbarity.—An European officer in Hyder's ſervice, of the name of Elliot, ſuffered ſtripes, by his orders, in the Durbar, for carrying ſome neceſſaries to Colonel Baillie; and all our officers, as well as men, were treated with great cruelty.—But a very minute account of the impriſonment and ſufferings of what remained of Colonel Baillie's detachment, has been communicated by the ſame officer, from whom the compiler of theſe Memoirs received the greateſt part of that information which has been here detailed, concerning the action near Conjeveram.

While Colonel Baillie, reinforced by the troops ſent to his aid under the command of Colonel Fletcher, ſtruggled with the over-

1780. bearing force of ſuperior numbers and adverſe fortune, the efforts that were made for ſupporting him by the Britiſh commander in chief on the coaſt of Coromandel were as follow. On the 9th of September, at night, a ſmart cannonade having commenced, which was diſcovered from an hillock on the left of our line, the guns were ordered from the piquet, and the tents to be ſtruck, as it was determined to march without loſs of time to the relief of Colonel Baillie. But the cannonade having ceaſed about twelve, the troops were ordered to reſt on their arms till further orders. In this poſture they continued till day-light, when they began to march towards Perambaukum; a detachment of the enemy, that had lain in watch for their moving, following them on their left flank.

Our army continued their march until it was near noon, when ſome wounded Sepoys, brought in by our flanking parties, informed the General of the dreadful overthrow and fate of our unfortunate little army. Immediately on this intelligence, the main army, reverſing the line of their march, returned

returned on their ſteps towards Conjeve- 1780.
ram, diſtreſs painted in every countenance; for all agreed in their report of the utter deſtruction of the detachment, and that no quarter was ſhewn. The army, during the whole courſe of their march on that morning, ſaw no appearance by which theſe ſad tidings might, in any degree, be falſified.—It was ſix o'clock in the evening when they ſtacked their arms in the village of Conjeveram; and about this time, more Sepoys and drummers came into the camp, all confirming the reports that had been made of the ſucceſs and the unrelenting fury of the enemy.

The General now gave orders for deſtroying his four cannon, being twenty-four pounders, and a great quantity of ammunition, as there was not any conveniency for carrying it. At two o'clock, on the 11th, in the morning, our army moved on without beat of drum, towards Chingliput, where they grounded their arms on the glacis, about break of day, on Tueſday the 12th of September. The enemy crouded

1780. around them, as they purſued their march, in great numbers, but without making any attack.

Colonel Coſby, juſt as he was about to make a forced march to Conjeveram, fortunately met with one of the fugitive Sepoys from Colonel Baillie's camp, and, after having been not a little harraſſed in his route, arrived ſafely at Chingliput, within twenty-four hours after the General.

On Wedneſday, the 13th, at ſix o'clock in the morning, our troops began to march from Chingliput, and after being annoyed all the way by the enemy's horſe, arrived about one o'clock in the morning, on Thurſday the 14th, at the Mount.

The retreat of our army to Madras, filled the whole inhabitants at once with ſorrow for their wounded or ſlaughtered friends, and anxiety for their own ſafety. The more timid were eager to find opportunities of returning, with as much of their ſubſtance as poſſible, to Europe, while thoſe of

of greater courage caſt their eyes to Bengal, 1780.
looking with ſolicitude for ſuccour from that rich, and extenſive province. There was not an inhabitant in the Preſidency of Madras that did not wear mourning. Civilians and ſoldiers united in their murmurs againſt certain perſons, to whoſe egregious negligence and infatuation they aſcribed the calamities that had overtaken the Britiſh in India; in paying the tribute of praiſe to the memory of Colonel Fletcher, and the brave officers and men who fell with him in the unequal conteſt; in doing juſtice to the bravery of Colonel Baillie and his fellow priſoners; and in applauding the councils and firmneſs of Lord Macleod, who had adviſed the General to form a junction of the troops at the Mount, and afterwards ſolicited him in the ſtrongeſt manner to move to the relief of Colonel Baillie with the whole army.

So great was the panic that had ſtruck all orders of men in the Preſidency of Madras, on this mournful occaſion, that if Hyder had immediately purſued and improved his

1780. victory, the 10th of September might have proved the moſt unfortunate in the annals of Britain. Nor would the calamities with which that day ſeemed pregnant have been long averted by the caution of Hyder-Ally at that important criſis, if the towering genius of one man had not, in this precipice of fortune, preſented an intrepid front to the enemy, and nobly dared to revive the ſpirits of his countrymen, by attacking inſtead of fleeing from the conqueror.

The Preſidency of Madras, as ſoon as they received intelligence of the diſaſter of our army, made a requiſition to the Supreme Council in Bengal, of a reinforcement ſuitable to the exigency of their affairs. This requiſition was accompanied by advice, that a conſiderable French fleet, with land-forces on board, were on their way to India. That ſuccours ſhould be ſent to Madras to a certain amount was readily agreed on by the whole Council: but concerning the quantity of theſe, as well as the time of ſending them, there were different opinions. Mr. Francis, deeply

deeply impreſſed with the unexampled diſ- 1780.
aſter which had befallen our arms, and the progreſs of Hyder in the Carnatic, was alarmed for the ſafety of Bengal itſelf, the centre and ſeat of the Britiſh government in Aſia. As in an animal body, under the influence of terror, the blood naturally runs inward to fortify the heart; leaving the extremities pale and trembling; the main exertions of government, if guided by the counſels of that gentleman, would have been confined to Bengal, which would have become the ſeat of war, and the other poſſeſſions of the Company in India left, almoſt wholly, to their own reſources.—The courage of the Governor-General, and other members of the Supreme Council, repelled the vital fluid from the centre to the moſt diſtant movements, and preſerved and ſuſtained the unity of the ſyſtem. Mr. Haſtings, kept a ſteady eye on every part of our eaſtern empire, and, with an out-ſtretched arm and liberal hand, carried relief to the diſtreſſed. By invading the dominions of our enemies, he drove the battle from our gates, deprived them of their reſources for carrying

1780. carrying on the war, and infuſed freſh ſpirits into the whole of the troops, Sepoys as well as Europeans, in our ſervice. It was determined in the Supreme Council to attack our combined foes in every quarter: in the eaſt, in the weſt, in the north; on the coaſt of Coromandel, on that of Malabar, and in the province of Malva.

The Governor-General, in the firſt council that was held after the diſaſter near Conjeveram, propoſed that Sir Eyre Coote ſhould be requeſted to take the command of the ſouthern army at Madras; that a reinforcement of Europeans ſhould be ſent thither by ſea, with a ſupply of fifteen lacks of rupees; that a large detachment of Sepoys ſhould be formed in order to march, as ſoon as the ſeaſon ſhould permit, into the Carnatic; that an offer of peace, on reaſonable terms, ſhould be made to the Marrattas, but if this ſhould be rejected, that the war againſt them ſhould be proſecuted with vigour. The advanced ſeaſon of the year rendered an embarkation of troops both difficult and dangerous; and the expences to be incurred

incurred by Bengal, for the ſafety of Ma- 1780.
dras, were uncommonly great. But there are conjunctures in which extraordinary expences are abſolutely neceſſary, and when great dangers muſt be hazarded. The Supreme Council, therefore, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of Mr. Francis to the embarkation of the troops, and to any ſupply beyond the amount of ſeven lacks of rupees, ſupported the motion that had been made by the Governor-General. And Sir Eyre Coote, with ſix hundred and forty Europeans, fifteen lacks of rupees, and a large ſupply of proviſions, arrived at Madras on the 5th of November.

Hyder-Ally, on the retreat of our army to Madras, reſumed the ſiege of Arcot, which yielded to his arms on the laſt day of October. Many other poſts of ſtrength fell into his hands without reſiſtance. He was now proclaimed Nabob of the Carnatic *, and exerciſed in fact all the prerogatives of ſovereign power. From policy,

* Others affirm, that it was Tippoo Saib who was proclaimed.

not

1780. not leſs than the natural inſolence of proſperity, he was at pains to cheriſh among his officers the pride of victory. He boaſted that he would prevent the Engliſh army from moving from the Mount, and that, in the courſe of a month, when he would be joined by three thouſand French troops, from the iſlands of Mauritius and Bourbon, he would commence the ſiege of Fort St. George. Mean-while, his numerous cavalry over-ran and ravaged the country.—Numbers of inoffenſive and unreſiſting people were ſacrificed to a ſavage thirſt of blood: ſome were cruelly tortured that they might be induced to give up treaſures they were ſuppoſed to conceal; others were wantonly mutilated, and at this day, many wretched men, without their hands, or ears, or noſes, record the inhumanity of a barbarous conqueror. Women were ſubjected to the brutality of luſt, or forced to ſave their honour by the forfeit of their lives; a ranſom which ſome had the fortitude to pay. The mother of two beautiful young ladies of Arcot, rather then conſent to their degradation in the Haram of the Sultan, emanci-

emancipated them, with their own conſent, 1780.
as well as herſelf, from the inſults of the enemy, by means of poiſon. Thouſands of boys and girls of different caſtes and different religions, were carried into captivity, in order to people the Myſorean dominions of the conqueror. A new village was built on this occaſion, for their reception; they were placed on an equal footing, and enjoyed equal privileges with the natives; and were inſtructed by maſters, many of whom were themſelves captives, in divers manufactures. For amidſt the ravages of war, Hyder did not loſe ſight of the arts of peace, by which, in the preſent refined period, the reſources of war are moſt effectually ſupplied. And it muſt be allowed, that although the inhuman cuſtom of the victors enſlaving the vanquiſhed in battle, in Europe at leaſt, be happily aboliſhed, it is in moſt caſes, wiſer policy, in the eye of ambition, to ſtrengthen the conquering ſtate by the introduction of foreigners, than to weaken it by ſending forth a part of its own population for maintaining diſtant conqueſts.

The

1780. The firſt fury of invaſion having ſpent its force, and the ferocity of animal nature yielding to the return of reaſon and humanity, multitudes of people who had fled from thoſe legions of barbarian cavalry that overſpread the land, to the hills and woods, were invited back to the ſettlements which they had abandoned, by aſſurances of protection from Hyder-Ally-Cawn, who declared himſelf a friend to the natives, but the inveterate enemy of the Engliſh. He reſtored that diſcipline in his army which the licentiouſneſs of war had unavoidably relaxed. He reſtrained his ſoldiers from rapine; and encouraged the country people to ſow their land, telling them, that if they were in want of ſeed he would furniſh it, and that thenceforth they ſhould enjoy the fruits of their induſtry. Never, indeed, was the foſtering hand of government more neceſſary than on the preſent occaſion. The calamities that overwhelmed the Carnatic were followed by want and famine. Under the walls of Madras, men, women, and children periſhed in crowds, and ſome were ſeen ſwooning in the ſtreets.

Hyder

Hyder, having exhauſted all that could 1780
miniſter fuel either to fury or to rapine in this country, determined to lead his victorious army to the regions ſouthward of the Coleroon. Theſe alſo had by this time experienced the ravages of predatory war, and every where bore marks of deſolation.—Multitudes of needy adventurers, who were drawn to his ſtandard by the hope of plunder, pouring down from the mountains of Myſore, overran the countries of Kavalore, Tanjore, Tritchinopoly, and Madura. A luxuriant crop was inſtantly ſwept off the ground, and every water-dyke and encampment totally deſtroyed. The inhabitants who eſcaped the ſword ſought ſhelter in the forts, where through want they miſerably periſhed.

The country of Tanjore was in the poſſeſſion of the invaders, who ſecured its crops and cattle, repulſed the Company's troops at different places, and confined them within a ſingle fortreſs in the capital; where the granaries were empty, the Rajah's ſubjects ripe for innovation and revolt, and he himſelf accuſed of clandeſtinely introducing

arms

1780. arms into his palace, and carrying on intrigues with Hyder. That nominal king, bearing royalty in fetters, and mortified by the humiliating condition to which he had been reduced, though he had not dared to avow a wiſh for his emancipation, began now from policy to favour the cauſe that ſeemed to prevail, and from inclination to liſten to the ſuggeſtions of a confederacy formed for the expulſion of ſtrangers. While he ſecretly endeavoured to convert his palace into an arſenal, he ſuffered the whole crops of the country to be collected by the enemy, at the ſame time that he reſiſted every ſolicitation to fill his magazines, and to provide for events neither evitable nor diſtant.

In the provinces to the ſouthward of Tanjore and Tritchinopoly, the aſpect of affairs appeared equally alarming to the Engliſh. The great Marawa was infeſted by a numerous body of rebels, under the conduct of a chief nearly related to the family on the throne: the little Marawa, by the murderer of the late Rajah, who, after the perpetration of that crime, had fled, in 1773, for protection to Hyder, but

but returning, at the preſent criſis, ſeized 1780.
the reins of government by the authority of that prince, kept the infant Rajah in confinement, and carried the deſolation of war into the adjacent territories of the Company, held under the name of the Nabob of Arcot. The flames of diſaffection and war were ſpread in their progreſs to Cape Comorin. An hundred thouſand Colleries and Polygars harraſſed the ſouthern provinces; and the ſubjects of Great Britain were often attacked within the range of their forts.

Such, then, was the ſtate of our affairs, on the coaſt of Coromandel, towards the concluſion of 1780, and the commencement of 1781. The native powers were united among themſelves, and with other ſtates and princes of India, in deſire and deſign to emancipate themſelves from foreign controul; French auxiliares were incorporated with their armies, in order to invigorate their attacks and direct their movements, and more were promiſed and confidently expected; a political and warlike prince, who united the military diſcipline

1780. and ſkill of Europe with the ſubtility and craft of Aſia, freely ranged over the whole land at the head of an army flushed with ſucceſs, and daily increaſing in numbers as well as courage. To this force and thoſe difficulties, the fortune of Great Britain oppoſed the army at Madras, to be reinforced by the ſuccours which have been already ſtated from Bengal, and whatever could be ſpared from Guzzarat by General Goddard, the military talents of Sir Eyre Coote, and the genius of Mr. Haſtings, whoſe eyes were open on every part of India, who ſupplied the reſources of war, and united the power of Great Britain in the eaſt, not more ſcattered in place than diſunited by civil diſſenſion, in one vigorous ſyſtem of military operation.

The reſpectable veteran, now inveſted with the command of our troops in the Carnatic, was in the ſixty-third year of his age. Though his conſtitution had ſuffered the debilitation of an enervating climate, he chearfully underwent, at this advanced period of life, as much fatigue as any ſoldier, and as readily encountered danger

ger as any officer in his army. He was an handſome man with a ſerious military air. He united ſpirit with caution, and the general courſe of his military conduct had been fortunate. There was in his character and example ſomething that engaged the affections of men, at the ſame time that it commanded their confi-dence and eſteem: objects which the General well knew how to value, and which he endeavoured on all occaſions to acquire.— It was on this principle, that although he poſſeſſed the ſole command of the army, he communicated his plan of operations, before he took the field, to a council of war, compoſed of Brigadier-General Stuart, Sir Hector Monro, and Lord Macleod, and alſo to the Select Committee at Madras. 1780.

In every point of view, it was expedient for the Engliſh to bring Hyder to a deciſive action; but how to accompliſh this object was the queſtion. Experience had ſufficiently proved that this was not to be effected by rapid marches. In a former war, Hyder, after leading an Engliſh General who pur-

1780. ſued him up and down through the whole kingdom of Myſore, and thus weakening his force by fatigue, by climate, and bad nouriſhment, marched paſt him to Madras, and intimidated the government into a diſhonourable treaty of peace. Nor was the experiment made by General Smith, neceſſary to evince, that an army formed like ours, of infantry, could not poſſibly out-march ſuch a force as Hyder's, which derived rapidity of motion from bullocks, camels, elephants, and cavalry.

On the other hand, to have acted on the principles of a beſieging army would have protracted time, diminiſhed our force by garriſons, and multiplied all thoſe advantages which the enemy had over us in numbers, ſupplies, and the poſſeſſion of the country. In theſe circumſtances, the Engliſh General determined, if poſſible, to bring Hyder to a cloſe engagement, by a plan of conduct that ſeemed to hold a middle place, between field-operations, on the one hand, and ſieges on the other; inclining to either, according

according to contingent events and circum- 1780.
ſtances. And as Hyder's numerous cavalry enabled him to drive the country, it became a part of the Engliſh General's plan, to ſecure, in all caſes, a communication with the ſea, by which he was to receive from time to time the neceſſary ſupplies for carrying on the war. Hyder, on the contrary, was careful, in all his movements, to ſecure a paſſage into the interior part of the peninſula through the mountains.

The Engliſh army, which had been diſ- 1781.
perſed in cantonements for the rainy ſeaſon, again took the field on the 17th of January, 1781. This, in point of diſcipline and numbers, was the fineſt body of men that ever took the field in India. It conſiſted of eight thouſand infantry, eight hundred cavalry, and ſixty-two pieces of cannon, with a ſuitable proportion of gunners, and a due proviſion of military ſtores. The confidence which the army repoſed in their commander, was expreſſed by a loud huzza.

1781. At this period, the places of ſtrength that now remained to the Engliſh in the Carnatic, were Vandiwaſh, Vellore, Parmacoil, Amboor, Chingliput, Cuddalore, and Tiagar: of which the four firſt-mentioned were beſieged or inveſted by the enemy.—On the 19th the army paſſed Chingliput, and encamped on the ſouth ſide of the river Polaar. On the 21ſt, the fort of Charangooly was ſurprized by a detachment under the command of Captain Davis, who very deſervedly received the thanks of the General for his ſteady gallantry on that occaſion. Our troops, leaving a garriſon at Charangooly, reſumed their march, and, on the 25th, carried relief to the long-inveſted garriſon of Vandiwaſh. The enemy, at the approach of our men, fled with precipitation: but this advantage was counter-balanced by the fall of the ſtrong fortreſs of Amboor, one of the inlets to the Carnatic. The Engliſh army, leaving Vandiwaſh, directed the line of their march towards Parmacoil, when intelligence being received by two expreſſes, which arrived at the ſame time, that a French fleet had paſſed Madras, they faced about, and returning on their ſteps,

ſteps, encamped along the eminences above Charangooly. On the 2d of February they marched from the left towards Parmacoil, where they encamped on the 3d; and, on the 5th, they ſat down on the red hills of Pondicherry, with their front towards Arcot; the chief ſtrength of the enemy in the Carnatic. 1781.

The town and fortreſs of Pondicherry, after a brave reſiſtance by an handful of men under the command of General Belcombe, though defended in many places only by new mud walls, was reduced, as already mentioned, by a detachment of the Company's troops under the conduct of General Sir Hector Monro, and garriſoned by a military force commanded by Colonel Braithwaite. The Colonel, having firſt demanded and obtained the ſolemn allegiance of the inhabitants, evacuated the town and fortreſs, in order to join the general rendezvous of our army, on the irruption of Hyder Ally, at Conjeveram. The moment our troops were withdrawn, the inhabitants of Pondicherry, in direct violation of their

1781. recent engagements, flew to arms, plundered the ſolitary Engliſh reſident who had been left as a ſpy on their conduct, and with fixed bayonets pointed to his breaſt, forced him to ſign a written inſtrument, of the contents of which he was wholly ignorant. They armed a number of Sepoys, and collected prodigious quantities of proviſions, which they depoſited at Charangoloy, a maritime town not far diſtant. Sir Eyre Coote diſarmed the inhabitants of Pondicherry, removed their ſtores, and deſtroyed a number of boats belonging to the French ſquadron.

Large bodies of horſe, in the mean time, took poſt in ſight of our camp, and obliged our advanced parties to obſerve the greateſt vigilance. Here the General intended to make a halt, both for the relaxation of the troops, and in order to learn the intentions and movements of the enemy. The French fleet, conſiſting of ſeven large ſhips of war and four frigates, lay at anchor off Pondicherry. Certain intelligence, however, was received, that the French Admiral was himſelf

ſelf too much diſtreſſed for want of men to 1781.
ſpare any for the aſſiſtance of Hyder.

But this commander, though unaſſiſted by his European ally, did not remain inactive. He was obſerved, on the 8th of February, nearly within cannon-ſhot of the front of our encampment, paſſing, with his eye fixed, as was ſuppoſed, on Cuddalore, at the head of his army. The drums inſtantly beat to arms. At four in the afternoon the army began to move, filing off by the left into the lower road towards Cuddalore. The enemy kept, what is called the Porto Novo road; ſo that the marches of both armies were parallel. Night was no ſooner ſet in, than the enemy began to throw rockets on our rear-guard, but at too great a diſtance for them to do any execution. On the 9th, the army encamped with its right to the ruins of Fort St. Davids, and its left to Cuddalore; a poſition which ſhewed our apprehenſions of the farther deſigns of the enemy. This minute deſcription will, perhaps, be excuſed, when it is conſidered that this is the firſt inſtance of an Engliſh army

1781. army being placed in ſuch a ſituation with regard to any of the native powers of India: an army, too, the beſt appointed that had ever taken the field in that country.

The Engliſh army, on the 10th, leaving their tents ſtanding, moved out from the cover of the guns of Cuddalore, and was formed in order of battle. A river ran along their front, and covered their right flank. Their left extended towards a range of ſtrong ground where cavalry could not act, and the bound hedge of Cuddalore, with three redoubts, ſecured their rear.—The army being thus arranged, the General rode along the line, and encouraged the ſoldiers to do their duty, with aſſurances that this day their labours would be at an end. "What I have all along wiſhed for," ſaid he, "has now come to paſs, and in a "few hours you join battle with the ene-"my." Other officers addreſſed the ſoldiers in words to the ſame purpoſe. In this ſituation, without tents, and the comforts which theſe afford, our men for three complete days offered battle to the enemy: who, it muſt not

be

be omitted, were at this time not leſs than 1781.
ten miles diſtant. The General, upon the fourth day, finding that Hyder would not accept of battle, returned to his camp, with a great increaſe in the number of his ſick. It was no wonder that the General was thus eager for battle. He was reduced to a few days proviſions; and delay to engage might be equal to defeat in an engagement.

Here let us pauſe for a moment to contemplate the alarming ſituation of our army, and the means by which they were extricated from impending ruin. Their proviſions were nearly exhauſted; an enemy's fleet was on the coaſt; Hyder-Ally was in poſſeſſion of the country round; and their cattle, on which they depended for the ability of moving from one place to another, dying in numbers for want of forage. The ſudden and unexpected departure of Monſieur D'Orves, the French Admiral, from the coaſt of Coromandel, brightened up the gloom that hung over the minds of our general officers, although they were careful to conceal

1781. conceal their anxiety from the troops under their command, by opening a channel for the reception of thoſe ſupplies which the unremitting vigilance and foreſight of the Supreme Council of Bengal conſtantly furniſhed. It is to the ſame vigilance and foreſight in our councils, that we are to aſcribe the ſeaſonable departure of the French Admiral. Sir Edward Hughes, after reducing the French fort of Maheé, and ruining Hyder's fleet in his own ports of Callicut and Mangalore, returned with a reinforcement of troops on board his fleet, from Bombay to the Coaſt of Coromandel. The certain information received by Monſieur D'Orves concerning the deſtination of the Engliſh, together with the loſs of the boats at Pondicherry, determined him to ſet ſail, which he did on the 15th of February, for the iſland of Mauritius. But had the French Admiral left only two frigates to block up the road of Cuddalore, conſequences might have happened as fatal to the intereſts of Great Britain in the Eaſt Indies, as flowed in North America, from the convention of Saratoga.

There

There is no reaſon, either of entertainment or inſtruction, to detail the particulars which fill the ſpace between the departure of the French fleet, and the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes with the Engliſh ſquadron and tranſports on the 14th of June. It may be mentioned, however, in general, that during this time Hyder-Ally was not idle. He plundered the country of Tanjore, he reduced the fortreſs of Tiagar, and cut off ſome of our flying parties; by which ſucceſſes he ſupported the ſpirits of his troops and raiſed their courage; and, what was of equal importance, maintained and heightened the glory of his name among the native powers of India. 1781.

Sir Eyre Coote, having encamped near Porto Novo on the 17th of June, marched, in perſon, a ſtrong detachment on the 18th to attack the fortified Pagoda of Chillumbrum, making the ſame deſperate aſſault that ſucceeded at Charangooly. He was repulſed, with the loſs of eight officers, and from two to three hundred men killed and wounded. A twelve-pounder, which was

1781. was uſed in blowing open the gates, added a field-piece to the train of the enemy.—When it is ſaid that a commander in chief heads an aſſault, or any deſperate enterprize in perſon, nothing more is commonly meant than that he is a ſpectator of what paſſes. Here the General's perſon was expoſed to great danger. Lieutenant Young, who commanded the European troops in this expedition, had his leg broken by the ſhot of a cannon, as he ſtood talking with him cloſe by his ſide.

It is but a ſhort way that the utmoſt human ſagacity can penetrate into the mazes of future events. The repulſe at Chillumbrum, which ſeemed pregnant with danger, extricated the Engliſh army from a moſt perilous ſituation, and happily changed the whole face of our affairs in the Carnatic. Even a return to Madras, if it could have been effected without a further loſs of men, would have been followed by effects little leſs diſaſtrous then what uſually accompany or flow from a defeat. It would have diſcovered to the native powers of India that

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our want of magazines would always oblige 1781.
us to keep near the ſea, or to make excurſions into the inland country: circumſtances which might be improved by a prudent adverſary for our diſadvantage and ruin.

The repulſe of our arms from Chillumbrum, which was greatly exaggerated to Hyder, with the preſſing entreaties of his auxiliary chiefs, and the French officer Lally, prevailed on the wavering mind of Hyder, notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of his eldeſt ſon, to offer the Engliſh battle.—Hyder, having remained for ſome weeks within random ſhot of Tanjore, ſet his face againſt Trichinopoly, and threatened to fill up the ditch with his Moormen's ſlippers. Tippoo ſtrongly adviſed him to purſue this object, urging, that the reduction of this place, which was equally defenceleſs and important, would extend his authority over the ſouthern provinces in the peninſula that acknowledged ſubjection to the Engliſh.—Hyder was not ignorant of the importance of Trichinopoly; but he was fluſhed with ſucceſs, and hoped that he would be able,

by

1781. by a cloſe engagement, to defeat the only force that could endanger either the conqueſt of the provinces ſouth of the Coleroon, on the one hand, or that of the Deccan on the other. He, therefore, took a poſition for that purpoſe, at a village called Mooteapollam, which commanded the common road from Porto Novo to Cuddalore, and to the natural ſtrength of his ground added ſeveral redoubts.

Our army, conſiſting of eight thouſand rank and file, with above ſixty pieces of cannon, marched from Porto Novo, with the ſea at no great diſtance on the right, early on the 1ſt of July, towards the enemy, whoſe number, according to the higheſt computation, exceeded an hundred, and according to the loweſt, did not fall ſhort of ſixty thouſand men, variouſly armed, with a field train of forty-ſeven pieces, of different calibres.

A detachment, conſiſting of two regiments of cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, with ſeven pieces of light artillery, was ordered to protect the baggage from Hyder's horſe.

horſe. This body of our troops, with the 1781.
uſual guard of an hundred and fifty Sepoys, a few Polygars, and a Marratta corps, were judiciouſly placed between the right of the army and the ſea. Our troops, formed in two lines, proceeded in order of battle.—Parties of horſe paraded in every direction, and great quantities of rockets were thrown without intermiſſion, to confound the obſervation, and, if poſſible, to throw the Engliſh army into diſorder, and to impede their movements. A large body of the enemy's cavalry now appeared, drawn up in great force on an extenſive plain. On this body the Engliſh opened an heavy cannonade, which forced them to retire as our men advanced. Their retreat opened to the General's view a range of redoubts, which commanded the road.—Struck with this unexpected appearance, he ordered the troops to halt, and called a council of his principal officers. To proceed forward in the direct line of their march, was to ruſh into the very throat of danger; the ſea confined their movements on the left hand, and impracticable ſand-banks on the right.

1781. During the halt of the army, and while a Council of War deliberated whether they ſhould advance or retreat, an officer, careleſsly walking to the right, diſcovered a road cut through the ſand hills. This road being examined, was found to be newly made, and calculated for the movement of troops and artillery. Hyder had made it the very night before, for the purpoſe of attacking the right of the Engliſh army, whilſt they ſhould be engaged in ſtorming the batteries in front. This further diſpoſition was intended by that artful commander, that, on the confuſion of our men, the main body of his cavalry ſhould ruſh from behind the batteries and complete the rout. This road, deſigned by Hyder-Ally for the overthrow of the Engliſh, was deſtined by Providence for their preſervation: for by this Sir Eyre Coote marched the troops, and effected their deliverance from apparent ruin.

Hyder, diſappointed in his ſtratagem, evacuated his works, and moved a-breaſt with

with our army, which, after paſſing through 1781.
the ſand-banks and quitting the road, turned to the left, and faced the enemy, who, in the poſſeſſion of a ridge of ſand-banks in front, ſeemed to offer a deciſive action.—The General, now, had not certainly any option; but, from ſome cauſe or other, a ſecond heſitation took place. Certain unaſked opinions were given in favour of a retreat, under the abject and ruinous notion of looking for more equal ground. To the honour of General Monro, it is right to mention, that when the enemy's batteries were diſcovered in front of our army, he gave his opinion againſt the madneſs of an attack: but that, in this ſecond ſituation, he urged the neceſſity of an attack, by the moſt ſenſible arguments and manly eloquence. A ſpace of time, which appeared to every individual in our army of great length, was conſumed, under the enemy's fire, who had withdrawn their guns from the batteries to the line, and preſented a new front, before the General determined to come to a cloſe attack: and it was during

1781. this interval, chiefly, that we ſuffered the loſs that was ſuſtained in this action.

Meanwhile, the heights in the rear of the firſt line of our army, led on by Sir Eyre Coote, were ſeized by General Stuart, who commanded the ſecond. This excellent diſpoſition encouraged Sir Eyre Coote to advance with confidence on the enemy. He marched up, at the head of the firſt line, to the enemy's artillery, quickly threw them into diſorder, and forced them to give way. But, previouſly to this attack, Hyder had detached a ſtrong body of diſciplined infantry, with a ſuitable train of artillery, a prodigious number of irregulars, and cavalry, to attack the Engliſh poſted on the heights. Another detachment alſo attempted, by penetrating into the interval between our two lines, to attack Sir Eyre Coote in the rear. Thus was each wing ſeparately, and almoſt equally engaged.—The freſh forces with which the enemy were inceſſantly relieved, rendered the battle long and obſtinate. It laſted above ſix hours, in

in which every individual in the Company's 1781.
ſervice fought as if the fate of the day had depended on his ſingle efforts. The firſt line, triumphing over every obſtacle, drove the enemy, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, promiſcuouſly before them. The ſecond line, under the command of Brigadier-General Stuart, had by this time, not only repulſed the other diviſion of the army, but driven them from their poſt and defeated every attempt they made to attack the General's rear. It was alſo the maſterly diſpoſition, and ſpirited exertions of the ſecond line, that protected the baggage, diſpoſed, as has been mentioned, cloſe by the ſea, from even the attempts of the enemy.

The rout was complete and general.—The tumult and confuſion in the retreat of ſuch a multitude of people tempted an eager purſuit, which, could it have been made, muſt have effected an unexampled carnage among men and cattle. But our guns were dragged ſlowly through deep and ſandy ſoil; while the numbers and the ſpirit of

1781. Hyder's cattle gave a celerity to his motion which ours could not equal. The greateſt loſs ſuſtained by the enemy happened before our ſecond line, where, ignorant of its force and ſtrong poſition, and miſtaking it for a common baggage guard, they made the only ſpirited attempt on their part; although, it muſt be allowed, that their artillery was ſerved with great promptitude and addreſs, during the whole courſe of the action.—What loſs of men is ſuſtained in an engagement by an Indian army, cannot be aſcertained with any degree of exactneſs, as it is a religious maxim with all the Hindoos, to carry off as many of their wounded and ſlain as they can. This they think of great importance, being perſuaded, that, after the body is burned, neither the evil principle or being, nor the dæmons of wrath who are ſubſervient to his will, have any power over the emancipated ſpirit: a notion that is in exact conformity to an ancient and very general doctrine, that matter is the grand principle of evil, and that the ſouls of thoſe who have departed from life, hover around, and

are

are attracted to their bodies, as long as they 1781.
are entire; either the whole coporeal frame, or any of the organized parts or members. The Marrattas, the Myſoreans, the Polygars, and in general all the Gentoo warriors, have their loins begirt with girdles or belts. The horſemen have an hook which they dart with great dexterity between thoſe belts and the dead bodies of their friends, and therewith carry them off from the field of battle. As nearly as could be conjectured, the number of the ſlain, on the ſide of Hyder, amounted to three thouſand: but what appeared in his fight a greater loſs, was the mortal wounds of Meer Saib, his favourite General and ſon-in-law, who, at the head of the Mogul and Canara cavalry, made the firſt impreſſion on the Britiſh lines, in the unfortunate action near Conjeveram. The Engliſh General halted near the field of action, from inability to purſue the enemy. Our loſs did not exceed four hundred, nor was there an officer of rank or diſtinction among either killed or wounded.

1781. Although no trophies were gained, or priſoners made, the firſt of July, 1781, will ever be accounted an important day to the eaſtern branch of the Britiſh empire. It broke that ſpell which was formed by the defeat of Colonel Baillie, and deſtroyed that reſpect which the name of Hyder-Ally-Cawn had obtained, from that diſaſtrous to this proſperous event, among ſuperſtitious obſervers, whoſe opinions are formed by the impreſſion of ſtriking events, more than by the deductions of reaſon,

The General, on the 3d of July, returned his thanks to the troops, gave orders for a *feu de joie*, and diſpatched expreſſes to every quarter with the news of the victory. His Majeſty's 73d regiment, on account of their diſtinguiſhed ſteadineſs in the field, as well as their exemplary deportment in quarters, were preſented by the General with fifty pounds to buy a pair of bag-pipes.

While theſe things were tranſacted near Porto Novo, a detachment under Tippoo Saib had inveſted Vandiwaſh, and begun to conſtruct

conſtruct batteries, and to make other ne- 1781.
ceſſary preparations for a ſiege. The General therefore determined to march to the northward, in order to relieve this place, and afterwards to form a junction with the Bengal detachment. Tippoo, on the approach of our army, precipitately raiſed the ſiege of Vandiwaſh, and joined the main army under Hyder, in the neighbourhood of Arcot.

Sir Eyre Coote, reinforced by ten battalions of Sepoys and twenty pieces of cannon, ſent from Bengal under the command of Colonel Pearſe, laid ſiege to Tripaſſore, which ſurrendered on the 22d of Auguſt, on terms of capitulation. A very ſeaſonable ſupply of paddy being found in the fort, the troops were provided with ſubſiſtence for ſeveral days, and the General, hearing that Hyder was, in full force, at the diſtance of about ſixteen miles, marched towards him, in order if poſſible to bring him to an engagement: the only meaſure that ſeemed to promiſe enlargement from ſurrounding difficulties. Hyder, on the approach

1781. proach of the Engliſh army, fell back a few miles, to the ground on which he had defeated the detachment under Colonel Baillie, where he took a very ſtrong poſition; and where, under the notion of its being a fortunate ſpot, he determined to try his fortune in a ſecond battle.

Theſe things being faithfully reported to the Britiſh commander, he marched towards the enemy on the 27th, in the morning, when, about eight o'clock, he diſcovered his army drawn up in order of battle, in full force, to receive him, and in poſſeſſion of many ſtrong and advantageous poſts, rendered ſtill more formidable by the nature of the interjacent country, which was interſected by very deep courſes of water.—Some cannon-ſhot being fired at our advanced guard, the army was immediately ordered to halt, till the baggage could be drawn to a ſtation allotted for it in the rear. This being done, the ſecond line, conſiſting of two brigades, turned to a ſituation of ſome ſtrength on the left. The firſt line, conſiſting of three brigades, filed off to the

place

place where the advanced guard had been fired on and formed in the face of a fire of ſix or eight pieces of cannon. This brought the front of the firſt line to a right angle with that of the ſecond, or, in military language, it gave the army a double front with a large interval. The General then ordered the firſt line to puſh through a ſpace of ground covered with buſhes and underwood, and to ſtorm the enemy's guns. When they cleared theſe obſtructions, nothing was to be ſeen except a line of horſemen at ſome diſtance: but ſuddenly the ſame guns that had been firing on our front, opened an enfilade on both our flanks. 1781.

When Hyder had thus completely entangled the firſt line, and not before, he opened a moſt tremendous cannonade on the ſecond. Sir Hector Monro, who commanded the firſt line, was of his own accord bringing round his front to the left, when he received orders from the General to join the ſecond line, as the left brigade under Colonel Owen were ſcarcely able to maintain their ground.—The diviſion of the army commanded by Monro,

1781. ro, after making the circuit that has been deſcribed, found themſelves, now, on the very ſpot where Colonel Baillie made his laſt ſtand. The fragments of bodies, the legs, arms and ſkulls, the manœuvres that were made, and the noiſe of the cannon, brought the bloody tragedy of September, 1780, full in their view, and made an impreſſion on their imaginations, which was to be ſurmounted only by military diſcipline, and a ſenſe of honour.

The firſt line now cloſing, and preſenting the ſame front with the ſecond, the whole army, in one connected line, was ordered to advance on the enemy's artillery. On this order, Sir Hector Monro ſubmitted to the Commander in Chief, what was murmured throughout the whole line, whether it would not be improper to abandon the ſhelter they derived from a long avenue and other trees, ſince the ground between the two armies was ſuch as could not be paſſed, and that an attempt to move cloſe up with the enemy, in that direction, would only expoſe them to the weight of their cannon,

non, without the poſſibility of their effect- 1781.
ing any object that might compenſate ſo great a diſadvantage. The General, in an hurry of ſpirits, which at ſuch a criſis might be well excuſed, and not perhaps attending to what Sir Hector Monro had ſaid, replied to his ſecond in command, "Sir, you talk "to me when you ſhould be doing your "duty*." In obedience, therefore, to the General's orders, the troops advanced more and more within reach of the enemy's cannon. The men dropped faſt, diſliked their ſituation, and became impatient. One tumbril had blown up at the inſtant when the two lines of the army were cloſing in one: a ſecond blew up now together with ſome limber boxes. Orders for ſome manœuvere were now expected from the General, by the firſt line, with great anxiety, but none arrived. Sir Hector Monro, ſitting by the only tree that was in the plain, in a ſullen mood, refuſed to give any orders whatever.

* This circumſtance is mentiond here, on account of Sir Hector Monro's having quitted the army, as ſoon as he could, and never again ſerving under Sir Eyre Coote.

The

1781. The ſecond line was in the utmoſt confuſion. The battalions, in opening for the purpoſe of giving way to the enemy's ſhot, had fallen into cluſters and become noiſy. Had the enemy charged our men with his numerous cavalry, from the left, at any period of the two hours during which our affairs were in this perilous ſituation, it is not improbable that we would have ſuffered diſcomfiture and defeat: and that the plains of Ticoallum, a ſecond time ſtrewed with the mangled bodies of the Engliſh, would have rivetted the ſuperſtition, and inflamed the cruelty of the barbarian conqueror.—Our cavalry, indeed, might have made good their retreat, as they were at ſome diſtance with the baggage: but the foot ſoldiers would never have been able to eſcape from the field: no! not perhaps even in the character of priſoners.

Happily, the diſorder of our line could not be eaſily perceived by the enemy: and there is reaſon to ſuppoſe that he neither knew of that confuſion, nor formed the plan of his operations, on the ſuppoſition that any

any confuſion was to happen. His chief 1781.
deſign, was to revive the ſpirits of his troops, and to convince the princes of the country, that he could yet engage, and make head againſt the greateſt European army that had ever taken the field in India.

The evening was now far advanced, when Hyder drew off his guns, and all was ſilence. It was thought adviſeable, at the ſame time, that our army ſhould march back to the ſtrong ground from which they had advanced. When the circumſtances that rendered it expedient to retire, were urged in a conference among the principal officers, one of the gentlemen happened unfortunately to make uſe of the word *retreat*. The General ſwore that he had never retreated in his life, but that he would *permit the army to fall back*. This happy expreſſion was followed by immediate orders for the troops to turn to the right about.

Our loſs, on this day, was heavier than on the 1ſt of July, and that of the enemy leſs, which was owning to their having ſheltered

1781. ſheltered themſelves under the cover of tanks, and other grounds which they poſſeſſed, favourable for that purpoſe. Of our privates ſix hundred either periſhed in the field or were deſperately wounded. General Stuart loſt his leg by a cannon-ſhot, whilſt bravely conducting the ſecond line to the ſupport of a poſt which the Commander in Chief had occupied at the commencement of the engagement, and on which the enemy had kept up a ſevere fire. The ſame ſhot alſo carried away the leg of Colonel Brown, and by his death, which ſoon followed, deprived the Eaſt-India Company of a very old and faithful ſervant, and the army, of an able and very experienced officer. Captain Hiſlop, alſo, a very active and ſpirited officer, and one of the General's aid-de-camps, fell in this obſtinate and indeciſive, not to ſay undecided, engagement.

The hircarrahs, or ſpies, ſent out by the General to diſcover Hyder's further plans, brought intelligence that the enemy had determined to attack the Engliſh army, ſome hour between midnight and break of day.

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In conſequence of this, orders were iſſued 1781.
for the whole line to lie all night under arms, in the front of the encampment. While our army guarded againſt an imaginary attack, the report of which had been induſtriouſly circulated by Hyder, that cautious commander, who judged it imprudent to leave his unconnected, in the vicinity of our diſciplined army, under the cloud of night, was retreating to a diſtance that might ſecure him againſt a ſurprize.

On the 28th of Auguſt, our dead were buried, and the wounded collected and dreſſed. The next day, our troops being maſters of the field of battle, and Hyder at ſome diſtance, the General ordered the men under arms, when our guns and ſmall arms announced a victory. The tents and baggage were then packed, and the troops put in motion for Tripaſſore, where they encamped on the 30th. Hyder called this march a retreat, and claiming a victory, proclaimed one, in all the pomp of war, to the nations of Hindoſtan.

1781. There was not any thing memorable that occurred before the 27th of September, when the Engliſh army, having pitched their camp, the day before, within four miles of Hyder, who waited for them at the paſs of Chillangur, was put in motion to try the fortune of a new battle. The baggage was thrown into a theatre which the hand of nature had formed. The ſecond brigade, with the two flank companies of the 73d regiment, the cavalry, and a train of twenty-two pieces of cannon, broke from the main body, and moved for ſome high ground to the left of the enemy's line of encampment, not yet ſtruck, while the main army continued to advance, in one line, upon the enemy's front. Hyder, who had aſſured himſelf from experience that Sir Eyre Coote would keep the whole of his troops together, and of courſe, had only guarded againſt a direct movement on his front, kept a ſteady eye on the left of our line and on the baggage.—A change of diſpoſition in an army unwieldy, and without ſubordination, involves an immediate retreat. Such was the army headed by Hyder-Ally. That experienced General

neral, therefore, inſtead of reſiſting the de- 1781.
tachment, endeavoured only to alarm them with a ſhew, and a ſlight attack by a body of horſe. He abandoned his deſign upon the left wing of our army and baggage, and, after a ſhort fire from his guns, ordered them to be carried off.

In doing this, his horſe were brought under our cannon, and ſuffered greatly. In the hurry of retirement, his guns were, at one time, huddled together in a miry place, which encouraged our men to advance againſt the enemy with greater rapidity.—Hyder, on perceiving this, inſtantly charged the aſſailants with a body of his beſt cavalry. This force interrupted the progreſs of our line: but after receiving many diſcharges of grape, and in reality ſurmounting their dangers, inſtead of riding againſt the files, they galloped through an opening they found in the line, and never ſtopped till they found themſelves without the reach of our cannon. One field piece, being a ſix-pounder, was found by our men, ſunk to the axle, and

1781. diſcovered to be one of the eight guns belonging to Colonel Baillie.

Night having overtaken our troops in the midſt of their victory, the ſecond brigade was called in, and the army encamped. In this action, which, from the paſs, is called the battle of Chillangur, Hyder-Ally loſt one thouſand men, and a greater number of horſes. The loſs, on our ſide, did not exceed that of one officer and ſixty private ſoldiers.

The General, without money and without proviſions, did not think it adviſable to purſue the retreating enemy: but, on the day after the action, directing his march to the interior Pollams, he came over eight miles of fatiguing ground, and encamped. What he had now in view, was, to offer the Polygars the ſame terms which, in the day of our proſperity we had violated, if they would eſpouſe our cauſe, and give up the intereſts of Hyder-Ally.

Theſe

The Polygars enjoy a degree of freedom unknown in the plains of India, the ſtrength of their ſituation, amidſt hills, woods, and deep ravines, producing the ſame effects with the like ſituations in other countries. There never was a power, among all the conquerors in India, to whom they ſo ſoon became tributary as that formidable invader, Hyder-Ally. The chief of the Polygars, in this part of the country, Bom Razee, had promiſed to furniſh Sir Eyre Coote both with money and rice, after Hyder ſhould be defeated, when he might do it with ſafety. The General now called upon him to fulfil his promiſes. The promiſes were continued, but the rice and money were not produced. The General, therefore, having ſerved out his laſt meaſure of rice, broke through the barrier, and penetrated into the interior Pollams, by a forced march, on the 1ſt of October, determined to compel Bom Razee to fulfil his engagements. On the 5th, he ſent out detachments from his camp at the village of Attamancherry, to bring in cattle and rice wherever they could be found. Theſe Bom- 1781.

1781. Razeé induſtriouſly threw in the way of our parties; a policy by which he hoped to avert the immediate vengeance of the Engliſh, whom he eſſentially ſerved, and to obtain from Hyder, in caſe of a reverſe of fortune, not only indulgence and excuſe on the ſcore of compulſion, but indemnification for his heavy loſſes.

On the 7th of October, a detachment of ſix battalions, two hundred horſe, and twelve field-pieces, under the command of Colonel Owen, marched out of the camp in the night, with the deſign of intercepting a large convoy from the Myſorean country on its way to Hyder's encampment at Lalpet. But Hyder, as uſual, receiving early intelligence of this attempt, ordered the convoy to return to one of his poſts.—In the mean time, as our affairs had now begun to wear a pleaſing aſpect, the army, without departing from that vigilance and military diſcipline which became their ſituation, enjoyed a grateful and ſalutary relaxation after their toils, in the delightful vale in which they were encamped, and Sir Eyre Coote

Coote liberally entertained his officers at a plentiful and feſtive board. But, on the 23d, having received the news of Colonel Owen's diſappointment and retreat, as ſoon as matters could be arranged after being ſo long in a fixed camp, they deſcended from the Polygar country, croſſed the plain of Paliput, and joined the detachment under Colonel Owen at the village of Mydowaddee. 1781.

A few days previous to the 23d, a company of European grenadiers commanded by Captain Moore, together with two twelve-pounders and ſome petards, joined Colonel Owen for the declared purpoſe of ſtorming the fort of Chittore. Hyder, not waiting for Owen's march to Chittore, formed the deſign of cutting him off, by coming between his camp and the paſs to which it was near. For this end, ſoon after it was dark, in the night of the 22d, he began his march from Lalpet, and, notwithſtanding the delays that uſually attend a nocturnal movement, he had gained in his progreſs four hours of day-light before Colonel Owen

1781. received any intelligence of his ſecret expedition. The Colonel, who had encamped only two miles weſtward of the paſs, fortunately arrived, by a rapid march, before the enemy. As the detachment began to defile, Hyder's cannon-ſhot fell among them with great execution. The confuſion into which this threw the battalion in the rear, encouraged a body of horſe to ruſh upon them at full gallop. The battalion was quickly diſperſed, and Captain Walker, who commanded it, was killed. The fall of this excellent officer and amiable man, on whom the according voice of all who knew him had beſtowed the epithet of *honeſt*, was exceedingly lamented, and drew not a little odium and reproach upon his battalion, to whoſe irreſolution it was generally aſcribed. The Sepoys ſeeing this battalion, which had hitherto been eſteemed one of the beſt in the ſervice, thus driven before the enemy, loſt all regard to the word of command, and fell into diſorder and conſternation.—What ſaved the detachment from entire deſtruction, was, Captain's Moore's company of Europeans, who at this critical moment wheeled

wheeled rapidly to the rear, and poured a volley of ſhot among the enemy, preſſing in crowds round a field-piece which our Sepoys had deſerted. By this ſpirited action the gun was recovered, the party that crouded around it diſperſed, the rapidity of the purſuit checked, and the Sepoys, recovered from their panic, reunited to the effective force of our little army. Captain Moore ſtill kept in the rear, which enabled Colonel Owen to make good his retreat with diſcipline, and without further riſk of deſtruction. Intelligence being received of the approach of the army, the detachment halted, and Hyder, rightly conjecturing, if not particularly informed of what had happened, withdrew the purſuit, and returned to his camp at Lalpet. In this expedition ſeven officers, and about three hundred men, were killed or wounded. Colonel Owen, with all his camp equipage, loſt his private baggage: but this was paid for by government, at the particular deſire of the Commander in Chief. 1781.

The

1781. The General, on the 26th October, removed his camp to Paliput, whither a detachment returned on the 30th, that had carried the ſick and wounded to Tripaſſore. This party fell in by accident with ſeven hundred bullocks laden with ſalt, which afforded a ſeaſonable ſupply to our troops. Theſe bullocks were the rear of a convoy of five thouſand deſtined for Hyder's camp: a due degree of information would have enabled our men to make an eaſy acquiſition of the whole.

Theſe immaterial circumſtances are introduced here as prefatory to an important obſervation made by every gentleman in the army that ſerved in the war againſt Hyder-Ally-Cawn, and Tippoo Saib, whether on the coaſt of Malabar or the Carnatic.—A battalion was never detached from our army but Hyder had the earlieſt notice of it: of Hyder's moſt capital movements we had not the ſmalleſt intelligence.—Hyder, it is well known, paid liberally for information; and it is as well known, that a moſt ſparing hand dealt out the money that was paid for ours.

ours. The natives of the Carnatic, though by nature puſillanimous, will undergo great hazards for the ſake of gain: but the meaneſt hireling will not incur the riſk of torments and death for *five pagodas:* yet ſecret-ſervice money was charged to government to a large amount.—Surmiſes fell on ſome agents; but none on the General. 1781.

About the 1ſt of November, at ſome diſtance from the Engliſh camp near the village of Paliput, a valuable quantity of rice was found, and ſufficient for the ſupply of the garriſon of Vellore, which from the want of that neceſſary article was at this time in the greateſt diſtreſs. In conveying the rice to that place, our army met not with the leaſt moleſtation: not that our movements eſcaped the uſual vigilance of Hyder, but becauſe he was not able, at this juncture, to bring his numerous and ill-regulated body, governed not by diſcipline, but in a great meaſure by circumſtances of ſuperſtition and currents of paſſion, to meet our men in the field of battle. This ſupply, therefore, notwithſtanding the reports induſtriouſly ſpread

1781. ſpread by the enemy, of ſtations occupied for cutting it off, was ſafely conveyed to Vellore: and, on the 7th, the army ſat down before Chittore, which, after a ſiege of two days, when our troops were in readineſs to ſtorm it, propoſed, on the 10th, terms of capitulation. The Keeladar, having fortified himſelf with bang, came out, with a few attendants, carrying a flag of truce, and boldly declared, that he would defend Chittore to the laſt extremity, unleſs the garriſon ſhould be permitted to go where they pleaſed, and to carry off all their private property. His conditions were granted, and the fort was given up. The ſenior engineer of our army, Captain Tippet, was killed by a random ball from a match-lock piece; but the firing from two very bad guns did not the ſmalleſt hurt to any of our officers or ſoldiers. From the forts of Charangooly, Tripaſſore, and Chittore, being without artillery, we may ſuppoſe that Hyder never conſidered them as tenable. The garriſons held on the frontier were in a far different ſtate of defence.

At

At this time the heavens threatened every 1781.
inſtant the fall of the Monſoon floods: yet ſtill the army continued to lie before Chittore, from the reduction of which they had not derived one advantage. They became ſtraitened for want of rice to feed the Sepoys, and began to feel the diſtreſſes of forces checked in their views, and cut off from their ſupplies. The General, who no doubt had his reaſons for continuing before Chittore, was diſappointed in ſome expectation, not publicly revealed, and manifeſted unequivocal ſymptoms of chagrin and diſcontent.

But, upon the 15th of November, Sir Eyre Coote was called from this ſcene of inaction, and apparent ſuſpence, by a letter received from Captain Temple, the officer left at Paliput, informing him that Hyder in perſon had fallen on his poſt unexpectedly, that he himſelf and his Sepoys had found protection in the hills, but that the baggage and guns had become the property of the enemy. Orders were now given for the army to march next morning from Chittore,

1781. Chittore, in which Captain Lamotte was left with two field-pieces and a battalion of Sepoys. When the General began to move from this place, on the 16th, Mahommed Ally, one of Hyder's auxiliary chiefs, made a ſhew of cavalry, as if he meant to diſpute the paſſage of the Engliſh over the river Ponee, but retreated before a few cannon balls. The army ſoon after this encamped at the paſs of Delamampetta, through which they deſcended on the 17th of November, and halted at Paliput. Here they were joined by Captain Temple's battalion, and the General was informed that it had been determined by Hyder, that Tippoo ſhould march through the Pollams, ſtop at Pollore, and, with the guns he ſhould take there added to thoſe of which he had became maſter at Paliput, advance to the ſiege of Tripaſſore.

A heavy cannonade, heard in the Engliſh camp, within a few hours, confirmed this intelligence, and ſummoned, in all the terrific pomp of war, the Engliſh army, to the relief of their friends in diſtreſs.

On

On the 19th, they had no ſooner ſet out in their march to Tripaſſore, than the clouds broke, and thoſe rains deſcended, which, in the fall of the year, pouring from the perpendicular ſides of extenſive mountains, render the rivers impaſſable in the ſhort ſpace of two days. The General, urged by the gathering floods, with the beds of three rivers on the rout that lay before him, continued his march without interruption till ten o'clock at night, when the van was ordered to halt: but the rear did not come up till one o'clock on the next day. The roads were already ſo much deepened by the rains, that an elephant, three camels, and a number of horſes, with many carriages and bullocks, ſtuck faſt in the mud, and were left behind our men on their march. The laſt branch of the Polaar was found juſt fordable when they croſſed it on the 21ſt. On the evening of that day the army encamped near Tripaſſore, with no more than two days proviſions. Tippoo Saib, although he had made a breach in one of the ſides of the forts, had withdrawn his forces: a circumſtance which ſeemed to juſtify 1781.

1781. tify the opinion of the commanding officer, that Tippoo did not act with a view to obtain poſſeſſion of Tripaſſore, and that the attack on this place was a plan of Hyder's for drawing the Engliſh from the Pollams. It happened fortunately for our army, whatever were the ſtratagems of the enemy, that the cannonade againſt Tripaſſore haſtened their ſteps as they returned from thoſe hilly regions.

Sir Eyre Coote, November 23d, altered the poſition of the troops by encamping on the Coccalore plain above Tripaſſore. The army, having loſt one third of the ſtrength it poſſeſſed when it marched, in Auguſt, from the Mount, occupied, on the 3d of December, the cantonements from which it had been drawn together on the ſame month of the preceding year. This campaign abounds with incidents more intereſting in their nature, as they lead to general concluſions, than important in their immediate and particular effects. It was not marked by any event that promiſed to decide the general iſſue of the war, but it ſhewed

Europeans

Europeans the means by which they may be ſucceſsfully oppoſed by Aſiatic enemies. 1781.

While our army lay encamped on the plain of Coccalore, a royal ſalute was fired on account of the reduction of the Dutch garriſon of Negapatnam, by the combined forces of the navy under Sir Edward Hughes, and the army ſtationed in Tanjore, the command of which had been given to Major-General Sir Hector Monro. The garriſon, in this place, had been reinforced by a large detachment of Hyder-Ally's troops, and new works had been added, by French engineers, to the fortifications.—The garriſon conſiſted of eight thouſand men, but of theſe only five hundred were Europeans. On the 21ſt of October, the Company's troops appeared at Nagore.—The ſame day, the whole corps of marines, amounting to four hundred and forty-three, officers included, landed, and joined the Company's troops; and, on the 22d, a battalion of ſeamen from the ſquadron, conſiſting of eight hundred and twenty-ſeven, including officers, was alſo landed: the whole

1781. under the command of the Captains Mackenzie, Mackay, and Reynolds, with orders to co-operate with Sir Hector Monro to the utmoſt, in all meaſures for the reduction of Negapatnam. In the mean time, battering cannon for the attack, conſiſting of four eighteen-pounders, and two twelve-pounders, iron guns from the tranſports, with twelve eighteen-pounders from the ſhips of the ſquadron, two mortars with their carriages, and a ſuitable quantity of amunition of all kinds, were landed through a great ſurf by the boats of the ſquadron, and on rafts, or catamarans, made for that purpoſe, with incredible fatigue to the men, but at the ſame time with incredible ſpeed and alacrity.

The ſtrong lines which the enemy had thrown up, flanked by redoubts, to cover and defend the approach to the town, being ſtormed, and carried by our troops, the General opened ground againſt the north face of the fort on the 3d of November, and the approaches were carried on with great rapidity. On the 5th Sir Edward Hughes moved

moved with a part of the ſquadron nearer 1781.
to the fort, on the flank of the Britiſh lines, and on the 6th, early in the morning, he came on ſhore, to concert with the General the beſt means of carrying on the ſiege with vigour. A battery of ten eighteen-pounders, within three hundred paces of the walls of the place being ready to open, a joint ſummons was ſent from the General and Admiral to the Dutch Governor, requiring him to capitulate, which he refuſed to do in poſitive terms. But a moſt formidable breach-battery having played on a baſtion with great effect, the Dutch Governor, who, during the courſe of the ſiege had made two deſperate ſallies, with the greater part of the garriſon, early in the morning of the 11th demanded a parley, and ſent out two commiſſioners to the General in camp, with terms of honourable capitulation, which were granted.

The Admiral, after experiencing all the viciſſitudes of a monſoon, and receiving on board his ſquadron a detachment of the Company's land forces, conſiſting of an

1781. officer and thirty European and native artillery, and about five hundred volunteer Sepoys, under a captain and five ſubalterns, ſailed from the road of Negapatnam, on the
1782. 2d of January, and arrived in Trincomalè Bay, in the iſland of Ceylon, on the 4th, where he found an Engliſh ſhip of war, under the command of Captain Montague, that had been ſtationed, by the foreſight and activity of Government, ever ſince the month of Auguſt, 1781, for the purpoſe of blocking up the Dutch ſhips in the harbour. Our troops were landed on the 5th, and, on the night of that day, Trincomalè fort was taken without reſiſtance. The grenadier company of marines, with the guns, ruſhed into it through the gateway, while the Governor was drawing up terms of capitulation. In this fortreſs, which commanded the only place where proviſions and ſtores could be landed from the ſhips, ten iron guns were found of different calibres: and three officers with forty men were made priſoners.

The

The Admiral now directed his force a- 1782.
gainſt Fort Oſtenburgh, ſituated on the top of an high hill which commanded the harbour, and containing all that remained of the ſtrength of the enemy. After an interchange of ſeveral polite and friendly letters, between Sir Edward Hughes and Van Albert Homoed the Governor, who had lived on the footing of intimate acquaintance and perſonal attachment, Oſtenburgh was taken by aſſault, about day-light, in the morning of January 11th. The aſſailants had the misfortune of loſing Lieutenant George Long, ſecond lieutenant to the Admiral, who was killed as he bravely advanced to the aſſault at the head of his company, and alſo twenty non-commiſſioned and private ſeamen and marines. Lieutenant Wolſely, who commanded a company of ſeamen, Lieutenant Samuel Orr, who commanded the grenadier company of marines, and did duty as a Brigade-Major, and forty non-commiſſioned and private ſeamen and marines were wounded. The enemy loſt but few men, as they ſoon, for the moſt part, threw down their arms; and their lives,

1781. though forfeited by the laws of war, were ſpared by the clemency of the conqueror.—The Governor with the garriſon, conſiſting of about four hundred Europeans, including officers, were taken priſoners.

By theſe ſucceſſes, eaſily obtained, the Dutch were driven entirely from the coaſt of Coromandel, an avenue was opened to the reduction of their ſettlements in Ceylon, and a door was opened into the heart of Tanjore, which ſpread the terror of the Engliſh name throughout that and the adjacent countries. Hyder-Ally's troops evacuated all the forts and ſtrong-poſts they held in Manjore; and the Polygars in the Marawa and Tinavelly provinces, who, at the inſtigation of Hyder, had rebelled againſt the Nabob of the Carnatic, and taken part againſt us, returned to their obedience.

The reduction of the Dutch forts was a meaſure that originated with Lord Macartney, who ſucceeded to the inglorious Mr. Whitehill in the government of Madras, and

and who firſt brought the news of a Dutch war, in June 1781, to India. 1782.

While the Engliſh fleet was employed in making and ſecuring the eaſy acquiſitions above deſcribed, the movements of our land armies in the Carnatic and in Tanjore were as follow.—Sir Eyre Coote, informed of the diſtreſs, marched to the relief of the garriſon of Vellore: but, on the 5th, indiſpoſition, ariſing not more from bodily fatigue and the cares of war, than from the vexatious diſputes in which he found himſelf involved with the new Governor of Madras, was obliged to halt at Tripaſſore. The General's declining frame, on this anxious day, was threatened with inſtant diſſolution, and his life was deſpaired of for ſeveral hours. On the 6th, however, his ſtrength was ſo far reſtored, as to admit of being borne in his palanquein. The army rejoiced at his diſcovery, reſumed their march, and encamped at a village called Edinburg, which, from its ſameneſs with the name of the capital of Scotland, affected the 73d

1782. regiment with a lively and tender recollection of their native country.

Nothing material paſſed till the 10th, when the army, now in the ſight of Vellore, with the convoy to the right under the hills, dragging their artillery through a deep moraſs, which Hyder had thrown in their way by breaking down the banks of a tank, were ſtruck, with the appearance of the enemy's line, which to the eye appeared to be regular, ſhooting towards their rear and baggage. But happily our army had croſſed the moraſs before they came up. A diſtant cannonade now commenced, which laſted above ſix hours, and by which we had three ſubaltern officers and ſixty-nine ſoldiers killed, or loſt to the ſervice by heavy cannon-ſhot wounds. The convoy was ſafely lodged in Vellore on the 11th, and on the 13th, the army coming up to the ſame moraſs, in their return, found Hyder prepared on the other ſide to diſpute their paſſage. A diſtant cannonade took place between the two armies, by which the Engliſh loſt Captain Lucas of the artillery, and nearly

nearly the ſame number of men that fell by the firing of the 10th. Hyder fell back, and our men purſued their march. 1782.

Upon the 15th, the army, after a long march, encamped near Tritani Pagoda, from whence the enemy's camp was ſeen at a diſtance, fronting ours. On the 16th, the General moved the army about two miles nearer the enemy, who alſo, on their part, drew ſomewhat nearer to our troops. Various manœuvres were practiſed on both ſides. Sir Eyre Coote challenged Hyder-Ally to try the fortune of a battle on ground approved by the Engliſh; and Hyder, in his turn, challenged Sir Eyre Coote to come on and meaſure the ſtrength of the Engliſh with his, on ground which he had choſen. After a mutual diſcharge of artillery, the armies parted, and pitched their tents.

The Engliſh General, having returned to the Mount, applied himſelf to the conſtruction of magazines, one at Chingliput and one at Tripaſſore; a meaſure which, could it have been carried into execution ſooner, would

1782. would have ſoftened the inconveniencies, given ſyſtem to the marches, and advantage and effect to the victories gained by the army. The continuance of our troops in this ſtation was prolonged by the unhappy differences between Sir Eyre Coote and Lord Macartney, which made it neceſſary for the General to ſolicit from the Supreme Council of Bengal the reſtoration of his authority over the ſouthern army, that he might be able to direct the co-operation of the whole force under his command, in ſuch a manner as might facilitate his own, and counteract the movements of the enemy.

With the inaction of our main army at this time, however neceſſary in ſome reſpects, we are to connect, perhaps, in the relation of cauſe and effect, the overthrow of our ſouthern army in Tanjore, under Colonel Braithwaite, and the re-capture of conqueſts made from Hyder-Ally on the coaſt of Malabar.

The troops under the command of Colonel Braithwaite, deſtined for the protection

tion of Tanjore and the neighbouring pro- 1782.
vinces, conſiſted of twenty-five European and one hundred and thirteen native artillery, ten field-pieces, one howitzer, one hundred and forty-two native cavalry mounted, and the ſame number diſmounted, one hundred and nineteen light infantry, with twenty-three artillery attached to the cavalry, the tenth battalion, and eight companies of the thirteenth battalion of Sepoys, two grenadier companies of the ſixteenth battalion, and ſix grenadier companies of Sepoys.—This force, amounting to about two thouſand and thirteen men, infantry and cavalry, lay in camp on the banks of the Coleroon, at the diſtance of forty miles from Tanjore. Colonel Braithwaite, ſituated in an open plain, was evidently expoſed to the enemy's cavalry; though apparently ſecured from any ſudden attack, by ſeveral large and deep rivers which lay between him and Hyder-Ally, who was at a conſiderable diſtance.—But Hyder, apprized of theſe circumſtances, determined to cut off this detachment, as he had done that under Colonel Baillie.

Tippoo

1782. Tippoo Saib, accompanied by Monſieur Lally with four hundred French infantry, marched on this enterprize, at the head of twenty thouſand troops of his own, one half of which was cavalry. With this formidable army, and twenty pieces of cannon, he ſuddenly ſurrounded the Engliſh, unprepared and unable to reſiſt him. Colonel Braithwaite, on the approach of Tippoo, endeavoured to march off to Tanjore, or ſome other place of ſafety. Superior numbers on the ſide of the enemy rendered this impoſſible, and brought on an action, which was continued from the 16th to the 18th day of February. For the ſpace of twenty-ſix hours, an unremitted fire of cannon and ſmall arms was ſupported on both ſides. The Engliſh commander, attacked in every quarter, that he might preſent a front every way to the enemy, threw his detachment into an hollow ſquare, with his field-pieces interſperſed in its faces, and his ſmall body of cavalry in the centre. The Colonel, though wounded and bleeding, would not withdraw from the ſcene of action for a moment: but encouraged the efforts of his intrepid

intrepid little army, by looks, voice, and 1782.
action. A violent cannonade on all ſides was expected to make a breach in our lines, in ſome quarter of the ſquare in which our troops were formed or other. Tippoo watched every appearance that might encourage an irruption of his cavalry, and wherever he judged that his fire arms had made an impreſſion, he led them on by examples, by promiſes, by threats, by ſtripes, and fugitives ſlain with his own hands.—They advanced repeatedly to the charge, but were as often repelled by ſhowers of grape-ſhot, and that of muſketry. The moment they were driven back, the Britiſh cavalry ruſhing forwards from the centre of the ſquare, through openings made by our well-diſciplined troops for that purpoſe, purſued them with heavy and unreſiſted execution to a proper diſtance, and then returned to their proper ſtations. But, at laſt, when great numbers of our men had fallen, and thoſe who remained were worn down with wounds and fatigue, Monſieur Lally, at the head of his four hundred Europeans, with fixed bayonets, ſupported by ſeveral battalions

1782. battalions of infantry, and flanked by prodigious numbers of cavalry, marched with ſteady reſolution to attack that ſide of the ſquare which had been moſt expoſed, and ſuffered moſt in the action. Our exhauſted Sepoys, unable to repulſe the onſet of ſuch a body of Europeans coming freſh into action, daring from the vaſt army that ſupported them, and confident of ſucceſs, were inſtantly thrown into confuſion. The enemy's cavalry ruſhed in amongſt our diſordered troops. A dreadful carnage enſued; nor would one have remained of this unfortunate body of men to report the fate of his friends, if the humanity of an European officer had not been oppoſed to the barbarous fury of Aſiatic conquerors. Monſieur Lally loſt not a moment in putting a ſtop to the effuſion of blood. The French troops readily obeyed his orders. But it was not till the ſword of the Commander was dyed with the blood of five individuals, among his native troops, that they ceaſed to indulge their ſavage fury.

It is remarkable, that notwithſtanding 1782.
the length of this engagement, and the ſlaughter that followed, of upwards of twenty officers, one only was killed, and only eleven wounded. Tippoo Saib treated his priſoners, eſpecially the officers and the wounded men, with great humanity: nor was aught omitted, within the compaſs of his power, that might alleviate their diſtreſſes. But a particular account of all theſe things is added in the ſequel of theſe Military Memoirs.

The efforts of the Governor-General and Council, and the perſonal exertions of Sir Eyre Coote, ſtemmed the torrent of invaſion: but, without new channels for its reception, were unable to divert it. Hyder-Ally, notwithſtanding that in every encounter our main army kept the field, and marched and countermarched whitherſoever the relief of the diſtreſſed or the hope of advantage and deciſive engagement called them, by the poſſeſſion of many ſtrong holds, and the devaſtation of the open country, had eſtabliſhed himſelf ſo firmly

1781. firmly in the Carnatic, that every exertion on our part, to drive him out from that quarter, was evidently beyond our ſtrength and impracticable. To attack Hyder's dominions from the coaſt of Malabar, which had before been a collaterel, became, now, a primary object of political conſideration: for this was the only meaſure that could deliver our poſſeſſions on the Coromandel coaſt from their dangerous invader.

What was now confirmed by experience, the ſagacity of government had ſuſpected. The firſt idea, accordingly, which occurred to the Governor-General, after ſending a ſupply of men and treaſure to Madras, was, to make a diverſion in favour of our operations on the eaſtern, by an attack on Hyder on the weſtern coaſt of the peninſula of Hindoſtan: But this was inſeparably connected with another object: peace with the Marrattas.—For this purpoſe, propoſals for an accommodation with that nation, were tranſmitted, in October, 1780, to the adminiſtration of Poonah, in which we offered to relinquiſh every conqueſt, excepting Ahmedabad

medabad and Gualior, the firſt of which had been guarantied to Futty Sing, and the ſecond to the Ranah of Gohud, upon conditions that the Marrattas ſhould unite with us in an offenſive alliance againſt Hyder-Ally, of whoſe poſſeſſions a conqueſt was to be made, and equal diviſion. Some ſtipulations, ſufficiently favourable, were propoſed reſpecting Roganaut-Row. The Rajah of Berar's offer of mediation and guarantee on this occaſion was accepted, himſelf permitted to become a party, and the treaty of courſe tranſmitted to him through the Marratta miniſter. 1781.

It was ſtipulated, among the preliminary articles of peace, ſent at this time to Poonah, that the Commander in Chief of the Engliſh army ſhould immediately ſuſpend all hoſtilities and military operations againſt the Marrattas, whenever he ſhould receive a requiſition to that effect from the Paiſhwa; and that ſimilar orders ſhould be given, on his part, to the officer commanding the Marratta armies. Copies of the propoſed treaty were ſent to the Select Committee of

1781. Bombay, and to General Goddard. To the General formal orders were alſo ſent for a ceſſation of arms whenever the Marratta miniſter ſhould require it: but, until a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities ſhould be required, he was directed to proſecute the war with the utmoſt vigour.

Three months having elapſed from the date of the treaty, and no notification received from the Paiſhwa, either of its arrival, or of any reſolution to which he had come after taking it into conſideration, our military operations were continued with unremitted ardour, and, in the middle of January, 1781, the whole of the army aſſembled at Viſrabuy, a place about twenty miles inland from Baſſein, which is accounted among the Hindoos a place of great ſanctity, and alſo held in high reputation for its hot-wells, which are ſaid to have great medicinal virtues. From this poſt it was determined to advance to Poonah, the ſeat of the Marratta Government.

There

There is a chain of high hills, riſing al- 1781.
moſt perpendicularly from the plains below, which extends itſelf from north to ſouth, along the Malabar coaſt, from Guzzarat to to Cape Comorin, though indenting the land at different diſtances from the ocean. Between the Gauts or Paſſes that lead through this range of mountains into the country of the Marrattas to the eaſt, which from its great elevation is ſtiled the Bala Gaut, and bounded by the ſea, on the weſt lies a tract of country of conſiderable extent, called the Concan. In this country, and at the foot of the hills and Gauts that form its eaſtern boundary, there was a Marratta army, conſiſting of at leaſt twenty thouſand horſe and foot, with about fifteen pieces of artillery. Theſe were poſted on the road to Bore Gaut, one of the moſt eaſy and practicable paſſes, and where the enemy expected that we meant to make our aſcent into their country, as it had been made choice of for the ſame end by the government of Bombay on a former occaſion, and was in fact the neareſt, and moſt convenient route to the Marratta capital, which is not at a

1781. greater diſtance from this paſs than five and forty miles. The Marrattas, notwithſtanding their numbers, oppoſed not any thing to the progreſs of our troops, excepting a few ſlight ſkirmiſhes, in which they always ſuffered defeat and diſadvantage. But when our troops reached Campoley, on the 8th of February, at the entrance of the Bore Gaut, they were informed that the enemy had previouſly aſcended this paſs, and that there was reaſon to apprehend that they had come to a reſolution of diſputing it obſtinately. Certain intelligence was brought, that about forty thouſand infantry, with a ſuitable train of artillery, had taken poſt at the top of it, and that the whole Marratta army, lately reinforced by fifteen thouſand men under Holkar, and about half that number under another chief called Roganaut Pundit, was encamped at no great diſtance.

General Goddard, conſidering that delay would not only increaſe the confidence of the enemy but afford them an oportunity of conſtructing new works, which would render the paſs every day more difficult and hazardous,

hazardous, reſolved to ſeize it that very night by ſtorm. The grenadiers, under the command of Colonel Parker, entered into the foot of the Paſs at midnight, and by ſteep and rugged paths, through narrow and winding defiles, aſcended to its very ſummit, drove them from Condolah, and thus completely ſubdued all that could now obſtruct their progreſs to the place of their deſtination. The terrour of the enemy, at the near approach of our army to their capital, was ſo great, that they entirely burnt and deſtroyed Tullicanoon, a very conſiderable town, about half way, and had actually made every preparation for ſetting fire to Poonah, by filling the houſes with ſtraw, and removing the inhabitants with their effects to the neighbourhood of Setterah. 1781.

This circumſtance being known, with many other conſiderations, prevented our army from advancing to the capital, and confined the remaining operations of the campaign to a defence of the conqueſts already made. As our whole force did not exceed ſix thouſand men, while that of the

1781. enemy was not leſs than eight times that number, it was impoſſible to make any diviſion of their force, or even to leave a detachment ſufficiently ſtrong to defend the poſt at Bore Gaut, if they ſhould advance beyond it: unaſſiſted by cavalry, they could not hope to command proviſions, or even to procure forage, in a country deſolated and ruined: and this circumſtance would have obliged them to carry along with them a very ample ſupply of grain, which, of courſe, would have greatly encumbered and endangered their march.

It is further to be obſerved, that an invaſion of the Deccan, where there was not any hope of their being joined by any party of the Marratta ſtate, promiſed not any event that could materially influence the ſtate of the war, and far leſs decide its termination. Without any determinate object to be attained, or the hope of a revolution to encourage their continuance, for any length of time, in the country, all that they would have acquired, would have been the empty glory of poſſeſſing for a few days, the Marratta capital,

tal, in effecting a retreat from which they must have incurred the most imminent dangers. 1781.

It had uniformly been the decided opinion of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, that nothing but a vigorous profecution of the war againſt the Marrattas could bring either that, or the general war in which we were engaged in India, to an honourable iſſue. Yet, in repeated letters from the coaſt of Coromandel, the moſt pointed and urgent repreſentations were continually made of the neceſſity of making a powerful diverſion in favour of our army in the Carnatic. In theſe letters the diſadvantages which that meaſure would relieve, and the farther loſſes which it would obviate, were painted in lively and alarming colours, without any conſideration of the actual ſtate of Bombay, or of the certain ruin with which that Preſidency, if the force neceſſary for its ſecurity ſhould be detached on a remote and ſeperate ſervice, would be menaced by the Marrattas.

1781. In theſe embaraſſing circumſtances, the Government of Bombay, in concert with General Goddard, ſtrained every nerve to afford relief to that of Madras, without leaving themſelves entirely defenceleſs.—But the utmoſt exertion that could be made on the weſtern ſide of India, at a time when they were engaged in a war with the whole Marratta empire, was, to relieve the Madras troops at Tellicherry, by an equal proportion from Bombay, and to ſend the former round to the coaſt of Coromandel. General Goddard, in order to carry this expedient into execution, deſcended the Bore Gaut, and marched towards the ſea coaſt. This movement was concerted with ſuch ſecrecy and ſkill, that the whole of the artillery and heavy ſtores reached the foot of the paſs in ſafety, and without the ſmalleſt interruption from the enemy, who were aſtoniſhed, on the morning of the 18th April, to find, that our poſt at Condolah had been deſerted during the preceding night.

The country through which the army was to paſs, in their march to the ſea-coaſt, was

was well calculated to reſiſt any impreſſion 1781.
from horſe, being exceedingly full of thick buſhes and jungles, with broken ground and narrow defiles, where it would be impoſſible, except in a very few places, for cavalry to act in a body. Yet was not this ſtrong ground the leſs dangerous to our troops.—They were ſecured by diſcipline, valour, and confidence ariſing from invariable ſucceſs againſt the moſt furious charge that could be made by Marratta horſe: but they were expoſed to the attacks of infantry, that might be lodged, in ſeparate parties, in hollow ways, behind rocks and buſhes, and in other places of concealment.

It was accordingly this very mode of attack that was adopted by the enemy, who, to the number of fifty thouſand men, ten thouſand of which were infantry, and moſtly Scindies and Arabs, the braveſt troops unacquainted with Euroropean diſcipline in Hindoſtan, fell down into the Concan, under the command of their principal chiefs, Hurry Punt, Furkea, Buriſs Rambow, and Tuckajee Holkar. The diſtance from the

ſea

1781. ſea to the foot of the Gauts was about twenty-four miles, and during the whole march of the Engliſh army, which laſted three days, the enemy exerted their utmoſt efforts to haraſs and annoy their line, without any other effect than killing and wounding a few of their camp-followers and private ſoldiers. But, while they were unable to obtain the ſmalleſt advantage over our troops, or even to ſeize any part of the great quantity of neceſſary ſtores that attended them, the number that fell, during a conflict that continued for three days, by the well-directed fire of our men, on their part, was very conſiderable.

In this action, the laſt of any conſequence that took place between the Marrattas and the Engliſh, Colonel Parker, the ſecond in command, gallantly loſt his life.

While the army were diſpoſed in winter quarters, General Goddard, notwithſtanding the tempeſtuous weather, which renders the navigation

navigation on the coaſt of Malabar, at that ſeaſon, extremely dangerous and almoſt impracticable, ſailed for Surat, where he arrived on the ſecond of Auguſt. Soon after his arrival, he effected an interview with Futty Sing and obtained from that chief a body of five thouſand horſe for the ſervice of the enſuing campaign, which exceeded by two thouſand the number he was obliged to furniſh by treaty. This important object being accompliſhed, and ſuch military arrangements being made as were not only neceſſary for the protection of Guzzarat, but for co-operating with the Bengal detachment ſtationed on the northern confines of Malva, the General returned to Bombay. 1781.

Immediately after the return of the enemy from the Gauts, the greater part of the Madras detachment, relieved by troops from Bombay, agreeably to the reſolution above mentioned, was ſent round from Tellicherry to the coaſt of Coromandel. Tellicherry is a valuable ſettlement upon the coaſt of Malabar, dependant on the

1781. the Preſidency of Bombay. It has a good road for ſhipping; and here the coaſting veſſels between Bombay and the coaſt of Coromandel are ſupplied with refreſhments. A briſk commerce has been carried on at this place, particularly in the pepper trade, ever ſince the firſt diſcovery of India by Europeans. After the capture of Maheé from the French, it was garriſoned by the Madras detachment, who defended it againſt the attacks of the Nairs, tributary to Hyder-Ally.

On the 9th of May 1781, Major William Abington arrived at Tellicherry, with a relief to the Garriſon, conſiſting of a detachment of artillery, one company of infantry, and the 10th and 11th battalions of Sepoys. After landing his troops, which were immediately ſent to relieve the Madras Europeans and Sepoys in various parts of the lines, his firſt care was to viſit and inſpect the fortifications. Theſe were of great extent, reaching from Moylan to Codoley and nearly five miles in circumference. They had of late been

been much neglected, on a ſuppoſition that 1781.
the ſettlement was to have been withdrawn, and, in many places, they exhibited the appearance of deformed and defenceleſs ruins. Theſe circumſtances, joined to the ſituation of the enemy, ſuggeſted to the Major the idea of making an attack, inſtead of purſuing defenſive operations; but that deſign not being approved of by the Madras commander, was dropt. On the 15th, Major Cotgrave embarked with the Madras troops, and left the garriſon to the charge of Major Abington.

A truſt of ſuch difficulty was not to be diſcharged ſucceſsfully by common genius, nor confined experience in the art of war. Lines of vaſt extent, and ruinous condition, were to be repaired and defended by a ſmall number of troops; while they were continually aſſaulted by an enormous army of ſubtle, fierce, and obſtinate barbarians. The reparation of the works became the grand object of the Major's attention, and ſo conſtantly and aſſiduouſly were the engineers employed, that in a few days a ſmall battery

1781. battery was opened with conſiderable effect. The moſt judicious orders were, at the ſame time, iſſued to the outpoſts and centinels, to prevent the danger of a ſudden attack.

A hircarrah ſent out in queſt of intelligence, returned with an account, that the enemy's force altogether exceeded not twelve thouſand; that Surdar Cawn, their leader, had lately received ſome letters reſpecting Hyder-Ally, which ſeemed to affect his ſpirits; but that, notwithſtanding his viſible dejection, he ſtill continued to aſſure his officers and men of his fixt intention never to quit the place till he had taken Tellicherry. Two days after, accounts arrived of this formidable chief's being killed by a cannon ſhot, as he was reconnoitering the lines.

The fortifications ſtill continued to be repaired, improved, and extended; not, however, without frequent interruption and annoyance from the enemy. The ſyſtem of defence was not embraced by Major Abington from choice, but neceſſity. He might,

might, indeed, have made ſallies, and diſ- 1781.
lodged the enemy from ſome of their poſts; but he ſaw the abſurdity of taking poſts which he wanted troops to defend, while he could not ſpare a ſingle man from duty to act as a reſerve. For three whole months the lines remained unbroken, the enemy were detected and counteracted in every ſtratagem, and in every attack repulſed with loſs.

Early in the morning of the 24th of Auguſt, they made a vigorous aſſault upon the lines between Wood's poſt and the Green Redoubt, and, owing to the negligence of the auxiliaries, about three hundred ruſhed within our out-works. The Moplas gave way at firſt, but, obſerving that the Sepoys preſerved their wonted ſpirit and bravery, they ſuffered themſelves to be rallied, and returning to the attack, made dreadful havock among the aſſailants. Twenty of them were killed within the lines, above ſixty lay between the ditch and abattie, and great numbers all along the field. Had the morning been clear, their loſs muſt have been far

1781. far more conſiderable. On the part of the garriſon, the loſs was only five wounded.

On the 6th of the following month, another attempt was made, by three parties of a thouſand each, at different places. They advanced under cover of a very thick fog, got in by one of the poſts defended by the irregulars, and took poſt at Wood's Redoubt with two ſtand of colours. They were very ſoon diſlodged by the Sepoys, ſixteen being killed on the platform and the rock below, and above thirty driven into the ſea. Indeed their loſs was not exactly known, the ſame fog which favoured their approach enabling them to carry off their dead unobſerved.

Notwithſtanding theſe ſucceſſes, the ſituation of Major Abington and his garriſon was very diſtreſsful. His diſpatches which he had ſent to Bombay, requeſting ſupplies of men and military ſtores, had been loſt at ſea. A heavy and almoſt continual cannonade from the beſiegers, together with exceſſive fatigue, daily leſſened the number of his effective men, and thoſe that remained

were

were haraſſed with the double duty of ſol- 1781.
diers and labourers. For the enemy had run ſeveral mines within a yard of the works, and ſome even under the lines and counter-ſcarp of the ditch at Fort Moylan, to diſcover and deſtroy which, required unceaſing toil. The engineers were indeed very ſucceſsful in counteracting theſe ſubterraneous approaches, and thereby ſo diſconcerted the beſiegers, that, concluding their meaſures to be betrayed by their Captain of Pioneers, they cut off his noſe and ears *: but ſuch advantages were frequently rendered imperfect and abortive by the ſcarcity of amnunition. The report of Surdar Cawn's death, too, was diſcovered to be falſe. He had been wounded, but was recovered, and had again taken the field.

On the 13th of November, in the evening, a Niar entered at Fort Moylan, with two human heads in a baſket, in ſuch a ſtate of putridity as not to be approached. They

* A barbarous and ſhocking puniſhment, of ancient ſtanding in the eaſt, as appears from the affair of Zopirus.

1782. belonged, he ſaid, to the Zamorin and his miniſter; and he gave this account of the lamentable fate of that unfortunate prince. About twelve days before, he had left his brothers at Toour, to go to Manjeree, a village ſituated five leagues above Calicut, deſigning to collect his ſhare of the harveſt; a practice which, though not publicly authorized by Hyder's government, had for ſome years been connived at, but always diſputed by the people, particularly the Moplas. The prince brought with him only an hundred of his own Niars, but, in his way to Manjeree, he was joined by ſeveral more, for the ſake of plunder. A number of theſe had ſwords and targets, ſome had lances, and others muſkets; but all were ill provided of ammunition, not having more than two or three rounds each. They arrived at Mangeree and collected ſome grain. In the mean time, about eight hundred Moplas ſecretly aſſembled, and in the night, ſurrounding the place where the Prince and his party lay, ſurprized them the next morning in ſuch confuſion, that few had time to make any reſiſtance. Every one

conſult-

conſulting his own ſafety, the Prince was 1781.
ſoon deſerted by all his people; and, thinking to conceal himſelf from the Moplas till an opportunity offered of making his eſcape, he jumped into a deep pit overgrown with buſhes. Of the prince's party, twenty, with his miniſter were killed, and three taken priſoners, of whom this Niar was one. Thoſe who eſcaped rallied, and made ſome attempts to reſcue the prince, or carry off his body if he ſhould be killed; but they were repulſed by the Moplas, who, after a long and fruitleſs ſearch, threatened to kill their priſoners, unleſs they diſcovered the retreat of their maſter. One of them, hoping to ſave his own life, betrayed that of his prince, by pointing to the place where he was concealed.

The Moplas immediately ſhot him dead, dragged up his body, and having cut off his head, obliged the priſoners to carry it, together with that of his miniſter, to Calicut, from whence they were ſent to Surdar Cawn. At this piteous ſpectacle, the ſavage chief was greatly pleaſed; but, to avoid

1781. the effluvia, he ordered them to be placed at a diſtance from him, and the priſoners to be unbound and releaſed. The Cawn having ſoon after retired into his tent, and his guards being diſperſed, it appeared not impoſſible to the faithful Niar to ſave his maſter's head from ſuffering greater indignities, and ſecure it a burial; he therefore watched his opportunity, took up the baſket, and made his eſcape into the lines of Tellicherry.

The warm reception which the enemy had found in repeated attempts to ſtorm the lines, had given them a diſguſt at that mode of attack, and they now confined themſelves to diſtant cannonading, diſcharges of muſketry, and running of mines in various directions. This laſt, by the great number of their working people, they were enabled to purſue with eaſe and expedition; ſo that, in ſpite of all the vigilance and aſſiduity of the garriſon, frequent and formidable breaches were made in the lines; but to theſe the Sepoys of the enemy would never advance, though urged on by threats, ſtripes, even wounds.

In

In the midſt of theſe efforts of gallant perſeverance, a letter arrived from the Governor and Select Committee of Bombay, declaring their utter inability to make any further proviſion for the maintainance of Tellicherry, and their reluctant purpoſe of withdrawing from the place; pointing out, likewiſe, what appeared to them the ſafeſt method of retreat, and the probable aſſiſtance which might be expected from the royal ſquadron. Inſtead of executing, inſtead even of publiſhing this abſurd and cruel plan, Major Abington carefully concealed it, together with his own emotions of diſguſt and anxiety. Preſerving ſtill the appearance of ſecurity and intrepidity, he ſhewed the impoſſibility of performing their orders, without the moſt ruinous conſequences. By arguments flowing from a benevolent heart, as well as a paſſion for military glory, he pointed out the miſeries that muſt await the abandoned ſettlement, and the improbability of even eſcape to the troops. Alluding, probably, to the diſaſters of other places in ſimilar ſituations, he declard himſelf unequal to the taſk of delivering brave men 1781.

1781. up to famine or poiſon; and pathetically intreated to be releaſed from a command, which expoſed his honour to ruin, and his name to execration. He informed them, at the ſame time, that if he could be ſupplied with a ſmall reinforcement of troops and warlike ſtores, he would anſwer for the ſafety of the place, and of the ſurrounding country.

His remonſtrance had the deſired effect. A packet ſoon arrived expreſs from Bombay, with intelligence of the Committee's reſolution of ſending a force, conſiſting of two battalions of Sepoys and forty artillery, with four ſix-pounders, for the relief of the ſettlement. Elated by the proſpect of ſuch aid, the Major neglected no means of improving it. While he continued ſucceſsfully his defenſive operations, he formed an admirable plan for a grand ſally and attack on Surdar Cawn's camp; and diſpatched proper inſtructions to the neighbouring potentates, in alliance with the Company, for regulating their co-operations. Of theſe, the King of Cotiote was chief, who, during the ſiege, had conſtantly ſignified his friendly intentions.

intentions. The Kings of Zamorin and Travancore were alſo addreſſed: but none of theſe took any active part in raiſing the ſiege. 1782.

The reinforcements being all arrived, and every proper diſpoſition made for the ſally and attack, on the 8th of January, 1782, the army marched out of the line. The clock ſtriking twelve in the fort, was the ſignal for getting under arms, and at one the march was begun in profound ſilence, no drum beating, nor other warning given. After paſſing a deep moraſs, and eſcaping the notice of two of the enemy's picquets, the army, about five o'clock, reached the new road leading to Putney Hill battery, and the grand camp. The front diviſion had orders to attack the former, while the main body advanced to the latter: a manœuvre that divided the force of the enemy. Juſt at the dawn of day, the enemy's centinels challenged the advanced party. They were anſwered only by the bayonet. The alarm, however, very ſoon took place, but not before the aſſailants had reached the battery,

1782. where, by their ruſhing impetuouſly on, the place was carried in an inſtant, and the conquering colours diſplayed in triumph. After having formed the line, the main body rapidly advanced to the camp, and the enemy immediately fled in the utmoſt confuſion, making ſeveral attempts to rally and form, which the impetuoſity of the attack rendered ineffectual. They were purſued as far as Curchee, where Surdar Cawn, being wounded in the leg by a muſquet ball, had taken ſhelter in a fortified houſe, ſcooped out of a ſolid rock, with a party of his beſt troops. This poſt he defended for near two hours, when, fire being communicated to it, the remains of his people endeavoured to eſcape through the flames, but were moſtly killed or taken. After the flames had abated, Surdar Cawn with his family were brought out from the ruins, and ſent to Tellicherry.

In the courſe of that day and the next following, all the enemy's poſts ſurrendered in ſucceſſion. The poſſeſſions of the victors now extended as far as Ajar to the north,

north, and Inilanda to the ſouth. Of 1782.
ſpoils they collected altogether one thouſand two hundred French firelocks, four braſs field-pieces, from fifty to ſixty iron guns of various calibres, thirteen elephants, horſes, &c. and a great quantity of powder, ſhot, ſhells, and other ſtores. Their loſs exceeded not nine killed, and forty-nine wounded; while of the enemy five hundred were killed and drowned in Maheè river, a vaſt number wounded, and one thouſand five hundred, including many of their principal officers, ſent priſoners to Tellicherry.

The wound of Surdar Cawn was in his ankle. When taken, he expected immediate death, enquired why it was delayed, and regarded the humanity of the Engliſh in ſparing him with aſtoniſhment. He deſired to have his wives and children reſtored, which was done. He died ſoon after, of grief and agony of mind, rather than any conſequence of his wound, deſiring as the laſt favour that his family might be ſent to Seringapatam. His requeſt was punctually performed.

Major

1782. Major Abington's views were now turned towards the ſettlement and ſecurity of his conqueſts. Remaining encamped on the field of victory, his firſt care was to reinſtate the ſeveral kings and princes, who had been forced, by the cruelties of Surdar Cawn, to conceal themſelves and their families in woods and ſwamps, for near three years. The only prince on the Malabar coaſt who had eſcaped oppreſſion and violence was the King of Travancore.—His means of defence were extraordinary and romantic. Around his capital, and chief province, he ſuffered the woods to grow for a number of years, till they formed an impenetrable belt of great depth. This, cut into labyrinths, afforded eaſy egreſs to his people, and rendered all attacks from without impracticable. Immured within this natural fortification, he encouraged the cultivation of the arts and ſciences; he invited the approach of men of genius and knowledge; he cultivated the friendſhip of the Bramins, and was himſelf admitted into their ſociety, by the ceremony of paſſing through a golden cow, which became

came the property of the Bramins, the cow being ſacred in India, as formerly in Egypt; and by preparing his own military ſtores, caſting cannon, making gun-powder, &c. he rendered himſelf independent of foreign aid. The ſubjects of his remoter provinces, who, to avoid the ravages of war, had taken refuge within the woody circle, now returned with their families and effects, to their former habitations, 1778.

The kings of Cotiote and Cartinad, with the Nambiers of Invanard, were, on various conditions, reſtored to their ſovereignties and poſſeſſions. To have ſeized on thoſe countries, and annexed them to the other conqueſts of the Company, would have been partly unjuſt, and was in fact impoſſible.—The views of Major Abington, therefore, in reſtoring them, were ſolid and juſt; for they pointed to the eſtabliſhment of peace on a permanent baſis, by conciliating the minds of the princes and people, and ſecuring their aſſiſtance on any future emergencies.

In

1782. In ſuch tranſactions, and in demoliſhing the enemy's works, ſending off their ſtores, and planting proper guards at the forts and paſſes of the mountains, the Major was employed till the 3d of February; when, having ſettled every thing in the beſt manner that circumſtances would permit, he marched towards Callicut. Before that fort he arrived on the morning of the 12th, and took poſt within two hundred yards of the walls. Next day, he had the good fortune to blow up, by a ſhell, part of the grand magazine, which ſo totally expoſed the garriſon to an aſſault, that they immediately ſurrendered. Upwards of ſixty iron guns, mounted, were found in the fort, with great quantities of military ſtores: ſeveral ſmall and large veſſels alſo, lying in different rivers with naval ſtores, fell into the hands of the conquerors.

Colonel Humberſtone arriving ſoon after at Callicut, claimed the command of the army, as being ſenior officer to Major Abington.

The

The date of theſe tranſactions, with the 1782.
inactivity of our army in the Carnatic, by which they were ſo materially affected, recalls our attention to the ſituation of affairs on the coaſt of Coromandel. Here we are preſented with a more extended theatre, and with more complicated ſyſtems of military operation. The ocean, which divides the Indian nations from Britain and France, unites their arms: and while ſquadron after ſquadron from Europe brings freſh ſupplies of men and warlike ſtores to the numerous bands of Aſia; fleets co-operate with armies in all the various attempts and ſtrategems of war, and bring forward into various and important action, the valour, the abilities, and the reſources of the two greateſt nations in the world.

A French armament, conſiſting of thirteen ſhips of the line, with a number of frigates and tranſports under the command of that great naval officer Monſieur Suffrein, appeared on the 9th of February off Pulicat. The Engliſh ſquadron, lying in the Road of Madras,

1782. Madras, whither they had repaired, after the reduction of Trincomaleè, for a ſupply of ſtores and proviſions, conſiſted only of ſeven two deckers and one ſmall frigate.

While Suffrein was ſtanding off and on, for the purpoſe of procuring intelligence of the ſtate of our affairs, Sir Edward Hughes was moſt fortunately joined by three large ſhips of war under the command of Commodore Almes. This critical junction took place on the 12th of February, and, on the 13th, Monſieur Suffrein hove in ſight, reconnoitered Madras, and anchored a few miles to windward of Sir Edward. Upon the 14th, Suffrein paſſed Madras in line of battle to the ſouthward. Towards the evening Sir Edward having received on board three hundred officers and men of the 98th regiment, weighed anchor, and ſtood after him. On the 15th, the fleets met, and a partial action commenced. Night parted them: and in the morning, the enemy's ſhips of war, to the number of twelve, of the line of battle, with a frigate, appeared

in

in view, bearing eaſt of the Engliſh fleet, 1782.
at the diſtance of four leagues, while ſixteen ſail of their frigates and tranſports, about the diſtance of three to the weſt, ſteered directly for Pondicherry. Our Admiral, on this, inſtantly made the ſignal for a general chace to the ſouth-weſt, in order, if poſſible, to come up with the tranſports.—Six of the enemy's ſhips and veſſels, accordingly, fell into our hands, five of which were Engliſh, taken to the northward of Madras: the ſixth was the Lauriſton, a tranſport, having on board many French officers, three hundred men of the regiment of Lauſanne, and laden with all kinds of ammunition. This ſhip, which was as great an acquiſition to us, as it was a loſs to the enemy, was taken by Captain Lumley of the Iſis. The other veſſels, after the Frenchmen were taken out of them, were ſent with their own crews to Negapatnam.

Monſieur Suffrein, having diſcovered the intention of Sir Edward Hughes to chaſe and take his tranſports, loſt not a moment to

1782. to make all the ſail after him that was in his power. By three o'clock in the afternoon four of his largeſt and beſt ſailing ſhips came within a league of the ſternmoſt of ours. The ſhips in chace, being ſcattered by the various courſes of the ſhips they were chaſing, the Engliſh Admiral made the ſignal for them to join him, which they all did, about ſeven o'clock in the evening of the 16th. Our fleet continued to ſtand to the ſouth-eaſt all that night under an eaſy ſail. In the mean time, the enemy appeared ſtill in ſight, making many ſignals, and with crowded ſails, bearing directly on our ſquadron through an hazy atmoſphere, light winds, and frequent ſqualls.

At ſix in the morning of the 17th, the Admiral made the ſignal for our ſquadron to form the line of battle a head. At twenty-five minutes paſt eight, our line being formed with great difficulty, from frequent calms, the ſignal was made for the leading ſhip to make the ſame ſail as the Admiral, and towards him, in the line a-head, that the fleet might, if poſſible weather the enemy, and engage them.

night, if poſſible, weather the enemy, and 1782.
engage them cloſely. Meanwhile, the French fleet, having the advantage of ſqualls from the N. N. E. advanced on our ſhips very faſt: ſo that the Admiral made the ſignal for our line to alter their courſe two points to leeward, the enemy then ſteering down on the rear of our line, in an irregular double line a-breaſt. Sir Edward Hughes, in order to draw the rear of his line cloſer to the centre, and to prevent the enemy from breaking in, and attacking it when ſeparated, at half paſt noon, made the ſignal for our ſquadron to form the line of battle a-breaſt. At three in the afternoon, the enemy ſtill puſhing onward to our rear in a double line a-breaſt, the Admiral again altered his courſe in the line, in order to draw his rear ſhips ſtill cloſer to the centre; and, at forty minutes after three, finding it impoſſible to avoid the enemy's attack under all the diſadvantages of very little wind and a leeward ſtation, he made the ſignal to form at once into the line of battle a-head. At four the Exeter, the ſternmoſt ſhip in our rear, when formed

1782. in line of battle a-head on the larbord tack; not being quite cloſed to her ſecond a-head, three of the enemy's ſhips in the firſt line bore right down upon her, whilſt four more of their ſecond line, headed by Monſieur Suffrein himſelf in the Hero, moved along the outſide of the firſt line to our centre. At five minutes paſt four, the enemy's three ſhips began their fire on the Exeter, which ſhe and her ſecond a-head returned.

The Engliſh Admiral now made the ſignal for battle. About twelve minutes paſt four the action became general from the rear of our fleet to the centre, which was formed by Sir Edward Hughes, on board the Superbe. The French Admiral, with the other ſhips of his ſecond line, advanced as far as the Superbe, but no farther. Thus eight of the enemy's beſt ſhips were engaged in an attack on five of ours. Suffrein adopted this plan of action in conſequence of the diſadvantageous ſituation of our fleet, the van of which, conſiſting of the Monmouth, Eagle, Burford, and Worceſter,

ter, could neither be brought into the en- 1782.
gagement without tacking on the enemy, nor tack on the enemy for want of wind. And, as our van was thus prevented from closing with our centre and rear, so the five ships of our centre and rear, then engaged with the enemy, sorely pressed, and greatly disabled in their masts, yards, sails, and rigging, could not follow the other four, without the utmost hazard of entire separation. But, at six in the afternoon, a squall of wind from the south-east brought the van of our line round, and a-head on the enemy to the north-east, when the engagement was renewed by the starboard guns of our other five ships, with great spirit and alacrity. The approach of night parted the two fleets: the French hauled their wind and stood to north-east: the English sailed with a favourable wind for Trincomalee to repair the damages sustained in this hot engagement.

In this action, Monsieur Suffrein displayed equal skill and gallantry, and Sir Edward Hughes sustained with singular bravery

1782. and addreſs the diſadvantages under which he laboured in a leeward poſition with regard to the enemy, and inferiority of force and number. The French fleet directed their fire principally againſt the Superbe and Exeter, both of which ſhips ſuffered greatly. Captain Reynold's of the Exeter was killed, and Captain Stevens of the Superbe died of his wounds.

The French ſquadron, when it left the iſlands, was commanded by Monſieur D'Orves: but on the death of that officer, which happened a few days after his arrival on the coaſt of India, the command devolved on Monſieur Suffrein. On their paſſage from the iſlands, they fell in with his Majeſty's ſhip the Hannibal, which they took off the weſt coaſt of Sumatra. The Hannibal raiſed the number of their line of battle ſhips to twelve, againſt nine under the command of the Engliſh Admiral. Monſieur Suffrein came to anchor in the neighbourhood of Porto Novo, where, in conſequence of the alliance between his nation and Hyder, he landed three thouſand four hundred men: the

the firſt diviſion of that force which, under 1782.
the command of the Marquis de Buſſy, was intended to ſubvert the Engliſh power in India. The fort of Cuddalore, weakly garriſoned, immediately became a place of arms and of comfort to the French troops. Sir Edward Hughes, having effected the neceſſary repairs, ſailed from Trincomaleè on the 4th of March, and on the 12th arrived at Madras.

Towards the end of March intelligence arrived that Monſieur Suffrein had ſuddenly ſlipped from Porto Novo, and put to ſea.—He had learned from a foreign veſſel that an Engliſh fleet was upon the coaſt, and it became, of courſe, his object to intercept it. But Sir Edward Hughes immediately got under way, and in ſight of the flag-ſtaff of Fort St. George fell in with the fleet of which the French Admiral was in purſuit, conſiſting of ſeven Indiamen, with the 78th regiment on board, eight hundred brave Highlanders, under convoy of two line of battle ſhips, the Magnanime and the Sultan. He ordered the men of war to join

1782. him, recruited himſelf from the merchant ſhips, and ſtood directly for Trincomalee, there to land a reinforcement, and military ſtores for the garriſon. Sir Edward prudently ſtudied to decline an engagement, till he ſhould land the troops and ſtores he carried to Trincomalee. It was the buſineſs of Suffrein, on the other hand, to court an action: he was upon an enemy's coaſt, without any harbour near, where he might ſhelter and repair his ſhips; and he was engaged in a daring enterprize, which required both ability and prompt execution.

The Engliſh and French admirals, purſuing their reſpective views, on the 12th of April, braced up to the wind, which blew from the land on the weſt. Sir Edward, by his ſuperior ſeamanſhip, had gained the weather-gage of the enemy, and had reaſon to look with conſiderable aſſurance for the accompliſhment of his object, when ſuddenly the wind changed to the eaſt, leaving the Engliſh fleet ſo alarmingly cloſe to the banks that lay near to Jaffanapatam, that one of the ſhips actually felt the ground.

Suffrein

Suffrein ſaw his advantage, bore down, and began the battle. The number of guns, on both ſides, was nearly equal: but the French fleet was full of men, while the Engliſh was ſhort of its compliment, and ſickly. Thus cruelly circumſtanced, did Sir Edward Hughes maintain an action with Monſieur Suffrein until it was broken off by the darkneſs of the night. The nature or character of this ſea-fight may be learned from this circumſtance, that for ſeven days the fleets lay within random-ſhot, without attempting any attack, or giving the leaſt moleſtation to each other. Monſieur Suffrein, who was enabled by the number of his hands to bring his ſhips firſt into order, after making a parade of offering battle, ſailed, for the purpoſe of compleat repairs, to Batkalo, in the iſland of Ceylon. Sir Edward Hughes, for the ſame purpoſe, entered the harbour of Trincomaleè. 1782.

The Engliſh army had now remained a conſiderable time at the Mount: but, on the 17th of April, it was put in motion for the relief of Parmacoil. But the General,

1782. on his arrival at Charangooly, was informed that Parmacoil had ſurrendered on terms, on May the 16th. On the 24th, the army encamped at Vandewaſh. The general orders of this day, for the purpoſe of confirming the courage of our men, looked back to the victory obtained by Sir Eyre Coote over the unfortunate French General, Lally, in 1760. The camp was pitched on the ſpot where that victory was obtained, and an extraordinary batta was iſſued out to the troops. But, on the following morning, it was found neceſſary, on account of water, to remove the camp to the oppoſite ſide of the fort.

Hyder Ally lay encamped in a ſtrong poſt on the red hills, near Parmacoil, from which various movements of the Engliſh General aimed to draw him, in vain. But the magazines of Hyder being depoſited in the ſtrong fort of Arneè, Sir Eyre Coote conceived that a march towards that place, might induce the enemy, for the ſafety of his ſtores, to hazard an engagement. The General, therefore, turning his back on Parmacoil,

Parmacoil, and leaving his laſt ground fif- 1782.
teen miles in the rear, encamped at Deſore. A ſummons was ſent, on the 31ſt, to the fort of Chittaput, to ſurrender to the arms of the Engliſh: to which the Keeladar, encouraged by the nearneſs of Hyder, in terms of great haughtineſs, bade defiance. Our army, therefore, paſſed this place on the 1ſt of June, and encamped on the weſt and ſouth ſide of the river, with an opening of three miles between them and the fortreſs of Arneè. Hyder, as ſoon as he received intelligence that Sir Eyre Coote had ſtruck into the road leading to Chittaput and Arneè, immediately marched after him, and coming over a ſpace of forty-three miles in two days, took up his head quarters in Chittaput, on the evening of the ſame day in which our troops ſat down in the encampment juſt deſcribed.

Although Hyder, when he has an object in view that requires expedition, obſerves not any order of march, and the whole country appears to be in motion, yet, his innumerable bodies of horſe guard him againſt

1782. againſt ſurprize, and enable him before ſuch an army as ours can ſtrike any blow of importance, to form his troops in order of battle. It may, perhaps, at the ſame time, afford ſome meaſure of gratification to European curioſity, to be informed, that the undiſciplined troops of Aſia, generally inflamed with bang and other intoxicating drugs, pour forth as they advance, a torrent of menacing and abuſive language on their adverſaries. Every expreſſion of contempt and averſion, every threat, fitted to make an impreſſion of terror, or to excite ideas of horror, that cuſtom readily preſents, or inventive fancy can ſuggeſt, accompanies the utmoſt ferocity of looks, voice, and geſture. A murmuring ſound, with clouds of duſt, announce their approach, while they are yet at the diſtance of ſeveral miles. As they advance, their accents are more and more diſtinctly heard, until at laſt, with their eyes fixed, and weapons pointed at ſome individual, they devote him, with many execrations, to deſtruction; giving his fleſh, like the heroes in Homer, and the

the Philiſtine warriors*, to the dogs, and the birds of the air, and the beaſts of the field. The numbers of the Aſiatic armies, the ferocity of their manner, and the novelty of their appearance, would unnerve and overcome the hearts of the ſmall European bodies that are oppoſed to them in the field of battle, if experience had not ſufficiently proved, how much the ſilence of diſcipline excels barbarian noiſe, and uniformity of deſign and action, the deſultory efforts of brutal force, acting by ſtarts, and liable to the contagion of accidental impreſſion. 1782.

Sir Eyre Coote, on the 2d of June, with his eye fixed on the treaſures and the ſtores of Arneè, began to move towards that important place, before break of day. But no ſooner had the approach of the ſun enlightened the horizon, than a heavy cannonade, of eighteen and twenty-four pounders, was opened on our rear, and fell very near it. Our army came twice to the right about, and the baggage was brought twice through the files before it was found poſſible to aſcer-

* 1 Samuel, xvii. 44.

tain

1782. tain the quarter from whence the enemy's fire proceeded. The General called a conſultation of his officers, and encouraged them to deliver their ſentiments, concerning the preſent ſituation of affairs, without reſerve. Some were of opinion that the enemy's horſe would charge in ſquadron: others agreed, in part, with this opinion, but added, that, after the baggage ſhould be thrown into confuſion, they would probably come round by a rapid wheel, and charge our troops in the rear. The reports that continued to be made from that quarter, having inconteſtibly proved that it was here that the enemy deſigned to make their principal attack, the General, without farther deliberation, brought about the line, and drew it up in order to receive them. But no ſooner were our troops formed to the rear, than a diviſion of the enemy, commanded by Tippoo Saib, moved rapidly to Arneè, carried away the treaſure, gave orders to the Commandant, and reinforced the garriſon. The enemy, in the mean time, occupied all the circumjacent grounds, and their cavalry, galloping to and fro in every direction, harraſſed

raſſed the Engliſh, who poſſeſſed a low ſitu- 1782.
ation, and galled them not a little, while they were forming to the rear in order of battle. The General made ſuch diſpoſitions as might beſt remedy the diſadvantage of his ground; and advancing againſt the enemy, endeavoured to bring them to a cloſe and deciſive engagement. But, as he advanced, Hyder ſhrunk back, and left the Engliſh in poſſeſſion of the ſcene of action. The inſtant our troops were ordered to relinquiſh the purſuit, and halt on the field of victory, a gun, with ſome tumbrils, was obſerved, oppoſite to the 73d regiment, ſticking faſt in the bed of the Arneè river, and a party of the enemy labouring to draw them out. The Honourable Captain Lindſey, againſt poſitive orders, as well as the rules of war, advanced with his grenadier company beyond the line, chaſed away the enemy's party, and ſeized the gun and tumbrils, the poſſeſſion of which, converted the General's diſpleaſure into commendation. When Captain Lindſey advanced, the other companies of his regiment followed, in order to ſupport him, and were drawn up

1782. up in one battalion, under that ſteady veteran Captain Shaw, on the oppoſite banks of the river. This victory, if it may be called a victory, was obtained at the inconſiderable expence of ſixty Sepoys killed and wounded. The enemy, it was conjectured, did not loſe aboye half that number.

As we were unprovided with battering cannon, ſcaling ladders were made of green bamboos, and a ſummons was ſent to the Keeladar of Arnee to ſurrender: but, as neither the anſwer of that commander, nor the ſituation of the fort afforded any hopes that it might be attacked with any probability of ſucceſs, our army, on the 6th of June, marched towards Madras. Having croſſed and recroſſed the courſe of the Arnee, they encamped, on the 7th, on the ſame ſide of the river from which they ſet out. While they lay in camp, on the eighth, the enemy, from a military knowledge of the ground, than which there is no circumſtance that is oftner improved by a ſkilful commander into happy projects, drew out our grand guard, conſiſting of a regiment of European

European cavalry, into an ambuſcade, where 1781.
they were either cut off by an open and heavy fire in their front, or taken priſoners by a numerous party of horſe that came ſuddenly between the main army and their rear. The Engliſh General returned, on the 9th of June, to Vandewaſh, where, after a fruitleſs attempt to retaliate the loſs of the preceeding day, by ſnares ſimilar to thoſe through which it was occaſioned, proceeded on his march, and on the 20th arrived at Madras.

In theſe ſtratagems and encounters, the laſt in which Sir Eyre Coote and Hyder-Ally-Cawn were deſtined to meaſure their ſtrength in the field, we behold the conduct of the commanders, and the whole character of the war. The Engliſh General oppoſing to numbers, artifices, and local advantages, the diſciplined valour of his little army, according to the plaineſt and moſt approved rules of war, and, without expoſing his troops to too great hazards, conſtantly endeavouring to reduce the various movements and feints of his antago-

niſt

1782. niſt to a point, where he could bear upon him with his whole ſtrength at once, and bring him to a cloſe and deciſive action: the Aſiatic politician and warrior, availing himſelf of preſent and vaſt reſources, eluding regular and compacted force by ſtratagems the moſt various and profound, and declining to commit to the fortune of a ſingle day, what would be enſured by a ſeries of conjunctures rightly improved, by diſtance of ſpace which might deprive his adverſary of ſupplies in the moment of exigency, and by the very lapſe of time, which, transferring the arts of the refined to the rude, levels in its progreſs the condition of nations.

Sir Eyre Coote ſecure, after the toils of the field, in the arſenal of Fort St. George, had the ſatisfaction of reflecting, that he had marched and countermarched, in ſpite of all oppoſition, whitherſoever he would, carried relief to the diſtreſſed, beaten back the enemy in every batt'e, and done every thing but bring him to a deciſive engagement. Hyder-Ally, repoſing in the for-

treſs

treſs of Arneé, preſerved by his arms, rejoiced 1782.
that he had been able to avoid a deciſive action; that he was ſtill in a condition to preſent a front to the foe; that the wounds he had given to the Engliſh were deeper than any they had inflicted on his army; and that, while he thus maintained his ground in the Carnatic, and braved with advantage a power deemed irreſiſtible, he might reaſonably hope that in proportion as the preſſure of terror, which alone kept the native princes under awe and ſubjection to the Europeans, ſhould be removed, they would gradually be united in a determined reſolution to expel them, without exception, from the coaſts of India.

We muſt now take a ſhort review of the ſtate of the war on the ſide of Bengal.

When it was determined, on the motion of Mr. Haſtings, to afford effectual aſſiſtance in men, money, and proviſions, to Madras, it was thought neceſſary, alſo, by the Governor-General, to break the grand and

1782. dangerous confederacy which had been formed againſt us, and, in order to effect this, he propoſed that an offer of reconcilement, upon very reaſonable terms, ſhould be made to the Marrattas, through the Rajah of Berar. This offer was made, but rejected; the next ſtep, therefore, was to compel that people to accept of peace, by multiplying the calamities of war.

We have already ſaid, that Mr. Haſtings had recommended an expedition into Malva, the country of Madajee Scindiah: a meaſure that was thwarted by the violent oppoſition and intrigues of Mr. Francis. But ſoon after the departure of that gentleman from India, which happened towards the cloſe of 1780, and which ſhall by and by be explained, it was determined to proſecute the expedition to Malva with the utmoſt vigour. Lieutenant-Colonel, then Major Popham, remained with a garriſon in Gualior: and Lieutenant-Colonel Camac was ordered to advance, at the head of five battalions of Sepoys, with the utmoſt rapidity to Ugein, Madajee

Madajee Scindiah's capital. This move- 1782.
ment was attended with all thoſe beneficial conſequences which Mr. Haſtings had predicted. Scindiah, who was the General of the Marratta army, and oppoſed the Britiſh General Goddard in Guzzarat, at the head of ſixty thouſand horſe, ſuddenly quitted the Marratta camp, for the defence of his own country. He advanced to Seronge in the month of February, 1781, ſurrounded Colonel Camac with large bodies of cavalry, interrupted his ſupplies, and reduced him to the greateſt diſtreſs. In this ſituation, the Colonel wrote in the moſt preſſing terms for reinforcements to Major Popham, and alſo to Colonel Muir and Colonel Morgan, who commanded four troops on the borders of Corah and in Oude; recommending, at the ſame time, that a diverſion ſhould be made in his favour from Calpee. Meaſures were immediately taken for the ſupport of Colonel Camac, but he had the good fortune to extricate himſelf from all his difficulties, before the reinforcements arrived to his aſſiſtance. He called a council of war on the 23d of March, in which it was propoſed by Captain Bruce,

1782. who commanded the ſtorming party at Gualior, to attack Scindiah's camp that night, as the only poſſible means of preſerving the army. This advice, moſt ſtrenuouſly ſeconded by Major Maclary, a gentleman now in England, was, after ſome debate and conſideration, adopted by the Colonel. At ſun-ſet, on the 24th, the army moved from their ground, and, after a march of thirteen hours, effectually ſurprized the two camps of Madajee Scindiah, made themſelves maſters of all his artillery, took his ſtandard elephant, a number of camels and bullocks, and a prodigious quantity of proviſions.

This action was deciſive of the Marratta war. Colonel Muir, who, in conſequence of Colonel Camac's letter from Seronge, had been detached acroſs the Jumna, had advanced as far as the Ranah of Gohud's country, to his aſſiſtance, joined the army with his reinforcement the following month, and being the ſenior officer, ſucceeded to the general command. The Governor-General and Council could not remove Colonel Muir, who

who was one of the beſt officers in their 1782.
ſervice, from a command to which Lieutenant-Colonel Camac himſelf had expreſſly called him. In the month of Auguſt, 1781, Scindiah made overtures of peace. A negotiation was opened for that purpoſe, and a treaty concluded with that chief in the month of October, 1781, which, in its conſequences, led to a general peace with the Marrattas. A total ceſſation of hoſtilities with the Marratta ſtates was the immediate conſequence of the ſeparate peace with Madajee, and a general pacification was ſigned in May, 1782. Thus did that expedition, on the ſucceſs of which Mr. Haſtings, when he propoſed it, had declared he would riſk his life, terminate preciſely as the Governor-General predicted: and, in the year 1782, of all the confederacy which had been formed againſt us, two members only continued hoſtile, Hyder-Ally-Cawn, and the French. Moodajee Booſlah had been bought off by a ſum of money: and the Nizam confiding, or pretending to confide in our promiſes, according to his uſual policy, continued inactive. To the honour of the troops em-

1782. ployed againſt Scindiah, it is neceſſary to mention, that they were five months in arrears during all the ſervice.

It was for this reaſon, and becauſe the treaſury of Bengal was totally inadequate to the continued and increaſing demands of an hundred thouſand men under arms, in the ſervice of Great Britain in different parts of India, that the Governor-General determined, in the month of Auguſt, 1781, to demand from the Nabob Vizier of Oude, the balance due to the Company, and from the Rajah Cheyt Sing, a Zemindar who rented, under the Engliſh Company, the rich city and dependencies of Benaras, together with ſuch farther contributions as the neceſſities of war rendered cuſtomary in the eaſt, from vaſſals to lords paramount, and from a ſubject to his ſovereign. The Princeſſes of Oude, the mother and grandmother of the Nabob Aſoph-ul-Dowlah, together with immenſe treaſures, poſſeſſed a conſiderable force, and not a ſmall ſhare of the authority of government.—The Rajah Cheyt Sing, from his father Bulwant Sing, who derived whatever degree of

of independency he poſſeſſed, during the lat- 1782.
ter period of his life, from the protection and intervention of our government, inherited a vaſt maſs of wealth, which he ſecured in the two ſtrong fortreſſes of Bidjey Gur and Lutteefpoor. But, if common fame made juſt reports, neither the Begums of Oude, nor the Rajah of Benaras, were friends to the Engliſh. Hoſtile intentions, it was every where ſaid, were manifeſted by overt actions: inſolent treatment of the Engliſh, correſpondence with the powers who were, or might eventually become our enemies, the collection of ſtores, and other acts of military preparation. The general ſtate and temper of the country, and particularly the evaſions by which Cheyt Sing ſought to with-hold the ſubſidies which our government had demanded and he had promiſed, rendered theſe reports not incredible to a mind, anxious, like that of Mr. Haſtings, for the public ſafety, which hung in ſuſpence on his deciſions. In ſuch circumſtances as theſe, the Governor-General determined to ſeize, in good time, an engine that might be turned againſt himſelf, and to anticipate any

1781. farther inſtances of hoſtility, which muſt involve in their progreſs, either the ruin of the princes from whom they proceeded, or that of the power againſt which they were pointed.

But before we enter into any detail of theſe hoſtile deſigns and actions, it will be proper to examine the ſprings from whence they flowed: the chief of which undoubtedly were, internal diſcord, and undefined government. However the calamities that aſſailed or threatened us in India were excited and encouraged by the confederacy that was formed againſt Great-Britain between America and Europe, they would have been early ſuppreſſed, or eaſily quaſhed, by our ſuperior advantages, had we poſſeſſed harmony in our councils. But the individual members of the Preſidencies were divided among themſelves; the Preſidencies, by political views and the love of power, from one another: and, while a permanent jealouſy was confirmed between the Eaſt-India Company and the nominal Princes in whoſe name they exerciſed the powers of government,

ment, diſſenſions alſo aroſe between the ci- 1782
vil ſervants of the Company, and the mili-
tary officers of the Crown. While Hyder-
Ally was at the gates of Madras, the Eng-
liſh, like the Greeks when the Barbarians
approached to Conſtantinople, diſtracted by
internal diſputes, not only concerning mea-
ſures but the power of enforcing them,
ſeemed almoſt to have forgotten that they
had any enemies to contend with but one
another. The Governor of Madras aſſum-
ed a controul over the troops within that
Preſidency, for the direction of meaſures in
which he conſidered himſelf as reſponſible:
the Commander in Chief, acting under the au-
thority of the Governor-General and Supreme
Council of Bengal, claimed authority over
every party or detachment, that he might
be enabled to unite and direct their com-
bined force in one ſyſtem of military opera-
tion. The General, reſtrained in his views,
made partial efforts, or remained inactive.
Detachments of our army were cut off, and
the enemy was enabled to repair his loſſes
where our arms were ſucceſsful. The re-
venues of Arcot were ſeized for the purpoſe
of

1782. of maintaining the war, by Lord Macartney; but reſtored by Mr. Haſtings. The order for reſtitution, the government of Madras determined to reſiſt, and Sir Eyre Coote to execute, if neceſſary, even by force of arms.

Meanwhile, the fluctuations in our adminiſtration and councils at home, gave birth to various projects for the appointment of new men, and the eſtabliſhment of new ſyſtems of government abroad. Theſe changes and deſigns were conveyed in private letters and printed publications to the powers of India, who, expecting the removal of Mr. Haſtings, and unaccuſtomed to ſeparate in their imaginations the perſons of princes from their plans of policy, were deterred from taking any part with ſo unſteady a government.

Diſſention and intrigue find their way even into the Divans of deſpotic powers: but when, in jarring councils and incompatible ſyſtems of government, it was eaſy to find plauſible theories and pretexts, as well

well as moſt powerful countenance and ſup- 1782.
port for almoſt any courſe of conduct, faction was invited, and indeed unavoidable. In ſuch circumſtances as theſe, it was not unnatural for Mr. Francis, a man of great abilities, both natural and acquired, as well as great ambition, and who might be diſtinguiſhed from all his cotemporaries, by an extreme irritability of temper, if he had not been as tenacious of revenge as he was prone to reſentment, to apply himſelf, with all the aſſiduity of habits formed by a life of buſineſs, to counteract the deſigns, and to ſully the glory of his immediate ſuperior, Mr. Haſtings.

From the death of General Clavering, which happened in the month of Auguſt, 1777, to that of December, 1779, Mr. Francis was, or pretended to be, in hourly expectation of ſucceeding to the government of Bengal. Mr. Haſtings had uniformly profeſſed the utmoſt indifference with regard to his own fate. In his correſpondence with the Miniſter, and with the Directors, he never once ſolicited his continuance in government, though he uniformly repreſented, in very ſtrong terms, the

1782. the neceſſity of increaſing the power of the Governor-General. The Britiſh Miniſter, who had uſed the moſt violent and unjuſtifiable methods to remove Mr. Haſtings from his office, in 1776, was the firſt to propoſe his continuance, two years thereafter. Whether on account of his growing embarraſſments, and the ſtrenuous ſupport which the Governor-General, in his laſt conteſt with government, received from the friends of the Marquis of Rockingham, or that the death of Colonel Monſon, and afterwards that of General Clavering, had diſarmed him of the reſentment which he once entertained againſt Mr. Haſtings, or in whatever proportions all theſe ſeparate circumſtances might have been combined, certain it is, that Lord North, unſolicited, propoſed, in 1778, that Mr. Haſtings ſhould be continued in the government of Bengal for one year longer; that he made a motion for a ſimilar end in 1779; and that parliament, on his motion, in 1781, continued him in office for ten years. The motives that induced theſe ſucceſſive appointments, are as honourable to Mr. Haſtings, as they are diſgraceful to thoſe who then voted for

his

his continuance in office, and have ſince 1782.
joined in his perſecution. Lord North openly averred, that he had moved the Houſe of Commons to re-appoint Mr. Haſtings, three ſeveral times, becauſe, our ſituation in Europe and in India was difficult and dangerous, and Mr. Haſtings poſſeſſed vigour and abilities, and the confidence of the Eaſt-India Company.

As ſoon as the firſt of theſe re-appointments was known in Bengal, a propoſition was diſtantly made for a conciliation between Mr. Francis and Mr. Haſtings. This propoſition was attended with ſo many important conſequences, that we ſhall ſtate them from ſuch authentic materials as we have been enabled to obtain upon the ſubject.

The firſt converſation that led to this coalition paſſed between Major Scott, then aid-de-camp to the Governor-General, and a gentleman in Mr. Francis's confidence, on the 24th of December, 1779. This conference was, on the Monday following, communicated by Major Scott to Mr. Haſtings,

1782. Haſtings, who declared his readineſs to accommodate all differences with Mr. Francis; but requiring unequivocally, that he, Mr. Haſtings, ſhould have the conduct of the Marratta war; Mr. Francis, having thrown upon Mr, Haſtings the reſponſibility of that war in ſo far as it was connected with the Bengal government. This arrangement was afterwards ſettled under the mediation of Sir John Day. Mr. Francis was accuſed by Mr. Haſtings, in the month of July, 1780, of having violated his engagements. A duel enſued in the following month, in which Mr. Francis was wounded: and, on the 9th of December, 1780, this gentleman quitted India.

Major Scott at that time commanded a battalion of Sepoys, at Chunar, about ſix hundred and fifty miles from Calcutta. The moment he heard of Mr. Francis's intended departure, he wrote to Mr. Haſtings, and pointed out to him the neceſſity of ſome perſon, acquainted with the late tranſactions in India, being ſent in order to explain any circumſtances that might be miſrepreſented.

If

If no fitter perſon occurred to Mr. Haſtings, 1782.
for this ſervice, Major Scott offered himſelf, as his battalion was at that time doing garriſon duty, without a probability of being relieved or employed according to the uſual courſe of the ſervice, before the cloſe of the war; and as he himſelf poſſeſſed, though a moderate, yet an independent fortune. Major Scott quitted Chunar on the 15th of December, 1780, and left Bengal in a neutral ſhip, the 9th of January following, with inſtructions to which he rigidly adhered. Theſe were, to explain ſuch parts of Mr. Haſtings's conduct as might be miſrepreſented, and to endeavour to procure him confidence and ſupport as long as he ſhould be continued in office, but, by no means to ſolicit his continuance in the government of Bengal.

Major Scott, in private circles, in parliament, and in printed publications, repelled the arrows of reproach, and maintained the cauſe of Mr. Haſtings with an enthuſiaſm that nothing but an unaffected admiration of the man, and indignation at injured merit,

1782. merit, could have inſpired. Yet his eloquence was not of that kind which ſtorms the heart by the contagion of paſſion; nor yet that which amuſes the imagination by the ſtores of literature and fancy; nor that, ſtill farther, which aſſumes the ſublimity of abſtracted terms, and the pomp of logical form. What he ſaid carried in it that clearneſs and conviction which were the natural reſult of an intimate acquaintance with his ſubject, and he often oppoſed with ſucceſs a fact to a flouriſh. He marked the inconſiſtencies of his opponents both in ſpeech and action, proclaimed aloud the eminent ſervices of Mr. Haſtings, poured light on what ſeemed dark and doubtful in his conduct, and glanced, by ſevere contraſt, at the unfortunate errors, not to ſay miſdemeanors and crimes, of men who had arranged themſelves under the ſtandard of perſecution. Here the Major had indeed an ample field. Foreign nations are aſtoniſhed, and poſterity will not believe, that he, who, by ſaving India, ſaved the Britiſh empire, was, on the return of peace, the only object of public enquiry and accuſation. Admirals had loſt opportunities, Generals

Generals had loſt armies, Commanders in Chief auſpicious conjunctures never to be recalled, but they threw themſelves into the ſcale of oppoſition, and were loaded with offices and honours. Mr. Haſtings courted not the favour of any party, but looked up with confidence to the nation for juſtice. 1782.

In the month of December, 1781, the Britiſh nation groaned under a load of public debt. Her commanders were generally unfortunate: her fleets were out-numbered: her armies had been captured: her miniſtry was diſtracted: and an oppoſition to government, powerful from the talents of its leaders, was hourly gaining ſtrength. The moſt ſanguine politicians, in that hour of diſtreſs, looked to the preſervation of India, as the only means of ſaving us from a general bankruptcy. In ſuch a ſituation, Lord North clearly and unequivocally ſupported Mr. Haſtings; and, notwithſtanding the general diſtreſs of the empire, very conſiderable reinforcements of ſhips and troops were ſent to India, in the winter of 1781.

1782. In the month of March, 1782, Lord North was compelled to reſign his office. His ſucceſſors ſtipulated, that not an atom of his adminiſtration ſhould remain, the preſent Lord Chancellor excepted.

The confidential dependant of the Marquis of Rockingham was Mr. Edmund Burke. This celebrated perſon is a native of Ireland. He quitted his own country nearly at the commencement of the preſent reign. Amongſt the various peculiarities which diſtinguiſh this reign from all others, there is none more ſtriking, than the very extraordianry increaſe of that body of men who are generally termed, political adventurers. Mr. Burke, amongſt this order of men, has been eminently ſucceſsful. He made his firſt entrance into public life in the character of private ſecretary to the Marquis of Rockingham, in the year 1765. He continued ſteady in his attachment to the noble Marquis, from the year 1765, to the time of his deceaſe, and it has been generally thought, that he governed the party, the heads of which, though men of good underſtanding, were more remarkable for the affluence

affluence of their fortunes, and their private worth, than for talents as orators and ſtateſmen. By a prudent though not ſordid œconomy, he avoided the inconveniencies and the dangers of embarraſſed circumſtances, and amidſt all the viciſſitudes of his public life, preſerved an independent and erect mind, with a narrow private fortune. 1782.

From the earlieſt years of Mr. Burke, there was ſomething in his ſentiments, purſuits, and manners, that indicated to the diſcerning eye ſublimity of genius and delicacy of taſte. As he advanced in years the preſages formed concerning him were more and more confirmed: and he grew up in favour with all around him. An intereſting ſweetneſs and ſenſibility of countenance prepared the ſtranger for thinking juſtly of the humanity of his diſpoſition, and, from the richneſs of his converſation on every ſubject, he was pleaſed, though not ſurprized, to find intellectual excellence in conjunction with moral goodneſs. There is nothing in nature that is ſolitary, or independent of that univerſality of things which compoſes one harmonious whole: nothing

1782. ſo inſignificant that it may not be aſſociated by a vaſt variety of connections, with ſomething moſt intereſting and ſublime: and all the arts and ſciences are linked together in one chain, affected by mutual influence, and ſuſtained by mutual ſupport. Hence the copious and diſciplined fancy of Mr. Burke, whether in private converſation or public diſcourſe, both in ſpeaking and writing, diffuſed a captivating charm on every ſubject, and gave relief and animation to topics the moſt dry and barren.

The ſciences have a natural tendency to produce candour and forbearance, by inducing in the minds of their votaries an habit of tracing every action and every effect to its proper cauſe. And polite literature and the fine arts, by exhibiting human nature in an infinite variety of intereſting ſituations, excite a thouſand ſocial and humane emotions, which cannot ſpring from all the occurrences and viciſſitudes of the moſt varied life. Thus the man of letters becomes a citizen of the world. His enlarged mind acquires an habit of ſympathetic indulgence. The antipathies and prejudices which

which ſet men at variance with one another, 1782.
are gradually worn off. Nothing that belongs tó human nature; no peculiarity in national character; no common failing or imperfection of the individual member of ſociety, moves either the ridicule or the rage of the man, who is accuſtomed to contemplate nature and humanity under manifold forms, and in whoſe breaſt diſguſt and even indignation at the effect, is partly loſt in the contemplation of the cauſe. The character of Mr. Burke, accordingly, was marked by nothing more than by ſuperiority to vulgar prejudices, and unbounded philanthropy to all claſſes and nations of men. It was this expanded ſentiment that, on different occaſions, inſpired him with courage tó reſiſt the popular fury, when it had broken looſe with a ſavage ferocity againſt unfortunate criminals, and a proſcribed religion. It was perfectly natural for ſuch a ſpirit to enter by a lively ſympathy, into the ſufferings of the Indian nations, under European tyranny, and to indulge an honeſt indignation againſt their oppreſſors. He ſuffered his imagination to dwell with pleaſure on the viſionary project, of uniting the

1782. freedom of the natives of India, with their dependence on Great Britain, and of bringing to exemplary puniſhment, an individual who had uniformly acted, in the character of the firſt miniſter in India, on thoſe very principles by which our poſſeſſions in that country had been acquired, by which they had been maintained, and by which alone, beyond all manner of doubt, in times of civil convulſion, they could be recovered or preſerved.

The fineſt genius, the moſt generous diſpoſition, is not unuſually found in conjunction with an irritability of temper, which magnifies its object. Although it may be too much to affirm, that belief is nothing more than vivid perception, attention has undoubtedly a microſcopical power, and this power we can command at pleaſure.—Hence that wonderful variety of opinions that prevail, on ſo many ſubjects, among men of equal underſtandings: for while reaſon and truth are uniform and invariable, the paſſions and intereſts of individuals are various: and when once the will begins to influence the judgment; fertility of invention, inſtead

inſtead of being a lamp of light, becomes a 1782.
ſource of error. Mr. Burke, in his eagerneſs to impeach the Governor-General of Bengal, loſt ſight of conſtant precedent, and political neceſſity: and, for what had become the predominant paſſion of his ſoul, his imagination, fertile even to exceſs, eaſily found a cover in partial views, and plauſible theories and conjectures.

In the affairs of India, this gentleman and his party had for ſome years but little concern. To Lord North's regulating bill, of 1773, they gave a feeble and unavailing oppoſition; but when his Lordſhip endeavoured to remove Mr. Haſtings, in the year 1776, on account of the Rohilla war, they exerted themſelves ſo ſtrenuouſly in oppoſition to that meaſure, that they defeated the Miniſter in Leadenhall-ſtreet, and prevented him from ſo much as bringing the ſubject before parliament the enſuing ſeſſion. It is of little conſequence to obſerve, that the ſame party which actually preſerved Mr. Haſtings in office, when the Rohilla war was made the ground of his

1782. removal in 1776, would have impeached him for the ſame meaſure in 1786.

In the year 1777, Mr. Burke began to appear more conſpicuouſly as an India politician. In that year, his near relation, Mr. William Burke, quitted England, ſecretly, and proceeded to Madras. In the following year he returned to this country, the agent of the Rajah of Tanjore. In the year 1781, he again proceeded by land to Madras, and in the following year, 1782, Mr. Edmund Burke, now a Privy Counſellor, and Pay-Maſter-General of his Majeſty's Forces, appointed his relation Mr. William Burke, Pay-Maſter of the King's forces in India, an office which he ſtill retains.

It was early determined by the Rockingham adminiſtration, that Mr. Haſtings ſhould be removed. Mr. Dundas, who had been Chairman of the Secret Committee; the origin of his greatneſs, concurred with them in this point, though he has ſince publicly expreſſed his ſatisfaction, that his views were counteracted. At the minute this

this reſolution was taken in England, our 1782.
empire in Hindoſtan tottered to its foundation. We have already ſhewn the difficulties under which Great Britain laboured in India, and the aſtoniſhing efforts that were made by Mr. Haſtings, and thoſe who acted under him, to prevent the total ſubverſion of our power in that quarter of the world. In ſuch a ſituation, Mr. Haſtings required ſupport from England, but he received counteraction.

The King's miniſters, who poſſeſſed the public confidence of the Houſe of Commons, intoxicated with the novelty of power, determined, in defiance of law and common ſenſe, that the Company ſhould be laid under new reſtrictions in the exerciſe of thoſe privileges which they enjoyed by charter.—The Directors were, in fact, ordered, by a vote of the Houſe of Commons, to remove Mr. Haſtings; and thus did Mr. Burke, who was the grand mover of this buſineſs, lay the foundation of thoſe extraordinary events which have agitated the political world for the laſt ſix years, which occaſioned the overthrow of his

1782. his party; and involved many of his connections in ruin.

Intelligence of theſe extraordinary proceedings in England, circulated throughout Hindoſtan, in the months of Auguſt and September, 1782, produced an effect perfectly natural. The Marratta peace, ſigned by Madajee Scindiah, and Mr. David Anderſon, in the month of May, was on the point of being ratified at Poonah, in Auguſt; but the Miniſters of the Paiſhwa declared their determination, firſt to wait the arrival, and to know the ſentiments of the new Governor-General. Fortunately for the exiſtence of the Eaſt-India Company, a packet diſpatched over land to Mr. Haſtings, by Major Scott, arrived at Calcutta in November, with intelligence of the death of the Marquis of Rockingham, and the determination of the Court of Proprietors to reſiſt the mandate of the Houſe of Commons, for the recall of Mr. Haſtings. This intelligence produced a very happy alteration in the ſtate of public affairs. The peace with the Marrattas was ratified in the

the month of December, 1782, ſince which 1782,
time, all the conditions of it have been ſcrupulouſly obſerved by both parties.

When we thus compare the actual ſituation of affairs in the eaſt, with what paſſed in Great Britain, we ſhall be led to conclude, that we owe the preſervation of India to the India Company. And here it is natural to reflect, on that ſteadineſs and ſtability of government, which ariſes from common ſenſe, and a concern for independent property, contraſted with the viſionary projects of the ſublimeſt and moſt cultivated geniuſes. To have removed Mr. Haſtings, and attempted to introduce a new order of affairs in India, during the rage of war, did not appear abſurd to Mr. Burke and Mr. Fox, and to a majority in the Houſe of Commons: but the Proprietors of India Stock were unwilling to hazard ſo bold an experiment; and their prudent caution has equally contributed to the preſervation of private property, and the promotion of public proſperity. The Eaſt-India Company may thus be conſidered as an anchor, that

fixed

1782. fixed the agitated veſſel of ſtate, toſſed amidſt the billows of foreign war, and internal diſſentions. This aſſociation of men are not to be viewed, by the political eye, ſo much as a ſet of private monopoliſts, as a moſt important member or branch of the ſtate; which could not now be lopped off without lacerating the parent ſtock, and the danger of even mortal wounds. Were the trade to India thrown open to private adventurers, where is the ſecurity that theſe adventurers, in their exports and imports, would confine themſelves to the ports of Great Britain? Nor is the loſs of public revenue, and of the advantage of an extended circulation, the whole, or perhaps even the greateſt part of the evil to be apprehended from ſuch a meaſure. The Britiſh Government, deprived of the Company's fleet, would be deprived of a faithful and powerful aſſociate, who has uniformly adhered to the cauſe of the nation, and mingled her intereſt with her's in every fortune. The Eaſt-India ſhips have ever been found of infinite ſervice to the public ſecurity: whether by co-operating with the royal navy for the defence

defence of our foreign ſettlements, in tranſ- 1782.
porting troops to Aſia from Europe, or from one port to another in India. It were ſuperfluous to prove ſo notorious a fact by multiplied examples. I ſhall juſt mention one. It was in the Kingſton East-Indiaman, commanded by Captain Nutt, that Sir Eyre Coote, with a body of European infantry, and a large ſupply of proviſions and money, carried ſalvation from Bengal to the Carnatic.

Yet, at the ſame time that a clamour was excited againſt Mr. Haſtings, certain wild projectors began to propagate ideas of diſſolving the Company, while others propoſed, what would have amounted, in the end, to the ſame thing, the moſt ruinous innovations in their ſhipping. Nor were the Directors of the East-India Company wanting to liſten to offers of neceſſitous and whimſical ſpeculators, who, playing a deſperate game, endeavoured to intrude themſelves into the Company's ſervice, by holding out illuſory views of a reduction in the freight of ſhips. —The ſavings propoſed, which, at the utmoſt,

1782. utmoſt, it was computed, would not have exceeded ſixty thouſand pounds annually, could never have compenſated for thoſe alarming hazards which muſt have been incurred by any innovation in the ſyſtem of the Company's navigation: a ſyſtem that had ſtood the ſhock of ſo many accidents, and ſo many hoſtile and formidable combinations. The owners of ſhips, by affording a conſtant and ſure reſource of ſhipping, at ſtated and proper times, give that ſteadineſs, conſtancy, and uniformity of exertion to the commerce of the Eaſt-India Company, which its particular nature requires, and which neceſſarily accompanies the ſucceſsful management of all extenſive concerns. The neceſſary veſſels are fitted out by them, equipped, victualled, manned, and drawn together at an appointed place and fixed time, with a degree of regularity approaching to mechanical exactneſs; an exactneſs, which a regard to protection, and the winds, called monſoons, renders indiſpenſable. All nations that have been ambitious to extend and eſtabliſh their commerce on ſure grounds, in diſtant quarters of the world, have been careful

careful to unite with navigation and the requiſites for commercial conveyance, the means of protection from hoſtile invaſion. The number of ſhips neceſſary for carrying on the commerce of the Eaſt-India Company, is not leſs than one hundred. Such a quantity of ſhipping may be converted into a moſt formidable navy, that ſhall not only be independent of convoys, but form a mighty addition to the maritime force of England. The owners of ſhips, it is ſaid, have determined, and one or two excellent citizens*, happily diſtinguiſhed by an union of fortune, capacity, and public ſpirit, have of late ſet an example of building ſhips on an enlarged plan, and conſtructed in ſuch a manner, as to admit at once a reduction of freight, and to do as much execution as a ſixty-gun ſhip of the line. This example will undoubtedly be followed, and the Eaſt-India Company, which has the glory of having ſaved the nation, by the independent virtue of their counſels, will alſo have the renown of making a moſt important addition to the force of its arms. It is not fit that the conſtitution of ſuch a body, ſhould be 1782.

* Captain Newte, Mr. Cameron, &c.

1782. be lightly tampered with. Experience has proved, that a conjuncture may happen, when they may form a neceſſary counterpoiſe to the levity of political ſpeculators; and there is ſcarcely a family of any note in Britain, that is not from perſonal intereſt, or ties of conſanguinity, nearly concerned in their ſtability and welfare. But let us now return to the means employed by Mr. Haſtings, in the hour of danger, for the ſalvation of India, from which we have been led to this political digreſſion.

Bulwant, the father of Cheyt Sing, had behaved ſo treacherouſly to the Engliſh in the war with Sujah Dowlah, that the Governor and Council had determined to deprive him, in 1765, of the Zemindary of Benaras, though it was afterwards judged prudent to make uſe of his ſervices in collecting the revenues of that province, to protect him from the hoſtile reſentment of the Nabob Vizier, who had compelled him, in May, 1765, to pay him twenty lacks of rupees, as a fine for his former contumacy, and in order to enable him, the Nabob,

to

to discharge the subsidy due, by treaty, from him to the Company, and to raise him to a degree of independence which he had never before enjoyed. On the death of this man, his son, Cheyt Sing, by a woman of a very low caste, was continued in the Zemindary through the English influence with the Vizier. And Mr. Hastings, in 1773, procured from the Nabob a confirmation of Cheyt Sing and his posterity in that rich possession. By the treaty of Lucknow, concluded in 1775, the sovereignty of Benaras and Gauzipore was transfered from the Nabob to the East-India Company. Cheyt Sing was still treated with the utmost indulgence, and no demands were made, on account of his annual revenue, beyond the sum formerly stipulated.— But on the eruption of a war with France, in July, 1778, Cheyt Sing was called upon, according to oriental custom, to contribute his share of the additional expences now to be incurred by his sovereign. 1782

When Sir Eyre Coote was about to embark, in October 1780, for the coast of

1782. Coromandel, and there was a very great degree of probability that Bengal would be invaded by the Marrattas, the plan adopted by the Goverment for the protection of Bengal and its dependencies from the attacks of our enemies, was, to put the troops of the native princes, connected with our nation, either by the ties of alliance or allegiance, under the diſcipline, and the command of Britiſh officers. As a part of the ſyſtem of defence, it was unanimouſly reſolved in Council, that a part of Cheyt Sing's cavalry ſhould be put under our orders.

The Rajah did not diſpute the right of his ſovereign to demand military aid, but he ſought to evade compliance, on pretence of poverty: and his excuſes and delays to pay his promiſed ſubſidy, there was reaſon to believe, were dictated by the doubts he had been taught to entertain concerning the ſtability of that authority by which it had been impoſed. His repeated inſtances of contumacy and diſobedience, though unjuſtifiable in themſelves, and aggravated by the extreme diſtreſſes and dangers of the ſuperior

perior ſtate, appeared to the Governor-General of leſs conſideration on account of their own criminality, than as they were evidences of a deliberate and ſyſtematic conduct, aiming at the total ſubverſion of the authority of the Company, and the erection of his own independency on its ruins. He conſidered Cheyt Sing as culpable, in a very high degree, towards our ſtate, and his puniſhment, of which he had given him frequent warnings if he did not amend his conduct, as an example which juſtice and policy required, equally for the reparation of the wrongs which its dignity had ſuſtained, and for the future preſervation of its authority. He ſaw a political neceſſity for curbing the over-grown power of a great member of the Company's dominion, and rendering it ſubſervient to their preſent exigencies. Theſe are the reaſons urged by Mr. Haſtings in his narrative of the inſurrection at Benaras, in a ſtream of eloquence that rarely, if ever, flows, at once with ſuch tranſparency and ſuch force, where the concluſions of the underſtanding de- 1782.

1782. rive not an impetus from the emotions of the heart.

The Governor-General, with a view to raiſe ſupplies for maintaining the war, and in the hopes of being able to effect ſome interviews that might lead to peace, ſet out from Calcutta on the 7th of July, 1781, with an intention to proceed to Lucknow, the principal reſidence of the Royal Family of Oude. He arrived at Benaras on the morning of the 14th of Auguſt, whither alſo Cheyt Sing came to meet him ſome hours later. The Governor-General forbad the Rajah to come that evening to his quarters, as he had intended; and required him to defer his future viſits until he ſhould receive his permiſſion, as he had ſome previous matters to ſettle with him, of which he would be informed by the Reſident whom he would depute to him, next morning, for that purpoſe. Mr. Markham accordingly carried a paper to the Rajah, in which Mr. Haſtings recapitulated the ſeveral inſtances of his conduct which for ſome time paſt had repeatedly drawn

drawn upon himſelf the ſevere reprehen- 1782.
ſions of goverment, and demanded a clear and ſatisfactory explanation. He charged him not only with ſhifts and delays in the payment of a ſum of money, which he had promiſed to contribute in the ſtrongeſt terms, and which was deſtined for diſcharging the arrears due to the army that had marched towards Malva, but alſo with diſaffection and infidelity to the Company, the patrons on whom he depended, and with endeavours to excite diſorders in their government. The Rajah, in reply, profeſſed the utmoſt gratitude to Mr. Haſtings, whom he conſidered as the ſource from whence alone he derived the fulfilment of all his wiſhes and deſires; apologized for his delays in paying the required ſuſidy, and number of cavalry, from inability, and urged that the delay in remitting the ſum which he had been able to raiſe to the army did not reſt with him. He affirmed, that his whole cavalry did not exceed one thouſand three hundred, of which ſeveral were ſtationed at diſtant places. In compliance,

1782. he ſaid, with the Governor-General's wiſhes, he had collected five hundred horſe, and, as a ſubſtitute for other five hundred, he had provided an equal number of Burgandazes, at that moment ready to go to whatever place they ſhould be ſent. He added, that, happily for him, the arrival of the Governor-General at Benaras, would enable him to aſcertain the truth of what he had aſſerted concerning his horſe, on the ſpot. He had conſtantly endeavoured to fulfil the Governor's orders, and to preſerve good government: "But," ſaid he, "if a perſon having committed a delinquency "ſhould eſcape to ſome other place, ſo as "to elude all diſcovery, in that caſe I am "helpleſs."

This anſwer appeared to the Governor-General to be not only unſatisfactory in ſubſtance, but, from an inferior in India to a ſuperior, offenſive in ſtyle, and leſs a vindication of himſelf than a recrimination on the Governor. It expreſſed not any concern for the cauſes of complaint contained in his letter, nor deſire to atone for them. An anſwer couched

couched nearly in terms of defiance, to re- 1782.
quiſitions of ſo ſerious a nature, Mr. Haſtings conſidered as an indication of that ſpirit of independency which the Rajah had aſſumed for ſome years paſt. Under theſe alarming appearances of the Rajah's conduct and diſpoſitions, he conceived himſelf to be indiſpenſably obliged to form ſome immediate and deciſive plan for ſecuring the Company's intereſts and rights in Benaras. He ordered the Reſident to proceed, early on the morning of Auguſt the ſixteenth, to the houſe of the Rajah Cheyt Sing, with his uſual guard, and put him in arreſt.—Mr. Markham, followed by two companies of Grenadier Sepoys, according to his inſtructions executed the arreſt, to which the Rajah quietly ſubmitted, aſſuring the Reſident, that whatever the Governor's orders were, he was ready to obey them. He hoped that he would allow him a ſubſiſtence; but, as for his Zemindary, his forts, and his treaſure, he was ready to lay them down, with his life, if required, at his feet. In two letters, alſo addreſſed to the Governor-General, in the language of deſpondent

1782. ſupplication, he profeſſed entire ſubmiſſion to his will. The Governor having now brought the refractory Rajah to the temper he deſired, comforted him with a ſhort note, in which he informed him, that Mr. Markham ſhould wait upon him in the afternoon, and explain particulars. In the mean time he deſired him to ſet his mind at reſt, and not to conceive any terror or apprehenſion. The Rajah to this conſolatory aſſurance replied, "My Protector! wherever you ſpread "your ſhadow over my head, I am entirely "free from terror and apprehenſion; and "whatever you, who are my Maſter, ſhall "as ſuch determine, will be right."

The Governor-General had by this time prepared new inſtructions to Mr. Markham; but before he could ſet out with them, intelligence was received, that large bodies of men, in arms, had croſſed the river from Ramnagur, and proceeded to Shewallah Gaut, Cheyt Sing's houſe. The guard placed over the Rajah, conſiſted of two companies of grenadier Sepoys, as above mentioned, from Major Popham's detachment, commanded

manded by the Lieutenants Simes, Scott, 1782
and Stalker, and ſtationed in an encloſed
ſquare which ſurrounded the Prince's apart-
ment in the palace: the Reſident's guard
had returned with him to Mr. Haſtings.
It now appeared that theſe troops were un-
provided with ammunition. Major Pop-
ham, therefore, ſent another company of
Sepoys, with ammunition, to reinforce and
ſupport the firſt party. But, on their ar-
rival at the Rajah's houſe, they found all
the avenues blockaded by a multitude of
armed men. The minds of this tumultu-
ous aſſembly, fermented into rage, by a re-
ciprocation of ſentiments and paſſions, and
aſſuming courage from their numbers,
made an inſtantaneous and fierce attack on
the Sepoys, who, wanting their accuſtomed
means of defence, fell an eaſy ſacrifice to
the ſuperior numbers of their aſſailants.
The officers, it is ſuppoſed, were the firſt
victims to their fury; but not until they
had, by aſtoniſhing efforts of bravery, in-
volved in their fate far greater numbers
of their enemies.

In

1782. In the midſt of this confuſion, Cheyt Sing found means to eſcape through a wicket that opened to the river; and the banks being exceedingly ſteep in that place, he was let down by turbans tied together, into a boat which conveyed him to the oppoſite ſhore. His adherents followed him acroſs the river in the ſame tumultuous manner in which they had aſſembled, leaving the party of four Sepoys which had laſt arrived, in poſſeſſion of the houſe. But if, inſtead of crouding after the Rajah, they had proceeded to Mahadow Daſs's garden, the reſidence at that critical hour of Mr. Haſtings, the blood of the Governor-General, with that of about thirty Engliſh gentlemen of his party, would have been added to the recent carnage, and the Britiſh empire in India would have ceaſed from that moment to exiſt. For every ſtate around it would have ſtarted into arms againſt it: and its own ſubjects, according to their degrees of power, would have been forward to renounce their allegiance.

Mr.

Mr. Haſtings, on the firſt intelligence 1782.
of this commotion, directed Major Popham to repair immediately to his camp, which was about two miles from the Reſident's houſe, and at the ſame diſtance from the Rajah's, and to march inſtantly with the remainder of his detachment to the ſupport of the party. Major Popham, though he loſt not a moment to execute this order, arrived too late, and beheld with ſorrow the effects of a maſſacre which he could neither prevent nor revenge. Cheyt Sing fled to Lutteefpoor with his family, and all his forces, except the ordinary guard of Ramnagur: a vaſt pile of irregular, but maſſy buildings, conſtructed of ſtone, on the river ſide, and partly within the bed of the river. To the original ſtrength of this place, Cheyt Sing had added ſome ſmall baſtions of ſtone and earth; but it poſſeſſed a ſtronger defence in a large town which had grown around it, and the complicated intricacies of the apartments and paſſages of the palace. Ramnagur had been evacuated during the commotions at Shewallah Gaut: but the firſt tumults of conſternation

1782. ſternation having ſubſided, about two thouſand men had returned to that fortreſs, on the 18th of Auguſt, under the command of Ramjeewuun, a confidential and domeſtic chief of the Rajah's family.

The whole ſtrength of the Governor-General at Benaras, conſiſted originally of ſix companies of Major Popham's regiment, about ſixty Sepoys which he had taken from the garriſon at Buxar, for the protection of his boats, and a few men without diſcipline, and without arms, who had been newly recruited for the Reſident's guard. Of Major Popham's regiment, eighty-two men had fallen in the maſſacre of Shewallah Gaut, and ninety-two were wounded. The whole number of killed and wounded, amounted to two hundred and five.

The remainder of Major Popham's detachment, conſiſting of four companies of Sepoys, one company of artillery, and a company of French rangers in our ſervice, were ordered to march immediately to Ramnagur,

nagur, and a letter was ſent to Lieutenant- 1782
Colonel Blair, to detach a battalion of Sepoys on the ſame deſtination, from the garriſon at Chunar. Theſe different forces were ordered to halt at a ſecure diſtance from Ramnagur, to avoid all hoſtilities, and to wait for further orders. Major Popham, formally inveſted with the command of this little body, in order to ſecure the ſucceſs of his operations, had choſen a convenient and open plain, on the ſhore oppoſite to Ramnagur, for a battery of two mortars, expected from Chunar. Theſe diſpoſitions promiſed a ſure and eaſy conqueſt; when an accident happened, which blaſted the reaſonable expectations, and had well nigh proved the ruin of the whole party. Captain Mayaffré, the ſenior, and conſequently the ruling officer before Major Popham aſſumed the command, unwilling to loſe the opportunity which his preſent and caſual authority afforded him of acquiring military reputation, without plan, without inquiry, againſt the advice of his officers, and againſt orders, led the detachment into the narrow ſtreets of the town of Ramnagur, where,

expoſed

1782. expoſed to the fire of an enemy ſurrounding them unſeen, one hundred and ſeven men, including Captain Mayaffre who commanded, and Captain Doxat who led on the attack, were inſtantly killed, and ſeventy-two wounded. Captain Blair, with the remains of the detachment, made a judicious and ſafe retreat. The date of this maſſacre, rather than defeat, was the morning of the 20th of Auguſt, 1781.

The Governor-General, plunged in a decided war, and anxious both to prevent its progreſs, and to bring it to a ſpeedy termination, diſpatched written orders, in multiplied copies, to our different military ſtations, for aſſiſtance, to the Reſident at the court of the Vizier, for a ſupply of treaſure, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Blair for an inſtant reinforcement. Certain intelligence was received of preparations at Ramnagur for an aſſault on his quarters, ſituated in the midſt of the ſuburbs of Benaras, and conſiſting of many detached buildings within one large incloſure, ſurrounded by houſes and trees, which intercepted every other proſpect.

His

His whole force was now reduced to about four hundred and fifty men. The reports of an intended aſſault, encreaſed with the advancing day: and boats ſeen in conſtant motion on the other ſide of the river, precluded all heſitation concerning a deſign ſo probable, except what might ariſe in chuſing means for defeating it. Divided between the dangers of a confined ſituation, and the want of proviſions, even for twenty-four hours, on the one hand, and the diſgrace of a flight, and compaſſion for our wounded Sepoys on the other, the Governor-General remained during the whole courſe of the day, in the moſt agonizing ſuſpence. But the diſgrace of a flight, yielded to the ſuperior weight of neceſſity; and, with regard to the wounded men, the diſtance at which they were quartered, their diſtreſſed ſituation, and the multiplicity of preſſing exigencies which the reſolution to remain muſt have created, would have rendered it impoſſible either to relieve or remove them. Mr. Haſtings, therefore, uniting as much as poſſible humanity with prudence, in the firſt place, diſpatched a meſſenger 1782.

1782. meſſenger to the Nabob Saadut-Ally-Cawn, or the brother of Aſoph-ul-Dow-lah, informing him of his reſolution to leave Benaras, and recommending to his care the wounded Sepoys; a requeſt which he afterwards renewed when he had effected his eſcape to the place he had deſtined for his retreat. In the evening, by the advice of Major Popham, and that of the other Field-officers preſent, ſeparately aſked and given, he gave orders to form their little corps, that they might have time to gain the open country before the enemy, apprized of their deſign, could croſs and obſtruct his march; entangled in ſtreets, lanes, and broken ground. They paſſed a battalion of Sepoys, detached by Colonel Blair to his aſſiſtance, who, immediately turned and joined them. Early the next morning, they arrived at Chunar. About this time, the Governor-General received a letter from Cheyt Sing, fraught with expreſſions of concern for what had paſſed, and general profeſſions of fidelity in future; and ſoon after, application was made by the Rajah to ſome gentlemen of the Governor's party,

for

for their friendly offices and interceſſion in favour of certain ſpecific propoſals for an accommodation. Theſe advances, on the part of Cheyt Sing, Mr. Haſtings, from ſeveral appearances indicating hoſtile intentions, conſidered as artifices to gain time. He did not, therefore, think it becoming to make any reply to the Rajah's letter. 1782.

Soon after our little party was formed, and the line in motion from Benaras to Chunar, Mr. Haſtings was met by Beneram Pundit, formerly mentioned in theſe Memoirs, miniſter to Moodajee-Booſlah, Rajah of Berar, and his brother Beſſumbar Pundit, on foot, with only one attendant. The Governor-General thanked them for the proof they had given of their attachment, but inſiſted on their return to Benaras, where they had a large family, which, by their continuance with him, might be expoſed to the reſentment of Cheyt Sing. But they perſiſted in their reſolution of accompanying, and committing their fate with that of our men: nor could all the importunities of Mr. Haſtings divert them from their purpoſe.

1782. Benaram Pundit, who was a man of a warm and eager temper, underſtanding the diſtreſs in which our ſmall detachment was involved by the want of both credit and money, offered and preſſed on the Governor's acceptance, a lack of rupees in ready money, which he received in the nature of a loan, giving him a note for it in the Company's name, and in the uſual form.

In the mean time, the Nabob Vizier, who had expected a viſit from the Governor-General, had left his capital, and advanced a ſhort way to meet him. The Governor was not inſenſible of the advantages to be derived by the preſence of the Nabob: but theſe, he conſidered, would invert the relation of their alliance, and inveſt that prince with a ſuperiority in their meeting, which would defeat its object. Beſides, he thought it inconſiſtent with the dignity of the Company's Government, to employ foreign aid in reſtoring its tranquillity. He, therefore, wrote a letter to the Nabob, requeſting him to return to Lucknow, and there remain until he, the Governor,

vernor, ſhould have leiſure to proſecute his 1782.
original journey. The Nabob, however, on the firſt intimation of his difficulties, was more earneſt than ever to join and ſupport him: a purpoſe which he executed with ſuch apparent zeal, that he made his firſt ſtages with no other attendance than about one hundred horſe, and about four companies of his body-guards, with his uſual domeſtic attendants. Mr. Haſtings, informed of this circumſtance, in order to remove any unpleaſant impreſſions that might have been made on the mind of the Nabob by his former letter, ſent a ſecond, expreſſing perfect confidence in his fidelity, and apologizing for what he had before written, from an unwillingneſs to involve him in a ſcene of trouble, and ſignifying his deſire of ſeeing him, according to his own wiſhes, at Chunar.

Whatever ſuſpicions, or tendency to ſuſpicion, the Governor-General might have felt within his own breaſt on this occaſion, not of the Nabob, who depended on the protection of our government, but of others

1782. who were near his perſon, and endeavoured to abuſe his confidence, he prudently ſuppreſſed: nor did he ever ſuffer his apprehenſions to influence his actions; ſince it was not in his power to uſe any means for counteracting their deſigns, which would not appear to proceed from a diſtruſt of the Prince himſelf. The favourites of the Nabob, the companions of his looſer hours, men of weak underſtandings and diſſolute morals, jealous of the ſuperior influence of Mr. Haſtings, united with the relations of the Royal Family, in inſinuating to their immediate ſovereign, the moſt pernicious counſels, repreſenting the preſent, as a fit conjuncture for aſſerting his independence. It is a common error, that plots are to be defeated only by counter-plots. Confederacies and intrigues, in the paſſions that prompt, and the variety of circumſtances which muſt concur in order to crown them with ſucceſs, involve weakneſs in their nature, and uncertainty in their iſſue: and the moſt direct road is uſually the ſafeſt. The undaunted air of the Governor-General, the confidence which he placed, or pretended

pretended to place in the Nabob, the pre- 1782.
parations he made for cruſhing the firſt beginnings of revolt, without calling, or even accepting the aid of tributary and dependent princes: all theſe circumſtances had a direct and powerful tendency, to maintain an ſcendant on the weak mind of Aſoph-ul-Dowlah, andto confine his hopes and fears within the channels in which they had been accuſtomed to flow. But, had the Governor-General openly avowed his ſuſpicions, and demanded the removal of evil counſellors from the perſon of their ſovereign, on the one hand; or endeavoured to form a party in his favour, in the Durbar of the Nabob, on the other: in either caſe his conduct would have been attended with danger. In the firſt caſe, he might have precipitated the deſigns of his enemies, who might have ſeized the perſon of the prince, and armed themſelves with his authority: in the ſecond, he would have betrayed weakneſs and fear, which, inſtead of dividing, would, in all probability, have united his enemies in a firm purpoſe, at ſo tempting a criſis, to effect his ruin. No-

1782. thing, therefore, can be imagined, either more magnanimous, or more judicious, than the conduct of Mr. Haſtings, who, without either holding a parley, or inviting an open conteſt with his enemies, ruſhed, without a moment's delay, into the ſecureſt fortreſs.

There was not, in reality, room, amidſt the difficulties with which he was environed, for the ſlow and indirect modes of political intrigue. The contagion of revolt had flown, in an inſtant, from Benaras, to Fyzabad, and the territories of Goruckpoor and Bareech. In the city of Fyzabad, the mother and grand-mother of the Nabob, openly eſpouſed the party of Cheyt Sing, encouraging and inviting people to inliſt in his ſervice: and the ſtandard of revolt was raiſed by their own ſervants. Two battalions of regular Sepoys, in the Vizier's ſervice, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hannay, ſtationed in Oude, were in various places ſurrounded, attacked, and many of them cut to pieces. Many of the Zemindars of Bahar, had diſcovered

coverd ſymptoms of diſaffection; and le- 1782.
vies of men, if common report can be credited, were openly entertained in that province for the enemy, by our own ſubjects.

Through an unfortunate train of official perplexities, which had happened ſome time preceding this, both Major Popham's regiment, the rangers, and all the corps of the garriſon of Chunar, were four months in arrears. The Governor-General, in the midſt of theſe alarming circumſtances, when the war in the Carnatic wore an aſpect that portended, at beſt, no more than the probability of being able to prolong an uncertain ſtruggle; when we were engaged in a war with the Marratta ſtates, on the coaſt of Malabar, and with Madajee Scindiah, near our own borders; when a ſudden rebellion had deprived us of every foot of land in Benaras, and, having involved the province of Oude in a ſimilar defection, was extending its contagion over thoſe of Rohilcund, and Doab, and when even our own province of Bahar was ripe for inſurrection: while troubles had overtaken, and were

1782. ſtill gathering around him on every ſide, the Governor-General found himſelf unable to command three thouſand rupees.

Under theſe accumulated difficulties and dangers, Mr. Haſtings derived comfort and relief from the public ſpirit, the activity, and the perſonal confidence and attachment of all the officers in the neareſt military ſtations, to whom, after the maſſacre of Shewallah Gaut, orders, in different letters had been ſent for aſſiſtance, and from the unſhaken fidelity of the Nabob Vizier. The early exertions made by Colonel Blair and Major Popham have been already mentioned. Though every letter ſent to Colonel Morgan, commanding the troops at Cawnpore had been intercepted, that officer, rightly judging of the paſt miſadventures of the Governor and his preſent ſituation, from conſtant report and the ſudden failure of intelligence, with a ſolicitude and deciſion which reflect equal credit on his character; detached to his aid, under the command of Major Crabb, two regiments of Sepoys, thirty European artillery men, and

two

two companies of the European regiment, 1782.
with four ſix-pounders, one howitzer, tumbrils, ammunition, draft and carriage cattle, and as great a quantity of proviſions as he could ſpare.

He was afterwards ordered to follow with his whole force: and Colonel Sir John Cumming, on receiving an order to occupy his ſtation at Cawnpore, marched thither, with the utmoſt diligence and alacrity, in the ſpace of four days. Lieutenant Polhill, on the 27th of Auguſt, arrived with ſix companies of Sepoys belonging to the Nabob Vizier's body-guard, ſtationed at Illiabad. He was ordered to encamp on the oppoſite banks of the river, for the purpoſe of preſerving a communication with that ſhore. On the 29th he attacked and defeated a conſiderable body of troops under the command of the chief Shehaub Cawn, who was ſtationed at a ſmall fort and town called Seekar, within ſight of Chunar.

On

1782. On the 13th of September, Major Roberts, with his regiment and a lack of rupees in ſilver, arrived from Lucknow, whither he had been ſent for a guard to the Governor-General's perſon, in his intended viſit to that capital. A farther ſupply of fifty thouſand rupees was received a few days after, by the collector of the Nabob's rents at Illiabad. On the 11th, the Nabob Vizier arrived at his encampment, which had been formed on the ſhore oppoſite to Chunar. Mr. Haſtings choſe to make him the firſt viſit, the ſame morning on which he arrived: and it was returned by the Nabob on the next. On the 15th Lieutenant Polhill croſſed the river and joined Major Popham's camp.

The whole detachment now conſiſted of one company of European grenadiers, one of light infantry, one of French rangers, thirty European artillery men, four regiments and one battalion of Sepoys, and ſix companies of the Nabob's body guard.

The

The troops entertained by the Rajah Cheyt Sing, amounted nearly to twenty-two thouſand, beſides a great number of huſbandmen and others, who voluntarily took up arms, encreaſing his whole forces, at this time, regulars and irregulars, to the number of forty thouſand. Theſe were ſtationed in Luteefpoor, Pateeta, and Ramnagur. Thoſe of them that were reputed the beſt, were at Pateeta. The great maſs of irregulars, with part of the other troops, remained with the Rajah at Luteefpoor, his reſidence ſince his flight from his palace at Benaras. Luteefpoor, ſituated fifteen miles eaſtward of Chunar, is a large fort built with ſtone, ſurrounded by hills, and, whether from neglect or deſign, concealed from diſtant view with thick coppice wood and trees. Pateeta is a very large town, ſurrounded by a rampart of earth, which extends to a great diſtance beyond it, to the adjoining hills, and including a ſmall ſquare building of ſtone inviſible, at firſt, to aſſailants, fortified with four round towers, and encloſed with an high rampart and ditch, which is in moſt parts broad and deep. 1782.

The

1782. The plan of operations originally intended, as above mentioned, was, in the firſt place, to reduce the town and fort of Ramnagur; the capture of which would lead to the repoſſeſſion of the capital, and reſtore the authority of the Engliſh over the whole province. For this purpoſe battering cannon and mortars were ordered to Major Popham's camp, and all other preparations made that were neceſſary for a ſiege; when the ſyſtem that had been adopted by the Governor-General and the officers of his party, was exchanged for another ſuggeſted by Bundoo Khan, a native and inhabitant of the town of Chunar. This man had accompanied Captain Blair, firſt in his action, already mentioned, at Ramnagur, and afterwards in another action at Pateeta, of which the following is a brief account.

Captain Blair, on the 3d of September, was detached by Major Popham with his battalion, and two companies of grenadiers, to ſuprize the enemy's camp at Pateeta.—Having marched at three in the moaning, they arrived by day-light at the ground; but

but they found it abandoned, and the ene- 1782.
my, who had by ſome means or other been apprized of their deſign, waiting for their approach, on ground which they had choſen about a mile beyond it. An engagement immediately enſued, in which the enemy, furious and daring from recent ſucceſs, fought with deſperate intrepidity. Our Sepoys had begun to give way, when the Lieutenants Fallon and Birrel, at the head of the two companies of grenadiers, turning the tide of fortune, obtained poſſeſſion of the field of battle, with four guns and four tumbrils loaded with ammunition.

The loſs ſuſtained by our ſmall detachment in this bloody action was very great: forty-eight men killed, and eighty-five wounded. The enemy were furniſhed with all the apparatus of artillery, equal, or nearly equal, to the production of an European elaboratory. It was from their cannon, which was well ſerved, that our party principally ſuffered. This victory, though it did not drive the enemy from Pateeta, and though purchaſed by the expenditure of one

fourth

1782. fourth of the party, was yet a victory in its effects, as it encouraged our troops, but diſpirited the enemy, and, at a time when the minds of all men were in ſuſpence concerning the party it would be prudent to flee or to follow, tended to form an important preſage of our ſucceſs in the public opinion.

Bundoo Cawn, who, by his knowledge of the ground and his advice in the application of it, had rendered eminent as well as gratuitous ſervice to Captain Blair, in this as well as a former action at Ramnagur, was induced by the intereſt and ſafety of a large family, which depended on our ſucceſs, and encouraged by the confidence and applauſe of the little Engliſh army, to offer his information and advice, on all occaſions where he thought they might be of ſervice. He repreſented, that, as the Rajah's force was principally collected at Luteefpoor and Pateeta, and was daily increaſing, it would be exceedingly difficult to diſlodge him, if he ſhould be ſuffered to eſtabliſh himſelf by a ſeries of detailed operations, ſupporting each other and combined in a ſyſtem.

The

The approaches both to Pateeta and Lutteefpoor were ſtrongly guarded, and eſpecially thoſe of Lutteefpoor, to which the only road that was practicable ran through Pateeta. But even if Lutteefpoor could have been carried, on another ſide, it would be untenable, the Cawn repreſented, from the ſtrength of the paſs, called, Suckroot, behind it, of which the enemy would keep poſſeſſion in defiance of all their efforts, and againſt any ſuperiority of numbers. He therefore adviſed that two attacks ſhould be executed at the ſame inſtant of time: one on the paſs of Suckroot, another on the fort of Pateeta. Of the paſs, he ſaid, which was of the eaſieſt acceſs, being unguarded from above, our forces might eaſily obtain poſſeſſion, and thereby gain the ſame advantage over the garriſon of Lutteefpoor, as the garriſon would have over them, if they took poſſeſſion of that fort firſt: and every other road of communication with Lutteefpoor, would be commanded by the poſſeſſion of Pateeta. Bundoo Cawn offered to conduct the party which ſhould be ſent againſt the paſs, by a road unfrequented and unknown, 1782.

1782. unknown, but which he deſcribed moſt minutely, and, as has ſince appeared, with aſtoniſhing correctneſs.

A ſimilar inſtance of this topographical ingenuity in the natives of Aſia, which appears to be ſomewhat akin to their diſpoſition and faculty for imitation *, was experienced by Colonel Fullarton, who commanded the Engliſh army ſouth of the Coleroon, towards the concluſion of the war with Hyder and Tippoo Sultaun. When the army encamped before Daraporam, it was not found practicable to approach ſo near the fort, as to determine with preciſion the moſt advantageous point of attack.—But a Bramin hircarrah, or intelligencer, explained every particular reſpecting the po-

* The nature of the Hindoos is peculiarly fitted for works of imitation by a delicate ſenſibility of corporeal organization, by that patient perſeverance, which ſo eminently diſtinguiſhes them, and by another quality, if it be another, namely, that they are wholly occupied and abſorbed in the preſent object. No diſtraction of thought; no wandering of imagination: the force of their mind is brought to bear with effect on one point, by means of deeply fixed attention. Hence, the original model is not to be diſtinguiſhed from the new production, in any kind of cloth, earth, metal, wood, or ſtone.

ſition

ſition of the works, and the nature of the ground adjacent, in ſuch a manner as enabled him to draw a plan from his deſcription. The Adjutant-General, Captain Oram, alſo drew a plan from the accounts of another Hircarrah. The two plans thus drawn from verbal information, were found ſo exactly ſimilar in every material point, that, on the ſtrength thereof, a body of our troops marched in a dark night, croſſed a river, and occupied a ſtrong poſition within four hundred yards of the fort, from whence they erected batteries, and effected a breach. 1782.

A better military plan than that which had been propoſed by Bundoo Cawn, could not have been laid down by the moſt experienced commander. Major Popham inſtantly ſaw its propriety, and adopted it. He formed the army into two diviſions. The Major, at the head of one of theſe, marched to Pateeta, which he took by ſtorm, on the morning of the 20th of September *.

* At the ſtorm of Pateeta, two Nujeebs were wounded and taken priſoners. They were part of a body of ſix hundred men recruited at Fyzabad, by the Begum's orders, and ſent to join Cheyt Sing.

1782. Major Crabb conducted the other diviſion through ways almoſt impracticable, to a village called Lóra, about two miles from the Suckroot paſs, where he found a body of men, with three guns poſted to oppoſe him. The enemy, after a ſtout reſiſtance, by which we loſt twelve men, but they themſelves a much greater number, fled through the paſs to Lutteefpoor. Our detachment followed them as far as the head of the paſs, where they encamped for the remainder of the day.

The mind of Cheyt Sing, amidſt theſe events, appears to have been actuated by ideas of hoſtility or of ſubmiſſion, according as it was impreſſed by preſent objects of hope or of fear. After the action of Captain Blair, at Pateeta, in which his party ſuffered ſeverely, and his return to Chunar, which was probably repreſented as a retreat, the Rajah, either authorized, or countenanced a maſſacre of fourteen of our ſick priſoners, who had fallen into his hands, in cold blood. At other times he ſent letters, fraught with aſſertions of his innocence, profeſſions of ſubmiſſion, and offers

offers of accommodation. Theſe, indeed, 1782.
were ſo ſtrong, and ſo often repeated, that had they proceeded from a ſenſible and manly character, the Governor-General, ſituated as he was, muſt have been inclined to liſten to them with pleaſure. But Cheyt Sing was a weak and irreſolute man. He varied in his views according to accidental advices and impreſſions, and, in proportion as he was removed from actual danger, by diſtance of place or time, he became confident of his wealth, his ſtrong-holds, the number of his adherents, the diſtreſſes of our government, and the power of its increaſing enemies. And, whatever may be thought concerning that political neceſſity, which impelled the Governor-General to provide for extraordinary exigencies, by extraordinary means, or, when the fate of his country ſtood trembling on a precipice, concerning the propriety of fixing his eye for relief, where wealth, acquired by the Company's patronage, was united with deſigns againſt the Company's ſafety; certain it is, that hoſtilities againſt the Rajah, had been too far proſecuted to be abandoned;

1782. for his proſperity could not co-exiſt with that of the Britiſh nation in India.

The news of our ſucceſſes againſt Pateeta, and the Suckroot paſs, heightening terror by ſurprize, diſarmed Cheyt Sing of all reſolution. His laſt refuge was Bidjey-Gur, a fort erected on the ſolid rocks of a hill, riſing from the ground to the height of ſeven hundred and forty-five perpendicular feet. This fort, which was the repoſitory of all his own and his father's treaſures, is ſituated about fifty miles in a ſouth-eaſt direction from Chunar. The road to this place lay through the paſs, which he durſt not attempt. But, by making a circuit over the hills, he gained the high road, at the diſtance of ſome miles beyond Suckroot, and proceeded with a few followers to the neighbourhood of Bidjey-Gur. He was now forſaken by all his adherents. On the approach of Major Popham, who advanced from Lutteefpoor to Bidjey-Gur, without loſs of time, he fled by the route of Rewa, to the capital of Bundle-Cund; taking with him as much treaſure as his elephants

elephants and camels could carry, which, 1782.
beſides jewels, amounted in ſpecie, to four hundred thouſand pounds ſterling. He left his wife, a woman of an amiable character, his mother Pauna, and all the other women of his houſe, with the ſurvivors of his father's family, who were connected with his, in the fort.

The whole province of Benaras returned under the obedience of the Company. The town was placed under the government of a newly-created and independent magiſtracy; and the Zemindary beſtowed, on the 30th of September, on Bauboo Mehipnarain, grandſon in the female line, to the Rajah Bulwant Sing, according to the Hindoo law the next lineal heir, after his mother and grand-mother, who, in his favour, formally yielded up their pretenſions.

It was agreed on between the Governor-General, in the name of the Eaſt-India Company, and the Nabob Vizier, that a re-

1782. duction ſhould be made in the expence and the numbers of the Nabob's troops, conſiſting chiefly of a diſorderly and uſeleſs rabble, and that a new military eſtabliſhment ſhould be formed, well appointed and commanded, efficient in ſervice, and ſuch as ſhould protect, inſtead of diſtreſſing his country; and that, as great diſtreſſes had ariſen to the Nabob's government, from the military power and dominion aſſumed by the Jagheerdars, he ſhould be permitted to reſume ſuch Jagheers as he might find neceſſary, with a reſerve, in caſe of the reſumption of any jagheers for the amount of which the Company were guarantees, that an equivalent for their clear collections or rents, ſhould be paid through the reſident at Lucknow in ready money.

Agreeably to this convention, a reſumption was adviſed by Aſoph-ul-Dowlah, and agreed to by Mr. Haſtings, of the jagheers or eſtates of the Begums or Princeſſes of Oude, his mother and grand-mother, who, as above mentioned, had united their authority and influence to embarraſs the Nabob's government,

government, and to extend and aggravate the difficulties of the Engliſh. A proviſion at the ſame time was made, for replacing their income at the exact rate at which it ſtood in their own eſtimate, while they held the jagheers, by making it the condition of the reſumption, that they ſhould receive a penſion equal to the amount of thoſe poſſeſſions, in equal monthly payments: and theſe, for the fulleſt ſecurity, were made payable from the produce of the Company's aſſignments. The hoarded treaſures of the Begums, at the requeſt of their ſon and grandſon, to whom they belonged by the right of hereditary ſucceſſion, were alſo reſumed: by which means the Nabob was enabled to pay the arrears of ſubſidy due from Oude for the protection of the Company, which furniſhed a very ſeaſonable and neceſſary ſupply for the ſupport of his own authority, by that of the Britiſh government in India. But this was not effected without a temporary confinement of two eunuchs, confidential ſervants of the Begums, and even ſubjecting them, for a ſhort time, to the rigour and indignity of irons. The uſual 1782.

1782. and neceſſary ſubſiſtence, too, was withheld from the inferior women and children of the late Nabob Sujah-ul-Dowlah, for ſome days: an act of cruelty which originated in the negligence of the Phouſdar of Lutteefpoor, and which was removed by the interference of the Britiſh officers. It cannot be imputed in any degree to the Governor-General, who was entirely ignorant of it till it was over.

The ſucceſsful vigour of Mr. Haſtings, the alacrity with which he was ſupported by our military ſtations, the rapidity with which his collected force quaſhed rebellion, and exalted the power of his country on its ruins, excited the aſtoniſhment of India, and the admiration of Europe. But the exultation of a great party in the Houſe of Commons, on this occaſion of triumph, was loſt in compaſſion for Cheyt Sing, the impriſoned eunuchs, and the Begums; in indignation againſt the Governor-General, whom they compared to Nero, Cortez, Pizarro, and other odious tyrants; and in melancholy forebodings of that ruin which the

the awakened reſentment of all the native 1782.
Princes muſt ſoon involve, if they had not already involved the Britiſh intereſts in India. They expatiated on the royal blood of Cheyt Sing, and bewailed the hardſhips of the Princeſſes of Oude, whoſe advanced years, tender ſex, and recluſe manner of life, rendered them very unfit perſons to wage war with a diſciplined European army.—They denied that there was the leaſt reaſon for imputing rebellious deſigns to Cheyt Sing or the Begums, and found fault with whatever kind or degree of evidence was alledged or produced of hoſtile intentions or actions. If the teſtimony of Hindoos was produced, they were under the influence of fear: if that of Europeans, they were under the impreſſions either of gratitude, or the hope of favour. If in any inſtance the Governor-General acted on the ſtrength of public notoriety, they demanded legal evidence: if the beſt evidence that could be obtained was given, they conſtrued the foreſight that obtained it into a proof of conſcious guilt. If the friends of Mr. Haſtings pled the difference between Aſiatic

1782. tic and free European Governments, they replied, that, however *fear* might have been the ruling principle in India formerly, they had projected, and even begun to make an experiment of an oppoſite ſyſtem. If it was ſaid that dominion, eſpecially in times of political danger, is beſt retained through the ſame means by which it was acquired, and that, in ſuch caſes, new experiments are dangerous, the anſwer was, *Fiat juſtitia, ruat cœlum* *.

To maintain a proſecution againſt a man allowed to poſſeſs many amiable qualities as well as great talents, unſuſpected of private rapacity, and who, at the worſt had ſaved our ſettlements in India by arts exactly ſimilar to thoſe by which we had obtained them, required uncommon abilities, and found them. Mr. Burke, in his charge againſt Mr. Haſtings, was ably ſupported by many of his political friends: but the moſt diſtinguiſhed of his auxiliaries was Mr. Sheridan.

* This maxim, which may be tranſlated, *Do juſtice and be damned*, is very juſtly conſidered by Mr. Hume as an abſurd ſacrifice of the end to the means.

by

Richard Brindſley Sheridan, a deſcendant 1782.
of that Sheridan whoſe name is immortalized in the writings of Dean Swift, was, like Edmund Burke, a political adventurer, and a native of Ireland, though he was educated in England, and, for ſome years, under the tuition of the learned and claſſical Doctor Samuel Parr. He poſſeſſed, like his illuſtrious countryman, excellent qualities both of body and mind, improved by a learned and liberal education: an expreſſive countenance, a manly yet pleaſing deportment, great inſinuation and addreſs, veratility and accommodation of manners in the common intercourſes of life, but, in matters of importance, inviolable attachment to his profeſſed principles. He was introduced to public life by Mr. Fox; and he has paid the fineſt compliment that was ever yet made to that wonderful man's penetration and diſcernment of character. He was diſtinguiſhed, as well as Mr. Burke, by learning, eloquence, wit, and humour, and, like Mr. Burke, he maintained unſhaken fidelity to his friends, with a narrow private fortune. In ſhort, the country, the ſituation and the friends of theſe

1782. theſe men were the ſame; and their talents and virtues nearly equal in degree, but different in kind. Though Mr. Burke knew how to excuſe the follies and frailties of his fellow-men, he was from the ſenſibility of his temper, not indiſpoſed to remark them. Mr. Sheridan had a quick apprehenſion of whatever was either odious or ludicrous in human life and conduct, but, except on the theatre he ſeemed too good-natured to obſerve it. Mr. Burke inclined ſomewhat to the ſternneſs of republican virtue: Mr. Sheridan to the indulgence of a court. They both of them ſeaſoned their orations with the pleaſing excurſions of fancy: but, while Mr. Burke often roſe from Earth to Heaven, and it was not every one who accompanied him in his flight that could diſtinguiſh the ſummits of mountains from clouds, clear argument and buſineſs were always the predominant features in the ſpeeches of Mr. Sheridan. The former preſerved his dignity by huſbanding fortune; the latter by deſpiſing it. Mr. Burke, like Cicero, ſacrificed, at his *Tuſculum**, both to the muſes, and the houſhold Gods. Mr.

* A beautified farm.

Sheridan,

Sheridan, like Cæſar, ſought to reign in the hearts of men, refuſed nothing when he had aught to beſtow, and, in every ſituation, with his eye fixed on the objects of a loſty ambition, waited in perfect tranquillity for that relief which the common viciſſitudes of human affairs, rightly improved by commanding genius, are wont to bring to all difficulties. 1782.

Mr. Sheridan, acting the part committed to him by his political friends, on the 17th of November 1782, at night, paid a viſit to a gentleman, who was known to have taken a very active part in favour of Mr. Haſtings, in whoſe family he had lived in India. This gentleman Mr. Sheridan had not viſited before this night for ſeveral months, and the intimacy between them, though not broken off, had long been ſuſpended. The expreſs and avowed purpoſe of this viſit, was, to talk over the affairs of Mr. Haſtings; and it was agreed between this gentleman and Mr. Sheridan, that the former ſhould call on the next morning upon Major Scott, to communicate what had

1782. had paſſed: and Major Scott was to be deſired to meet Mr. Sheridan at eleven o'clock that morning, at a third houſe. The communication made by the gentleman who viſited Major Scott was, as he underſtood, that he came to him with the olive branch; that Mr. Haſtings might come home with perfect ſecurity, with half a million, or whatever might be the amount of his fortune; that the miniſters had ſtrength enough to carry Mr. Fox's bill by which the government of India was to be veſted in ſeven commiſſioners appointed by the Houſe of Commons, but they knew it would be oppoſed at the India Houſe. The condition therefore required from Major Scott, was, that the friends of Mr. Haſtings ſhould not join in the oppoſition to the bill. In reply to this communication, Major Scott at once ſaid he would not meet Mr. Sheridan, but that he would go to the gallery of the Houſe of Commons, where he ſhould hear Mr. Fox himſelf: and he further told the gentleman who called upon him, in anſwer to ſome doubts that were expreſſed whether Mr. Haſtings would come when recalled, that

that all the world knew there had been a 1782.
letter upon the table of the Court of Directors, ſince the month of September, in which he expreſsly deſired them immediately to appoint a ſucceſſor to the government of Bengal. The gentleman who waited upon Major Scott further told him, that, if the negociation came to nothing, no notice was to be taken of any offer of the kind having been made. Mr. Fox made his famous ſpeech on the 18th of November, in which he grounded the neceſſity for his bill upon the miſmanagement of Mr. Haſtings, and ſaid, that his whole proceeding was the proceeding of a man who had drawn the ſword, and thrown away the ſcabbard. The following morning, the 19th, Major Scott, and the friend who had called upon him, met again, when the latter clearly declared, that after Mr. Fox's ſpeech, Mr. Sheridan had no right to expect ſecrecy from either of them. The preſs was not idle: every paper teemed with groſs and *anonymous* abuſe of Mr. Haſtings, with threats of vengeance, and now and then with ſomething like a promiſe of favour, if the friends

of

1782. of Mr. Haſtings would be leſs active. In anſwer to one of theſe paragraphs, Major Scott, openly, and with his name at full length to the aſſertion, avowed, on the 27th of November, ten days after Mr. Sheridan had viſited his friends, that he, Major Scott "*rejected the offer of an act of oblivion for* "*his principal, provided he would remain ſi-* "*lent during the preſent attack upon the Eaſt* "*India Company.*" This avowal, written before the Committee of proprietors at the India Houſe, and inſerted in the Morning Chronicle, was never anſwered; nor was the gentleman whom Mr. Sheridan had viſited, or Major Scott, taxed with a breach of ſecrecy.

Mr. Sheridan having failed of ſucceſs in the character of a negociator, diſplayed tranſcendent eloquence in that of an accuſer. The part he undertook, was, to make good the charge of oppreſſion and cruelty, on the part of Mr. Haſtings, towards the Princeſſes of Oude, or, as they were commonly called, the Begums of Fyzabad. He ſpoke ſix hours and an half without producing in his audience any ſymptoms of fatigue,

fatigue. He ſhewed conſummate art in 1782.
the arrangement of his matter, and ſkill in the conduct of the paſſions; making a juſt eſtimate of the impreſſion that it was reaſonable to ſuppoſe what he had ſaid, in the different ſtages of his oration, had produced, addreſſing himſelf to the tone of his audience, paſſing by natural tranſitions from one topic to another, relieving the attention by wit and humour, or commanding it by glowing ſentiments of compaſſion and of indignation. At the concluſion of his ſpeech, a great number of the members had the indecency to clap their hands, and to ſtamp with their feet and their ſtaves, as if they had thereby expreſſed their ſatisfaction at a theatrical entertainment. Yet, although he acted the part ſo properly committed to his powers, with all this ability, a little recollection would have ſufficed to diſcover, in many inſtances, the weakneſs of his ground; nor would his eloquence have ſilenced, for a time, almoſt the whole Houſe of Commons, if they had not been pre-diſpoſed to acquieſce, either in reality or in appearance, in his

1782. reaſoning. Mr. Pitt, the firſt Lord of the Treaſury, jealous of the great mind of Mr. Haſtings, embraced with avidity a pretext for humbling the man whom he conſidered as his rival, and veiled his own hoſtile fears under the ſacred name of a regard to juſtice. But, as he owed his ſtation to the friends, and to the perſonal magnanimity of Mr. Haſtings, in refuſing to purchaſe his quietus by joining a faction againſt him, and might ſtill, perhaps, have need of ſupport from the Eaſt-India Company, he mingled praiſe with his ſlight cenſures, and ſeemed willing that no heavier ſtigma ſhould be affixed to the name of Haſtings than what might juſt be ſufficient to preclude all ideas, at leaſt for a long time, of placing him at the head of the adminiſtration for India.—When Mr. Pitt, after an equivocal exordium, gave his voice for bringing an impeachment againſt Mr. Haſtings, on the day after Mr. Sheridan made his ſpeech, certain ſpectators in the gallery of the Houſe of Commons, expreſſed their ſurprize and diſguſt, in involuntary burſts of aſtoniſhment and indignation. Among

thoſe

thoſe who walked out on that day, under 1784.
the ſhadow of the miniſterial wing, to vote againſt Mr. Haſtings, was, Mr. Henry Dundas, who, on different occaſions, had emphatically acknowledged, that, but for the exertions of the Governor-General, India muſt have been loſt to Great Britain. Here we ſhall take an opportunity of recording the following extraordinary fact. The vote of the Houſe of Commons for recalling Mr. Haſtings, above-mentioned, though it originated with Mr. Burke, was moved by Mr. Dundas, who publicly and repeatedly declared, that he did not make his motion, though preſſed to make it by the importunities of Mr. Burke, on the ground of delinquency.

Other inferior charges were brought againſt Mr. Haſtings by inferior orators.—At a time when the world waited to know what mark of honour the Court of London would beſtow on the man who had ſaved India, and in fact the Britiſh empire, Sir James Erſkine, one of the repreſentatives of the people, purſued him with hoſtile vengeance, for not driving an harder

1782. bargain in certain opium and bullock contracts.

But, in the midſt of all theſe proceedings, when a ſingular concurrence of prejudice, faction, and private jealouſy, under the ſtandard of the moſt faſcinating eloquence, aimed at the ruin of Mr. Haſtings, and dazzled and confounded the credulous multitude with the boldneſs of their aſſertions, the candid and conſiderate part of the nation, whether in Parliament or private ſocieties, in favour of the Governor-General of Bengal, urged, or liſtened to ſuch arguments as theſe:

"In the whole compaſs of morality there "are two things principally to be conſider- "ed: firſt, What are the ſentiments and "what the tenor of conduct that denomi- "nates one action, or courſe of actions, virtu- "ous, and the contrary vicious? and, ſecond- "ly, by what principle or law is virtue recom- "mended and authorized, and vice ſtigma- "tized and reprobated? Concerning the "laſt of theſe queſtions metaphyſicians have "differed,

" differed, and will probably continue to 2782.
" differ: but, with regard to the firſt and
" moſt important, they are, all of them,
" very nearly, if not wholly agreed. They
" aſſign, as the ultimate reaſon for every
" rule which they eſtabliſh, the neceſſities
" and the conveniencies of mankind, and
" readily admit, that the firſt and funda-
" mental law in all political conſtitutions,
" is the preſervation of ſociety. It has ac-
" cordingly been the uniform practice of all
" countries, when there was a proſpect of
" war, on public grounds of ſuſpicion, to ſe-
" cure the perſons of individuals thought to
" be diſaffected to the ſtate, by which means
" great public calamities are prevented.—
" On the ſame ground of public utility and
" advantage, villages are deſtroyed, leſt they
" ſhould afford ſhelter to the enemy. It
" is true, that, in ſuch caſes, reparation is
" made to the inoffenſive inhabitants: and,
" accordingly, reparation has been made to
" the Princeſſes of Oude, for the reſump-
" tion of their jagheers; and their hoarded
" treaſures belonged of right to their ſon
" and grandſon.

1782. "With regard to Cheyt Sing, without "determining whether the inſurrection at "Benaras was accidental or deſigned, it is "ſufficient to obſerve, that having fled on "the reſtoration of tranquillity with his "treaſures to the Rajah of Bundle-cund, "he neither experienced the rigour of our "government, nor its lenity or juſtice.— "Has the Britiſh Parliament, in which we "find the men who held in their hands "the reins of Government, during that "conflict with ſo many nations, whoſe af- "flicting conſequences we all feel and de- "plore, has the Britiſh Miniſtry and Par- "liament, in all caſes, made compenſation to "thoſe who have ſuffered in the cauſe of "England, as ample, as eqnal, as permanent "and ſecure as that which the juſtice of Mr. "Haſtings has granted to the Princeſſes of "Aſia. The American Loyaliſts, on the very "ſcene, braved the fury of prevailing rebellion "with an intrepidity and conſtancy that re- "proached that timorous and temporizing "policy, that indolence and infatuation in "the ſervants of the crown, both by ſea and "land, and that cruel rage of faction,

"which

" which impeded the wheels of a weak 1782.
" government, in more forcible ſtrains than
" the moſt piteous complaints that could be
" poured forth before a generous people.—
" This is a ſubject worthy of all the Mu-
" ſes fire, never worſe employed than in
" arraigning one of their moſt favoured ſons!
" In what pathetic accents might not the
" inimitable eloquence of Burke and She-
" ridan repreſent the diſconſolate widow,
" ſitting in ſolitary places, mourning an huſ-
" band ſlain, an infant loſt? And how eaſy
" would it be for the logical diſtinction of
" Mr. Pitt, were he inclined, to find ſome
" precedent or pretext for ranking the miſ-
" conduct of Mr. Haſtings, and the ſufferings
" of women who had been reduced to the ne-
" ceſſity of accepting a yearly revenue from
" their ſon inſtead of a landed eſtate: how
" eaſy would it be for the ſubtlety of Mr. Pitt
" to find ſome reaſon or other for ranking the
" miſconduct of Mr. Haſtings, and the grie-
" vances of the Begums, in an order infe-
" rior to the enormities that diſgraced dif-
" ferent parties in the conduct of the Ame-
" rican war, and the calamities that afflict-

" ed

1782. "ed and ſtill afflict the loyal ſubjects of "Great Britain acroſs the Atlantic? Does "the pittance allowed by Government, as "an indemnification to the Loyaliſts, bear "any proportion to the income continued "to the Begums? Ladies ſecluded from the "world in the receſſes of a ſeraglio, and in "whoſe hands political power and import- "ance ſerved only, by nouriſhing a ſpirit of "ambition, to diſſolve the ties of blood, "and to embitter the fallen ſtate of their "family by domeſtic diſcord? Far different "from theirs is the condition of the diſper- "ſed families of the Loyaliſts! Aged pa- "rents, accuſtomed to receive their kindred "and friends with plenty and hoſpitality, "now in the character of petitioners for "ſome proviſion againſt the extremity of "want for themſelves and their children; "and the tender ſex ſtruggling by every ef- "fort to unite that delicacy and dignity of "ſentiment, in which they have been bred, "with the means of ſelf-preſervation! While "ſuch objects, related to us by blood, by "language, manners, and religion, by "friendſhip ill-requited on our part, and

"fond

" fond cofidence miſplaced on theirs; while 1778.
" ſuch objects preſent themſelves to our view,
" whence all this gallantry to Bow Begum,
" and the women of the Haram of Sujah-ul-
" Dowlah?

" Charity naturally begins at home.
" That which ſeeks objects of compaſſion
" in an oppoſite hemiſphere, is ſuſpicious.—
" In the relation that ſubſiſts between ſove-
" reigns and their ſubjects, if allegiance is
" implied on the one part, protection is pre-
" ſumed on the other. The Loyliaſts, there-
" fore, if the affairs of ſtate, even on the
" greateſt emergency, are to be ſquared by
" the abſtracted accuracy of eternal juſtice
" and truth, have an undoubted right to an
" abſolute reſtitution of all they have loſt,
" and reparation, as far as that is poſſible,
" for all they have ſuffered. But is it ar-
" gued, that full reſtitution, as well as com-
" plete reparation to the unfortunate ſubjects
" of Britain in America, is impoſſible?
" Then it is admitted, that political exigen-
" cies may not only ſuſpend, but ſuperſede
" the execution of juſtice. Under this
" conviction,

1782. "conviction, then, let the candid mind "judge of the conduct of Mr. Haſtings re- "ſpecting the Begums of Oude and the Ra- "jah of Benaras.

"Whoever imagines that, by all the "mildneſs we have mixed, or that it is "poſſible for us to mix with our tyranny "over the Princes of Aſia, we ſhall be "able to gain their confidence and affection, "is egregiouſly miſtaken. Whatever aro- "matics we may infuſe in their cup, "the bitter taſte will ſtill ſo far prevail as "to induce a ſtrong deſire of caſting it from "them whenever they can: and the greater "the hope of being able to do ſo, the more "ardent alſo will be the deſire. It is a "property in human nature, that any emo- "tion which attends a paſſion is eaſily con- "verted into it, though in their natures "they be originally different, and even "contrary to each other. Hence hope is "able not only to inflame the deſire of ob- "taining any particular object, but alſo to "excite anger againſt the perſon who with- "holds it, or to heighten it where it was "before-hand the predominant paſſion.

" To govern reduced provinces, eſpeci- 1782.
" ally ſuch as are remote from the ſeat of
" government, by ſlackening the curb of
" power, and granitng a few indulgencies
" to a ſubjected people, imperious nations
" have always found to be difficult, and
" for the moſt part impoſſible. After
" what has ſo recently paſſed in America
" and in Ireland, we cannot be at a loſs to
" judge of the effects of partial conceſſion.
" Every degree of liberty indulged to men
" tends to produce at once a deſire, and a
" ſenſe of their natural right, to enjoy it in
" its full extent.

" It was through the grand-mother of
" Aſoph-ul-Dowlah, as was juſtly obſerved
" by the accuſers of Mr. Haſtings, that he
" ſucceeded to the rank and power of the
" Nabob Vizier, ſhe being the daughter
" and only heir of the antient Soubah.
" She is allowed to be a woman of an
" high ſpirit; and her pride is naturally
" heightened by the recollection of her an-
" ceſtry and of former times. She therefore
" conſidered the Engliſh as the oppreſſors of
" her

1782. "her family, and the uſurpers of its inhe-
"ritance. The reſentment which ſhe natu-
"rally entertained againſt our nation, there
"was reaſon to dread, would be inflamed
"by the hope of gratification. She was
"not uninformed of the ſituation of affairs
"in the weſtern world. The crowns of that
"monarch, whoſe power ſhe had long equal-
"ly dreaded and deteſted, ſeemed now to tot-
"ter on his head; and that of America had
"already fallen. The French, the Spani-
"ards, the Dutch, the three greateſt mari-
"time powers in the world next to our-
"ſelves, whoſe ſtrength was but too well
"known in the eaſt, preſſed with their uni-
"ted weight on the Engliſh, and the
"ſtandard of revolt began to be raiſed in
"Benaras. In ſuch circumſtances what
"confidence could Mr. Haſtings repoſe in
"the attachment of the high-ſpirited Be-
"gum, or what in her numerous ſubjects?
"Mankind are governed by opinion; and
"the opinion by which they are governed is
"two-fold: an opinion of intereſt, and an
"opinion of right. Ideas of right have
"an influence on the minds of men which

"have

" have been found, in ſome inſtances, to " prevail over thoſe of intereſt.

" Hence in all nations, and in none more " than in Great Britain, Chiefs have been " found, who, in the full poſſeſſion of their " privileges and fortune, have flown to the " ſtandard of exiled Princes, followed by " bands of voluntary vaſſals. But in Aſia, " where the reverence to royal blood is " ſtronger than in Europe, and where the " oppreſſions of Europeans, compared with " thoſe the people ſuffer under their na- " tive princes, are greater; in Aſia, where " all ranks of men are divided againſt us by " an opinion both of right and intereſt, and " ready to ſtart into a poſture of hoſtility " on every occaſion where there is any " proſpect of ſucceſs, and in circumſtances " ſo full of alarm, why ſhould Mr. Haſ- " tings deem it incredible that the Princeſſes " of Oude ſhould join the general conſpiracy " of the world againſt Great Britain, or " ſeek for theories by which he might recon- " cile hoſtile appearances with benevolent " intentions? Is not our government over

" the

1782. " the natives of India, whatever palliatives
" we may apply or project, in reality deſpo-
" tic? Is not the firſt principle of deſ-
" potiſm, jealouſy of its ſubjects? Was
" there no ground of jealouſy, jealouſy
" heightened beyond the pitch of its uſual
" vigilance, in the circumſtances in which
" the Governor-General of Bengal was pla-
" ced towards the cloſe of the year 1781?
" If there was, is his country, which his
" ſervices have ſo eminently contributed
" to ſave, to make no allowance for the
" force, for the violence with which reports
" of military preparations muſt have fallen
" on a mind anxious for the preſervation of
" all that was committed to the exertion of
" its powers? If there were among his col-
" leagues in the Company's ſervice, men
" who were perfectly undiſturbed amidſt
" growing alarms, there was the more reaſon
" for Mr. Haſtings to be vigilant. On the
" one hand, it was at leaſt probable
" that a revolt was begun in the pro-
" vince of Oude as well as in Benaras,
" and more than probable that it was
" intended: on the other, it was poſſible

" that

" that the reports concerning the orders 1782.
" and deſigns of the Begums might be falſe.
" If the fears of the Governor-General
" ſhould prove to be groundleſs, and that,
" in ſeizing the reſources of the Begums, he
" ſhould commit an injury, that injury
" might afterwards be repaired; but if, on
" the preſumption that their intentions,
" notwithſtanding all appearances to the
" contrary, were pacific, he ſhould forbear
" to act as he did, the empire of Great
" Britain in the Eaſt might be loſt.

" In our wars with the houſe of Bour-
" bon, have we not been accuſtomed, on
" the appearance of hoſtilities on the part
" of that kingdom, to anticipate an attack
" by making one? Is this conduct to be
" condemned? Are the miniſters who fol-
" lowed it with ſucceſs to be impeached, and
" thoſe who, notwithſtanding the commu-
" nications from Lord Stormont when am-
" baſſador at Paris, neglected it to the diſ-
" grace of Britain, to be promoted and ho-
" noured? Was not the conduct of Mr.
" Haſtings exactly in the ſpirit of the great

" Earl

1782. "Earl of Chatham, when, being appre-
"henſive of the deſigns of Spain, he nobly
"dared to deſpiſe vain forms, and by a ſud-
"den blow to prevent their execution?—
"And whether are we to reprobate the
"memory of the father, or to approve the
"*legal policy* of the ſon; who, as if he
"were born to refute the doctrine that the
"qualities of the mind are hereditary as
"well as thoſe of the body, condemns in
"Mr. Haſtings what raiſed his progenitor
"to immortal honour?

"Though the Begums of Oude lived
"under the protection of our ally, and were
"in fact our ſubjects, they were divided
"from the Engliſh by all thoſe circum-
"ſtances of diverſity which commonly
"prove the ſources of animoſity and con-
"teſt among nations. Though overborne
"by ſuperior power, the unconquerable
"will remained of ſhaking off the Engliſh
"yoke: and who, reaſoning on the princi-
"ples of the law of nature, will affirm that
"they had not a right to ſpurn it if they
"could? The very circumſtance of their
"ſubjection

" ſubjection was a reaſon why we ſhould 1782.
" be jealous of their endeavours to overturn
" it. There were more points of oppo-
" ſition between them and the Britiſh na-
" tion, than between the Britiſh nation
" and the Spaniards: and their minds
" were at leaſt equally hoſtile. What is
" the magic then, in the name of God, of
" their being our friends, allies, or ſubjects,
" that ſhould ſuperſede the propriety of con-
" ſidering what are their real inclinations,
" and what their power in all ſitua-
" tions when vigilance becomes the firſt
" duty of a ſtateſman, when jealouſy be-
" comes a virtue? The only queſtion is,
" concerning the different degrees of the
" dangers which threatened Great Britain
" from the Spaniards in 1762, and from
" the Princes of India in 1781. And here
" an opportunity is preſented of diſplaying
" the ſtriking contraſt between the glorious
" ſucceſſes of the Engliſh arms in the for-
" mer period, and the misfortunes which
" menaced our independence in the latter.
" But it is ſuperfluous to dwell on ſo fertile
" a theme. For who that, diſmiſſing the

1782. " illuſions of the imagination, yields to the
" conduct of his underſtanding, does not
" perceive the abſurdity and injuſtice of ap-
" plauding the vigour, promptitude, and
" prevention of the Earl of Chatham in
" times of national ſplendour unſullied by a
" cloud, and condemning the ſame quali-
" ties and a ſimilar courſe of conduct in Mr.
" Haſtings, when condenſing ſtorms ſeemed
" ready to wreck the ſtate on rocks and
" ſhoals, or overwhelm it in the troubled
" ocean?

" Suppoſing, not granting, that there was
" not ſufficient evidence to convict the Be-
" gums either of rebellious actions or deſigns,
" before an ordinary court of juſtice in ordi-
" nary caſes, yet if the ſituation of affairs
" was ſuch, that either the public ſafety
" muſt be ruined, or ſome ſacrifice or other
" made for its preſervation, it was the duty
" of Mr. Haſtings to make ſuch a ſacrifice:
" and if there was an option of ſacrifices, it
" was alſo his duty to fix on that which was
" the moſt effectual for obtaining its end,
" and which could be made with the leaſt
" violation,

" violation, or appearance of violation, of 1782.
juſtice.

" But to reſume the jagheers (an equi-
" valent being intended), and to ſeize the
" treaſures of the Begums, was the moſt
" effectual ſacrifice that could be made.
" It was alſo that which could be made
" with the leaſt violation, or appearance of
" violation, of juſtice: for there was at
" leaſt a degree of probable evidence that
" thoſe Begums entertained hoſtile deſigns
" againſt the Engliſh, and that they had
" even begun to carry them into execution:
" therefore, the meaſures taken by Mr.
" Haſtings, on the emergency in queſtion,
" were, in all reſpects, the moſt proper that
" could have been poſſibly imagined. If
" they were improper, let the Engliſh na-
" tion reſtore their treaſures to the Be-
" gums.

" The governments in Aſia are deſpotic,
" and it is by ſummary proceedings alone,
" and a ſtrong arm, by which, in their pre-
" ſent moral condition, they can be govern-

1782. "ed. To introduce new forms of govern-
"ment into nations, if practicable at all, is
"the work of time. Attempts were made
"to introduce at once liberty into Ruſſia,
"but they proved abortive; and, in like
"manner, the ſteps that have been taken to
"introduce the Engliſh law into India have
"been attended with great confuſion, and
"been productive of much inconvenience
"and miſchief. It is found difficult to
"govern the Hindoos by our laws, even in
"times of profound peace. What then
"was Mr. Haſtings to do in times of infi-
"nite difficulty and danger? In proportion
"to the embarraſſments of the Engliſh, the
"ideas and pretenſions of the native princes
"of India naturally revived. The novelty
"and the odiouſneſs of our inſtitutions were
"more ſenſibly felt; the ſanctions by which
"they were eſtabliſhed were weakened;
"and all things ſeemed rapidly to revert
"to that ſituation in which we found In-
"dia, when, under the pretence of being
"the treaſurers and tax-gatherers of the
"Great Mogul, we extended our power
"over ſo many provinces of Aſia.

"The

"The Britiſh power in India was only 1782
"of an artificial kind, the whole maſs of
"numbers, and opinion of right being againſt
"it. If the truth muſt be told, it was
"purely deſpotic, and depended, for its ef-
"ficacy, on the principle of FEAR. Should
"the preſſure and weight of Government
"be leſſened, the fire, which was ſmo-
"thered only by that weight and preſſure,
"muſt break out with an exploſion fatal
"to the oppreſſors. The feeble, the par-
"tial, and varying attempts that had been
"made to eſtabliſh a new order of affairs,
"had not formed ſuch a ſtrength of Go-
"vernment as could be depended on in a
"new and unprecedented ſituation, big
"with danger and final deſtruction. The
"artificial mounds by which we had ſome-
"times endeavoured, and might yet pro-
"poſe to confine and lead the ſtream of po-
"pular opinion, would give way to that
"ſtorm which was ready to fall, and reſtore
"all things to their uſual, and their deepeſt
"channel. It is juſtly obſerved by the Ro-
"man Hiſtorian Salluſt, that dominion is
"eaſily preſerved by the ſame means through

1782. "which it was gained. On the occaſion
"of an extraordinary and alarming conjunc-
"ture in India, the Governor-General of
"Bengal reverted to the principles by
"which our dominion there had been both
"acquired and ſupported, and provided for
"the public ſafety by expedients, which,
"in times of tranquillity, and in European
"Governments, might be deemed violent
"and irregular, but which, in the circum-
"ſtances in which he was placed, were
"proper, becauſe they were neceſſary. He
"burſt through the cob-web ſublimations
"of caſuiſts, which cannot, in all caſes,
"conſiſtently with the beſt ends of
"Government, be reduced to practice, and
"left faction to blame, his country to judge,
"and the world to admire him."

But among thoſe who, on the whole, admired the character, and approved the conduct of Mr. Haſtings, there were not a few who, under the conviction, that the proofs of premeditated rebellion in Oude and Benaras were vague and imperfect, regretted that the Governor-General did not openly avow the neceſſity

neceſſity of ſeizing for the public ſafety, mo- 1782
ney, wherever he could find it. Without entering either into the deſigns of Cheyt Sing and the Begums of Fyzabad, or into the opinion that Mr. Haſtings might be ſuppoſed, on probable evidence, to entertain concerning thoſe deſigns, and to confine our views merely to local circumſtances and political advantage, it is obvious that, to have acknowledged a neceſſity, on the part of Great-Britain, to ſeize the wealth of individuals, would have undermined that power which it was intended to ſupport. It would have anounced our extreme neceſſities to all India: the natives would have made no diſtinction between an act of rapacity, and a ſeizure of property in the nature of a loan, or a promiſſary note or bond: and the whole circulation of the country would at once have ſhrunk and diſappeared. Mr. Haſtings, even when the clamour excited againſt him was at the higheſt pitch, was, on the whole, juſtified by men of integrity and ſenſe on this ground. In this, unprejudiced men, of all denominations agreed. The propriety of Mr. Haſtings's conduct was admitted

1782. by the moſt diſtinguiſhed lawyers, ſoldiers, and country gentlemen. It was aſſerted by the manly ſenſe as well as metaphyſical acumen of Lord Thurlow; by the the ſolid judgment and liberal views of Lord Hood; and the fair and juſt conſtructions of Mr. Dempſter. In reality, even without making allowance for Aſiatic manners and cuſtoms, there was nothing in the conduct of Mr. Haſtings that was not perfectly conſonant to common ſenſe and the practice of all nations. It readily occurs as a natural and incontrovertible maxim, that the dependants of an empire, who have flouriſhed under its auſpices in the days of its proſperity, ſhould contribute to its ſupport in the hour of difficulty and danger. It was thus, that, about twenty years ago, the Britiſh Parliament impoſed arbitrary taxes on the Americans. If we abſtract certain accidental circumſtances of moral and political ſituation, there was not any matterial difference betwixt the caſe of the Zemindar, William Penn, and that of the Rajah Cheyt Sing. It ſhould be recorded, at the ſame time, that there was an unaffected, though vague and unde-

fined

ſined ſympathy with the oppreſſed Hindoos, 1782.
that pervaded the nation. Yet neither ſhould it be omitted, that Mr. Fox was almoſt the only man, who had conſiſtency enough to talk ſeriouſly of reſtoring CheytSing to his Zemindary: and not one man ever propoſed to return their treaſures to the Begums. The fact is, the progreſs of luxury, in this, as in other nations, keeps pace with that of humanity. We feel a little for the Hindoos, but we would feel more from the want of thoſe advantages which we have been accuſtomed to draw, by all means in our power, from their country.

As in the courſe of theſe Memoirs, it has been to often neceſſary to introduce the name of Mr. Haſtings, who was, in fact, the great ſupporter of the Britiſh intereſts in India, during a long and moſt arduous ſtruggle, it may be expected that we ſhould give the world a more particular account of this extraordinary man.

Mr. Haſtings is the ſon of a clergyman of the church of England, and was born at Darlesford,

1782. Darlesford, in Worceſterſhire, the ſeat of his anceſtors for many generations, in the year 1732. His family is one of the oldeſt and the moſt reſpectable in that county: but having taken part with Charles the Firſt during the civil wars, many of its poſſeſſions were ſold, and the produce expended in the ſervice of that unfortunate Monarch. Four manſions near Barford, in Oxfordſhire, are now in the poſſeſſion of the lineal deſcendant of Mr. Lenthal, the Speaker, which were made over to that gentleman, in order to preſerve Darlesford, which had been in the family of Haſtings ſince the year 1250, as appears by Doctor Naſh's Antiquities of Worceſterſhire. The laſt portion of their patrimonial eſtates was ſold by the grandfather of Mr. Haſtings, to Sir John Knight; and his father dying when he was young, Mr. Haſtings was left under the care of an uncle, Mr. Howard Haſtings, who ſent him to Weſtminſter ſchool, where he was diſtinguiſhed as an excellent ſcholar, and went into College, the head of his election, in the year 1746. He there gave the firſt proofs of thoſe "uncommon abilities,"

as

as Mr. Francis calls them, which have 1782.
diſtinguiſhed him through life—nor was he more remarkable as a ſcholar, than for perſonal intrepidity. His uncle dying in the year 1749, Mr. Haſtings was left under the guardianſhip of Mr. Criſwicke, an Eaſt-India Director, who appointed him a writer to Bengal, much againſt the inclination of of Doctor Nichol, the Head Maſter of Weſtminſter, who entertained ſo high an opinion of little Warren Haſtings, as he called him, that he offered himſelf to educate him at Oxford.

Mr. Haſtings arrived in Bengal in the year 1750, when the Engliſh poſſeſſed neither territory nor power in Hindoſtan.—He was in the interior parts of Bengal when Calcutta was taken by Surajah Dowlah, in the year 1756, and was allowed his liberty at Manhedabad, a ſingular mark of the eſteem in which his character was at that time held. At the capture of Calcutta by Colonel Clive and Admiral Watſon, he ſerved as a volunteer in the army, and being the firſt Engliſhman in Bengal who

ſpoke

1782. ſpoke the Perſian language, he ſucceeded Mr. Scrafton in the year 1758, as Reſident at the Court of Meer Jaffier, one of the moſt conſiderable offices in Bengal.

Here Mr. Haſtings remained until he obtained a ſeat in the Council of Calcutta. He quitted India in the year 1765, with an unblemiſhed reputation, and a fortune ſo moderate, as only to entitle him to lodgings in Eſſex-ſtreet in the Strand.

Diſappointed in his hopes of returning to India, he had formed a plan, in concert with the late Doctor Samuel Johnſon, of founding a Profeſſorſhip for the ſtudy of the Perſian language at Oxford; but a change ſoon after taking place in the Eaſt-India Direction, he was appointed ſecond in the Council at Madras, in the year 1769, and ordered to ſucceed to that Government.—In the year 1771, the Directors removed him to a country with which he was better acquainted, and he became Governor-General of Bengal in the year 1772.

He

He ſoon found that Lord Clive had ſta- 1782.
ted the revenues of the company too high, and the expences of government too low. The Eaſt-India Company, by paying annually four hundred thouſand pounds to the ſtate, dividing twelve per cent. on their capital, and receiving bills from Bengal to a very large amount, were reduced, in a ſeaſon of profound peace, to the neceſſity of applying to parliament for relief, and Lord North ſeized this opportunity of aſſuming the management of their affairs: an act of uſurption which has been tranſmitted to poſterity by the proteſt which was made on that occaſion by the Dukes of Portland and Richmond, the Lords Rockingham and Fitzwilliam, and other members of oppoſition. Mr. Haſtings did not expoſe the alarming neceſſities of the Company without taking meaſures for ſupplying them *.

The

* The diſputes which at preſent prevail in a neigbouring kingdom, preſent, at this ſtage of our narrative, ſome points of compariſon. Mr. Neekar over-rated the revenues of France, and under-rated the public debts and expenditure. A demand was made of extraordinary taxes to ſupply the de-

deficiency

1782. The Mogul, before the return of Mr. Haſtings to Bengal, had withdrawn himſelf from the Company's protection, and thrown himſelf into the arms of the Marrattas. The Governor-General, therefore, withheld from that Prince the tribute ſtipulated as a condition of his amity, and concluded a very advantageous treaty with the Nabob Vizier, Sujah-ul-Dowlah, by which a part of that treaſure which had been ſo abſurdly exported from Bengal, was brought again into circulation. A ſuc-

deficiency in the revenue, under the ſanction of the Notables, and advantage was taken of this circumſtance to wreſt if poſſible the impoſition of taxes from the crown, and thereby to introduce an innovation in the moſt important branch of legiſlation. So natural it is for popular aſſemblies, as well, as kings, to ſeize every opportunity of extending their power!

Mr. Haſtings, from the ſame comprehenſive view, and minute acquaintance with the Companys affairs that qualified him to point out the diſtemper in their ſtate, was alſo enabled to effect the remedy. Mr. de Calonne, who diſcovered the public embarraſſments of France, and beſt knew their origin and progreſs, was the moſt proper perſon in the kingdom for retrieving them, and in all probability, he would have retrieved them, if he had not been abandoned in the midſt of his proceſs for this purpoſe.

ceſsful

ceſsful war with the Rohillas, founded on their breach of treaty, by the enqueſt of a rich but hoſtile country, extended and ſecured the frontiers of the Nabob Vizier our ally, and added fifty lacks of rupees to the Company's treaſures. 1782.

Mr. Haſtings, by his regulations of the public offices, of the collections, and by various other œconomical reforms, which, notwithſtanding the difficulties that retarded, and the temporary odium that accompanied and followed it, he had effected in the ſpace of thirty months, with the ſupply of treaſure juſt mentioned, raiſed the reputation of the Government of Bengal to the higheſt pitch.

It was this proſperous ſtate of the Company's affairs in Bengal, at his acceſſion to the chair deemed irretrievable, which enabled him to make thoſe exertions of which ſome account has been given, for the ſupport of our other eſtabliſhments in India, and, in ſpite of the formidable confederacy that aſſailed us in every quarter, to impreſs on

1782. on the minds of the Princes of India a ſuperſtitious dread of the name of Haſtings.

The Governor-General had relieved the incumbrances aud improved the revenue of Bengal, drawn off the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar from the confederacy againſt the Engliſh by ſtrokes of policy, and Madajee Scindiah by force of arms, effected a peace with the Marrattas, carried relief to Madras, and, by well-timed ſuccours, enabled the Bombay government to divert the Myſorean armies from the Carnatic, and was continuing his efforts for the welfare and glory of his nation, when the Grey-hound Packet arrived with diſpatches from the Court of Directors, tending to perſuade every man in Bengal, that the removal of Mr. Haſtiugs was neither diſtant nor evitable.

He had long borne up under this counteraction, but conceiving now that there was a determination to force him from Bengal, and that, without ſupport from home, he could not expect to conduct the public

public affairs with ſucceſs, he ſent a letter 1782.
to the Directors, on the 21ſt of March, 1783, in which he briefly touches, with juſt confidence, both on the ſucceſs of his meaſures amidſt the dangerous viciſſitudes incident to an unſettled and undefined Government, and the rectitude of the motives from whence they ſprung; complains of an uniform counteraction from thoſe very powers from whom he derived his authority, and who were bound to ſupport it: and deſires them to obtain an early nomination of a perſon to ſucceed him in the government of Fort William, declaring that it is his intention, after allowing a competent time for the choice of a ſucceſſor, to reſign the ſervice. But he added, that if, in the intermediate time, they ſhould proceed to order the reſtoration of Cheyt Sing to the Zemindary from which, by the powers he legally poſſeſſed, and conceived himſelf bound to aſſert, he had expelled him, and that their council ſhould reſolve to execute their orders, he would inſtantly give up his ſtation. The Court of Proprietors, on the receipt of this letter by the Direc-

1782. tors, voted their thanks to Mr. Haſtings for his ſervices, to which they added a requeſt, that he would not reſign until the complete reſtoration of peace, and the eſtabliſhment of the ſtipulated arrangements in India.

By this time Mr. Fox, then Secretary of State, had formed the plan of bringing the complete management of India under the controul of adminiſtration. To effect this, Mr. Haſtings was repreſented as a man who had formed connections dangerous to the intereſts of Great Britain, and it was ſaid that he had ſo far miſmanaged India, as to make it abſolutely neceſſary both to recall him, and to annihilate the Company. Mr. Pitt on this occaſion joined moſt cordially with the friends of Mr. Haſtings, and Mr. Fox and his bill ſhared the ſame fate. The friends of the Governor ſcorned to ſtipulate any conditions either for themſelves or for him: the conſequence of which was, that Mr. Haſtings, on his return, became an object of vengeance to a defeated party.—But theſe political intrigues have carried us far

far beyond that point of the war in India, 1782.
from which they have diverted our attention.

A private letter from Mr. Haſtings, Governor-General of India, to Lord Macartney, Preſident of the Council of Madras, informed his Lordſhip that peace was concluded with the Marrattas. This intelligence was announced with the firing of the guns in camp, and the artillery of Fort St. George, on the 29th day of June, 1782.—Sir Eyre Coote, inveſted withthe powers of peace or war, required Hyder to accede to the treaty, with intimation, that if he did not reſtore all the forts he had taken, and at the end of ſix months evacuate the Carnatic, the Marratta arms were to be joined, for the purpoſe of compelling him, to thoſe of the Engliſh. On this Lord Macartney was alarmed, and, in order to participate, at leaſt, in whatever honour or advantage might be found in this pacificatory negotiation, acquainted Hyder, that without their concurrence and mediation, no permanent treaty, or temporary convention, would be

1782. valid. What effect this interference muſt have produced on the diſcerning mind of Hyder-Ally, it is impoſſible to tell, but not difficult to conjecture.

The General, with a view to counteract the alarming induſtry, and to be at a diſtance from the eye of Lord Macartney, left Madras on the 1ſt of July, and on the buſineſs of peace, approached to Hyder. The Khan, grown old in Aſiatic arts, amuſed and detained him in the neighbourhood of Vandewaſh, till our army had conſumed not only their own rice, but that alſo which was for the uſe of the garriſon. Having gained this point, he ſuddenly required time for the better adjuſtment of preliminaries, and withdrew his vakeel, leaving the General wholly in the dark concerning his intentions. Sir Eyre Coote returned with the army to Madras.

A combined attack on Negapatam had been planned by Hyder and the French Admiral; to favour which, by detaining the army, the former amuſed our people with the

the hopes of peace. His artifice, however, 1782.
was foiled by the chances of war. Suffrein, in ſailing for Negapatam, was deſcried by the Engliſh fleet, and in ſpite of every attempt to gain the roads without fighting, he was, by the maſterly manœuvres of his opponents, forced to give them battle. At three o'clock, on the 3d of July, the Engliſh Admiral left the road of Negapatam, ſtretching ſouthward with his ſquadron all that evening and night, in order to gain the wind of the enemy. He effected his purpoſe, and by day-break gave ſignals for forming the line. About eleven, the engagement became cloſe and general, and continued ſo till half paſt twelve, when the French line appeared greatly diſordered, ſeveral of their ſhips having ſuffered ſeverely both in their hulls and rigging. At the moment when victory ſeemed ready to declare deciſively for the Britiſh flag, a ſea breeze ſpringing up reſcued the enemy from impending ruin. Our line was thrown into diſorder, and Suffrein effected a maſterly retreat, fighting his beſt ſhips to protect thoſe which had ſuſtained the greateſt da-

1782. mage. The victors remained floating about in the utmoſt confuſion, without being able to renew the attack. The next day, the French, without the loſs of a ſingle ſhip, eſcaped to Cuddalore. From this nominal victory no advantage reſulted; and it was accompanied with the loſs of Captain Dunbar Maclellan, an officer, for his naval and military abilities, deſervedly in high eſtimation. He commanded the flag ſhip, and was ſhot through the heart early in the engagement.

Sir Edward Hughes, after informing the garriſon of Negapatam that the danger which threatened them was retarded, for a ſeaſon at leaſt, brought his ſquadron to the roads of Madras, where he was joined by the Scepter, a new ſhip of ſixty-four guns, belonging to Sir Richard Bickerton's fleet.

The deſigns of Suffrein againſt Trincomalé being known, or ſuſpected, it was determined to reinforce that important place. Accordingly, about the firſt of Auguſt, the Scepter and Monarch, ſhips of the line, with

with about two hundred troops, ſailed on 1782.
that expedititon, leaving the reſt of the ſqaudron for repairs in the roads of Madras. Two days after the departure of this reinforcement, Sir Edward was informed, that the French Admiral, with his fleet, had left Cuddalore on the firſt day of the month. On the 16th, the Coventry, a frigate of twenfour guns, arrived from Bombay. Captain Mitchell, her commander, reported, that he had by the way engaged the Bellona, a French ſhip of forty guns, off Friar's-hood, on the iſland of Ceylon; that after a ſevere conflict of two hours and a half, the Bellona fled towards the French fleet, conſiſting of twenty-three ſail, in Battacola road; and that the Coventry had ſuffered ſo much in her maſts and rigging, as not to be able to overtake her. The Scepter and Monarch returned with information, that they had found Suffrein off Trincomalé harbour, and had with difficulty eſcaped. At length, on the 21ſt, Sir Edward Hughes having compleated his tedious repairs, ſet ſail to protect Trincomalé, to fight Suffrein, or, if neceſſary,

1782. to co-operate with the army in the intended attack on Cuddalore.

Hyder having marched to the Tanjore country, found that the defeat of Suffrein had ſtruſtrated their intended operations againſt Negapatam. He therefore returned, directing his march towards his magazine at Arneé. This movement being reported to the Britiſh army, the General took the alarm, being apprehenſive of danger to the fort of Vandewaſh. Abandoning, for the preſent, his deſigns on Cuddalore, he advanced a day's march towards the fort: but receiving intelligence that very evening from the commanding officer, that Hyder had paſt the Arneé river, he reſumed his original route, and, on the 6th of September, encamped on the Red-hills of Pondicherry, the place of rendezvous appointed for the enemy's ſhipping. Two days paſt, without the appearance of any ſhips, or any accounts of them. But, on the third, certain notice arrived, that Suffrein's active valour had reduced Trincomalé: and ſoon after, a frigate brought intelligence, that

that the two fleets had fought a fourth bat- 1782.
tle, and that the Engliſh Admiral was on his way for Madras. Sir Eyre Coote, who had ſuffered about this time a ſecond ſtroke of the palſy, ſailed for Bengal in the beginning of October, leaving the army under the command of General Stuart. The General, connecting with this return of Sir Edward all the conſequences of a defeat, gave inſtant orders in perſon for beating an alarm. A haſty retreat from Pondicherry enſued, the more remarkable for happening on the ſame day and month of the year with the flight from Conjeveram; a circumſtance which did not eſcape the notice of the ſoldiers. At eleven in the night, the army encamped at Killenar, having in the hurry loſt their rice and baggage. The march continued, unaccompanied by any circumſtance worthy of record; and, on the 19th, the arrival of the army at the Mount concluded the campaign of 1782: a campaign ſomewhat reſembling the expeditions of feudal times, when kings could only keep the field for thirty or forty days,

The

1782. The army now found, that, inſtead of an imaginary defeat, Sir Edward Hughes had obtained another victory. On the night of the 2d of September, he arrived off Trincomalé, and the next morning diſcovered French colours flying on all the forts, and their ſquadron, reinforced by the Illuſtre of ſeventy-four guns, the St. Michael of ſixty-four, and the Elizabeth of fifty, with ſeveral frigates, making in all thirty ſail, at anchor in their ſeveral bays. The Engliſh might eaſily have avoided an engagement, for though, immediately on their appearance, the French ſquadron got under ſail, yet, for ſeveral hours, they ſhewed manifeſt tokens of heſitation. But the ardor of our officers, incenſed at the loſs of Trincomalé, was not to be reſtrained. At half paſt two o' clock, the French line began firing on ours; and five minutes after, the engagement, from van to rear, became general.—The Worceſter, in the rear, was furiouſly attacked by two of the enemy's additional ſhips, but made a brave reſiſtance, and was gallantly ſupported by the Monmouth; while, at the ſame time, in the van, five

ſhips

ſhips bore down in a crowd on the Exeter 1782.
and Iſis, and by a cloſe and concerted fire, forced the former, much diſabled, from the line, leaving the Iſis to receive their fire as they paſt in ſucceſſion. The oppoſing centers, in the mean time, were warmly engaged, ſhip to ſhip. For three hours the battle continued to rage, with equal fury and obſtinacy through every part of the line. The contending Admirals diſplayed great bravery and ſkill. Suffrein, in the Heros, having come down upon the fire of two of our largeſt ſhips, two of his maſts were ſhot away by the board, and his veſſel ſoon reduced to a mere wreck. He inſtantly removed his flag to another, giving the Heros up for loſt; but, by ſome negligence on our part, and the brave conduct of a French frigate, ſhe was towed round to their fleet.

The fight was terminated only by the darkneſs of the night; and its conſequences muſt have been far more ſignal, had the French wanted the ſhelter of Trincomalé: nor would the Britiſh Admiral have immediately ſteered for Madras, if Suffrein had not

1782. not been ſo near his port. So completely routed were the enemy, that their ſhips crowded without order into Trincomalé. One of them was loſt upon the rocks; and it was ten days before two others, diſmaſted and ſhattered, were able to get into harbour. Theſe, Suffrein didnot ſcruple to ſay, he regarded as preſents made himby the Engliſh Admiral.

The loſs on our ſide in men was incredibly ſmall, not exceeding fifty-one killed, and three hundred wounded; but in officers we ſuffered moſt ſeverely. The Honourable Captain Lumley of the Iſis, a very promiſing young man, was ſlain: Captains James Watt, of the Sultan, and Charles Wood, of the Worceſter, both officers of high deſert, were mortally wounded. The 78th and 98th regiments, too, loſt many of their braveſt men.

The loſs of the French was, comparatively, enormous, amounting to four hundred and twelve killed, ſix hundred and ſeventy-ſix wounded. The carnage on board of the Hero was ſuch as is ſeldom ſeen, except

except in caſes of burning or exploſion. Six 1782.
French Captains were broke, and ſent priſoners to the Iſland of Mauritius.

On the arrival of the Engliſh ſquadron at Madras, their ſituation was found to be ſuch as induced the Admiral to think of proceeding to Bombay, and in this purpoſe he perſiſted, notwithſtanding the oppoſition of the Governor, Lord Macartney. A great number of ſhips, at this time, ſent from Bengal, lay in the roads, laden with rice. The Governor laid an embargo on them; yet refuſed, it was ſaid, to give a price for the grain equal to the riſks of trade, or to allow it to be ſold to the ſuffering inhabitants, who, amidſt a famine that raged throughout the whole of the coaſt of Coromandel, were dying by hundreds in a day. Suſpicions were entertained according to the manner of the people, of a contrivance for engroſſing the grain. Nevertheleſs, the paſſive genius of a deſpotic climate conſpired with the artillery of Fort St. George to prevent ſuch an inſurrection as would have been unavoidable, in ſimilar circumſtances, under the moſt

1782. moſt arbitrary Government in Europe. The gentlemen of Madras, alarmed at the conduct of the Governor, having aſſembled together, drew up a decent remonſtrance. But his Lordſhip threw it aſide, charging the meeting in which it was framed with audacity and ſedition. It afforded but little conſolation to dying multitudes of men, women, and children, that the Governor obſerved the decency of ſending away his carriage horſes. The approach of the monſoon made not any impreſſion on the mind of Lord Macartney. He perſevered in his views, whatever they were, and the rice ſhips were forced ſtill to lie at anchor. But, on the fifteenth of October, the ſky began to lower, and the gathering clouds burſt towards the evening in a violent ſtorm. The return of day preſented the diſmal proſpect of wrecked veſſels, and dead bodies floating along the ſhore. Of the rice ſhips, driven by the hurricane from their moorings, the greater part were loſt, and the remainder ſtranded on different coaſts. As the tempeſt blew from the ſhore, his Majeſty's fleet, anchored in water fifteen fathom deep,

deep, on the firſt appearance of the ſtorm, 1782.
ſtood out to ſea, and, after weathering many dangers, happily arrived, though not a little ſhattered, at Bombay, in the end of December. But the wideſt doors of calamity ſeemed now to be thrown open at Madras; and fears and future evils preſſed down the load of actual ſuffering. Our ſquadron was abſent, the French Admiral in our neighbourhood, multitudes ſwooning in the ſuburbs and ſtreets of the town for want of food, proviſions nearly expended in the garriſon, the land around, ſince Hyder's irruption, uncultivated and unſown: in a word, famine and war encircling the Fort of St. George without, and civil diſſention blazing within it.

It was dreaded at this time, that Suffrein would block up Madras, and that the army muſt be diſperſed: but the ſea remained open, and this diſgrace was prevented.—A few days after the ſtorm, Sir Richard Bickerton arrived from Bombay with five ſhips of the line, without having either experienced any ill weather, or ſeen a ſingle ſhip

1782. ſhip belonging to the fleet. After covering the Indiamen under his convoy, having on board three regiments of infantry, with a thouſand recruits raiſed in Ireland, and Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horſe, Sir Richard returned immediately without making a halt, that he might join Sir Edward Hughes at Bombay, at which place Sir Richard arrived even ſome weeks before the Admiral. It was, perhaps, the movements, and the conſequent junction of our ſquadrons, that diverted the attention of Monſieur Suffrein from Madras, and ſaved our army from diſperſion.

During the whole month of October, our affairs in the Carnatic continued to wear a gloomy aſpect. But, in the month of November, they aſſumed a more proſperous appearance, and, before the end of the year, the face of ſorrow was brightened up by the meritorious exertions of the government of Bengal, who ſupplied Madras with plentiful ſtores of grain. The conduct of Lord Macartney, with regard to the rice ſhips ſent from Bengal formerly, has never been made

ſubject

a ſubject of either public accuſation or en- 1782.
quiry. Neither has his perſiſtence in refuſing, to the repeated requeſts of Monſieur de Suffrein, an exchange of priſoners.—Of this matter, as it is not the object of this narrative to connect events merely by coincidence of time, but much more by other relations, it is not unnatural to give ſome account in this place, which may be done by a ſimple exhibition of the following correſpondence between the French Admiral and Mr. Haſtings.

Mr. de Suffrein, in a letter dated on board the Hero, at Tranquebar, the 8th of May, 1783, writes thus: "Permit me, "Sir, to recommend to you the French pri- "ſoners detained in Bengal, particularly "Mr Soverain, a gentleman of my province, "and Mr. de Goy, an Officer embarked "with me, and for whom I have a great "regard. I do not know whether they are "allowed to write, but I have not received "any letter from them. I have not only allow- "ed letters to be written, but I have taken "ſome trouble to give a paſſage to them. I

1782. "have left ſeveral people on their parole at "Tranquebar: I have ſent ſome of them "to the Iſle of France, and from thence "to Europe; for example, Mr. Chriſtie, "Captain of the Hannibal. None of my "priſoners has had this ſatisfaction. I have "written to Lord Macartney, and propoſed "to him an exchange. He ſays, that he never "received my letter. But knowing my incli- "nations, and that I had written to him on "that ſubject, he might well have written "to me. He has received the letters of Mr. "Motaix, Intendant of the Army, charged "with full powers from me, to agree to an "exchange. Sir Eyre Coote has received "thoſe of Mr. du Chamier. Sir Edward "Hughes daily refuſed the exchange of "Mr. Degoy and ſeven men. Amidſt the "ambiguity of all the anſwers I received, "it was clearly apparent, that they did "not deſire an exchange.

"Having no place of ſecurity on the "coaſt, deſtitute of proviſions, grieving "to ſee the unhappy men, who had been "ſix or ſeven months at ſea, die of the "ſcurvy,

"ſcurvy, I have been *now* obliged, to my 1782.
"great regret, to deliver the priſoners * to
"the Nabob. I took every precaution for
"their good treatment. I am ſure, thoſe
"who know me, will do juſtice to the
"feelings of my heart. Even the un-
"happy men will pity me, and, in their
"deſpair, only curſe thoſe whoſe cruel
"policy reduced me to this terrible ne-
"ceſſity. I have entered into this detail,
"becauſe I prize the eſteem of any one,
"who is ſo generally eſteemed as you are.
"Lord Macartney has written to a Cap-
"tain of the ſquadron, a letter *antedated*
"ſix months, to make an overture, for-
"getting all that has paſſed, and attend-
"ing only to the intereſt of humanity.
"I wrote inſtantly to him, to aſſure him
"of my deſire, that an exchange might be
"made; and to apprize him, that I had
"no longer any concern in it; that it was
"to Monſieur le Marquis de Buſſy that
"he ſhould addreſs himſelf." *Poſtſcript.*
"I ſend you back an unfortunate invalid

* In number from three to four hundred.

1782. "with a wooden leg; and at different "times, I have given leave to more than "twenty Captains or Officers, beſides thoſe "which I permitted to be Tranquebar, "on their parole, and who went away "from thence without any other reaſon, "than that they found the reſidence there "inconvenient."

Mr. Haſtings, in anſwer to this, after reſpectfully ſaluting M. de Suffrein, wrote as follows:

"Your letter, and the candid intention "with which it was written, deſerved an "earlier acknowledgement of it; nor "ſhould I have failed to make an imme-"diate reply, had I not been diſabled by "a ſevere indiſpoſition.

"I hope that the gentlemen of your na-"tion will all do this Government the "juſtice to atteſt, that however I myſelf "may have been deficient in perſonal at-"tention, its conduct towards them has "been marked with every ſubſtantial effect

"of

" of humanity and tenderneſs. To Mr. 1782.
" de Soverain I am precluded from af-
" fording any proof of the reſpect which
" I am deſirous of ſhewing to your recom-
" mendations, as his own perſonal merit
" had before excited in my breaſt every
" ſentiment which could have been pro-
" duced by the knowledge of your wiſhes
" in his favour. I have requeſted that he
" would afford me an opportunity of being
" acquainted with Mr. Degoy, whom I
" have not yet ſeen, as he has been ſome
" time confined by ſickneſs.

" I am ſorry that none of the letters
" from your Officers, who are reſident in
" this province, have reached your hands.
" No prohibition has been ever expreſsly
" made againſt their maintaining ſuch cor-
" reſpondence with their friends, as the
" precautions neceſſary to a ſtate of war
" might allow. On the contrary, they
" had frequent opportunities by Daniſh
" ſhips; and I believe it has been well
" underſtood, that they would not have
" been prevented, on a proper application,

1782 " from ſending them through the chan-
" nel of our own.

" The regret which you expreſs for the
" unhappy neceſſity which compelled you
" to ſend the priſoners of our nation to
" Hyder-Ally-Cawn, is evidenced by terms
" which could only have been dictated by
" a mind conſcious of its truth, and a
" ſenſibility wounded by the reflection of
" having been, however repugnantly, the
" inſtrument of others ſufferings. It is
" too late to look back.—I truſt to the
" generoſity of your ſentiments, and above
" all, to the virtues which have moſt emi-
" nently diſtinguiſhed your public charac-
" ter, and which are rarely known to ex-
" iſt in an unfeeling heart, that you will
" exert your influence to its utmoſt effect,
" for obtaining the deliverance of our pri-
" ſoners who are now in the hands of the
" Ruler of Myſore. It is in my private
" character only that I expreſs to you this
" wiſh, the duties of my office not ex-
" tending to the object of it; nor is it in
" your authority that I rely for its accom-
" pliſhment,

"pliſhment, as you have told me that 1782.
"this is the province of the Marquis de
"Buſſy, but on the claims which you
"poſſeſs on every Chief of your own na-
"tion, which you have ſo faithfully ſerved;
"and yet more on the man, who owes his
"preſent exiſtence perhaps wholly to your
"ſupport."

This letter, the production of an elegant and feeling mind, was dated at Fort William, the 16th day of July, 1783.

From this correſpondence it is evident, that if the conduct of Suffrein, in giving up his priſoners to the Barbarians, was not wholly excuſable, his offence was attended with circumſtances of extenuation. But, before theſe alleviating circumſtances, which the letter here publiſhed has firſt revealed, were known, that act of the French Admiral, which was regarded by every gentleman in Hindoſtan with horror, in England was ſcarcely mentioned, and never with any marks of diſapprobation; while the ridiculous circumſtance of two eunuchs

1782. confined until they ſhould give up the treaſures under their cuſtody, in payment of a legal debt, has been circulated throughout the whole kingdom in terms of the groſſeſt exaggeration. It deſerves to be recorded, as ſtrongly characteriſtical of the times, that from the commencement of the American war to the preſent moment, both orators and authors, by aggravating a few facts, and circulating, if not inventing many falſehoods, have laboured, with an induſtry that exceeds the uſual licentiouſneſs of liberty and extravagance of faction, to degrade our national character, in the eyes of Europe and of the world. It was in this ſpirit, that, when the Boſtonians in 1776, treated Sir Archibald Campbell with the moſt ſhocking inhumanity, a powerful and active party in England ſympathized with the Americans, whom they called our injured fellow-ſubjects, and almoſt exulted in the ſufferings of that gallant General. Several Engliſh gentlemen, connected with the firſt families in the kingdom were put to death, in cold blood, by Hyder-Ally-Khan, or his mercileſs ſucceſſor.

ceſſor. Some were confined, upwards of 1782.
three years, in dungeons, and loaded with irons, with an allowance ſcarcely ſufficient to purchaſe rice and water for the ſuſtenance of life. Others were compelled to renounce their religion and their country, in order to avoid a cruel and lingering death. Yet no one man in England has publicly lamented the fate of theſe meritorious Officers, and many have affirmed, that their ſufferings were well deſerved. We are happy, that we have been enabled at laſt, from authentic documents, to prove their innocence: which ſhall, by and by, be done in its proper place.

The concluſion of 1782 was marked by the death of Hyder Ally. His age is not exactly known, though it is certain that it was not under four-ſcore. He preſerved the powers of his mind entire, and perſevered in his uſual habits, acting the part of a profound politician, and able commander, to the morning, it is ſaid, of the third day before that on which he died.

Tippoo

1783. Tippoo-Saib, at this time, was engaged in oppoſing an irruption, of which an account ſhall be given hereafter, into the Myſorean territories. But, the moment he was informed of the death of Hyder, he returned with incredible celerity to the Carnatic, ſecured the good will of the principal officers of the army, by liberal preſents of money, as well as promiſes of favour, and anticipated the formation of any hoſtile faction, by the authority of his preſence, and an immediate exerciſe of the powers of Government. Tippoo, though the firſt-born of Hyder, was the ſon of a concubine. His brother, though younger, poſſeſſed the advantage of being deſcended from a Princeſs of royal extraction.—Though neither the capacity nor the ambition of this young man were ſuch as to impreſs the great mind of Tippoo with fear, he yet judged it prudent to fix himſelf in the adminiſtration of affairs, in the firſt place, and by firm poſſeſſion, to prevent all ideas of competition.

The

The firſt important act of Tippoo Sul- 1783.
tan's Government, was a propoſal of peace to Lord Macartney, on terms that were rejected by his Lordſhip without ſubmitting them to his Council. The Sultan, thus repulſed, connected himſelf as much as poſſible with the French. And, although, in order to avoid the arms of the Marattas, he determined, within the time ſpecified in the treaty between that nation and the Engliſh, to withdraw his troops from the Carnatic, he deſtroyed Arcott, and the forts which he had garriſoned; carried with him a battalion of French troops, and left for the uſe of our enemies at Cuddalore 2,000 cavalry, under the command of Sid Saib. Theſe things were tranſacted before the end of February.

Our army having diſmantled the forts of Charanagooly and Vandewaſh, and relieved the garriſon of Vellore, returned to the Mount, where they encamped on the 20th of March. On the 12th of April, Sir Edward Hughes, with his whole ſquadron, came to anchor in the Road of Madraſs.

1783. draſs. This was the fineſt fleet that had ever appeared in the Indian Ocean. It conſiſted of ſeventeen ſail of the line, four frigates, one ſloop of war, two cutters, and a fire-ſhip: all ſheathed with copper. Suffrein, not ſuſpecting that the Engliſh fleet was ſo near, had ſcattered his ſhips for the purpoſe of making captures. It was only on the evening preceding the arrival of Sir Edward Hughes, that a cruizing ſquadron of French ſhips paſſed almoſt within cannon ſhot of Fort St. George. On the night of the 20th, the French Admiral, with only ſeven ſhips, paſſed Sir Edward Hughes on his return to Trincomalé: So narrow were the eſcapes which were made at this time by the fortune of France, from utter ruin in India.

The hopes that were entertained, on the arrival of Sir Edward, in ſuch force, from Bombay, were ſuddenly exchanged for an apprehenſion that a large and valuable fleet from England, whoſe near approach was announced by the arrival of one of its ſhips, would fall into the hands of the French

French Admiral. The ſituation of Suf- 1783.
frein to windward, and that of Hughes to leeward, afforded matter of ſerious alarm. But Heaven ſoon relieved the anxiety of our countrymen. The arrival of the Briſtol man of war, with ten Indiamen, and three ſtore-ſhips, gave upwards of 600 men to the ſquadron, and about 1,900 recruits to the army. A French officer, who ſtood by when this fleet landed at Madraſs, exclaimed, "There is but one God, and that God muſt be an Engliſhman!"

The military preparations for an attack on Cuddalore, retarded by the diſſenſions of men in power, with oppoſite opinions and pretenſions, advanced but ſlowly, when a circumſtance occurred which converted thoſe very diſſenſions into the means of accelerating them. Intelligence was received that Sir Eyre Coote had ſailed from Calcutta, with power to head the army, independently of the Madraſs Government. Lord Macartney had determined to reſiſt to the utmoſt, the powers with which Sir Eyre was inveſted by the Supreme Authority

1783. rity of Bengal. That he might the more eaſily effect this purpoſe, it is ſaid, he reſolved that the General ſhould not find the army in the neighbourhood of Madraſs. A peremptory command was ſent to General Stuart to march the army on the 21ſt of April, towards Cuddalore. On that day, before the neceſſary arrangements were completed at land, or the ſtore and fire-ſhips ready to accompany them, they marched from Tamberam. At Chingliput, where they halted to bury their dead which, for the moſt part, were Iriſh and Hannoverians, they were informed that Sir Eyre Coote died at Madraſs, on the 26th of April, being the third day after his arrival from Calcutta. The ſhip that carried him was chaced for five days by the French cruizers that paſſed Fort St. George on the 11th. This circumſtance, it is thought, operating with too forcible an impreſſion on his mind, which was lofty, and prone to irritation, was that which brought on the third and mortal blow of the palſy, which terminated his life without pain, and without a groan.

On

On the 7th of June our army arrived 1783.
before Cuddalore. The enemy, who had hitherto only guarded againſt a north attack, began now to raiſe works to the ſouth. On the 12th, it was diſcovered that they had, with uncommon celerity, extended works from the ſea on their left, to the Vandy-Pollam Hills, which formed a ſweep around the Britiſh front and flanks. To have poſtponed an attack any longer, would only have expoſed our army to farther difficulties. It was therefore determined in a Council of War, to attack the enemy the next morning.

Colonel Kelly, with a brigade of native troops, and 180 Europeans, marched, about midnight, without artillery, by a foot-path unknown to the French, which led to the rear of the work on their right hand, on the Vandy-Pollam Hills. To ſeize that poſt was the firſt and leading object in the plan of operations, adopted by the General, but ſuggeſted by Kelly. The European grenadiers, about 300 rank and file, and the 73d regiment, about 200,

with

1783. with two battalions of ſepoys, covered by the fire of a battery of ſix 18 pounders, were to wait the ſucceſs of Colonel Kelly, and ſtorm the intrenchments to the enemy's right. The immediate ſucceſs of this was to be followed by aſſaults on their left and centre, ſupported by the Hanoverians.

On the 13th of June, as the day began to dawn, a cannonade from the 18 pounders, and from ſome field-pieces brought up by that valuable Artillery Officer, Major Mackay, opened at Point Blank, and from commanding heights upon the works to the enemy's right. Colonel Kelly's column, ſoon after appearing in their rear, they were ſtruck with terror and ſurpriſe, fled from their ſtrong-poſt on the Vandy-Pollam Hills, and retired in confuſion to their ſecond work, leaving two 6 pounders, and ſeveral guns, to be poſſeſſed by our men, upon the intrenched ground below. Colonel Kelly did not purſue this blow, but remained, according to orders, in the poſt that had been occupied by the French,

the

the reſt of the day. Nor did the troops under Colonel Stuart make any movement, when that poſt fell into our poſſeſſion. But the 73d regiment, led on by Major Lamont, made a reſolute attempt to ſtorm the enemy's ſecond works. They were driven back, by grape ſhot, to the ground from which they had advanced, where they waited for the general attack. 1783.

The battery of the 13 pounders, which had opened from a commanding height, and driven the enemy from their firſt poſt, having ceaſed to fire, that eminence was choſen by the General as a fit place for the purpoſe of making ſignals. Word was ſent round throughout the troops, that the General would fire three field-pieces from the hill, as notice for a general and connected attack. But it was impoſſible that our officers ſhould diſtinguiſh the ſound of the ſignal-guns from that of thoſe that were firing all around them. The three intended attacks, therefore, did not commence together. It was upon ſeeing the centre engaged, that Colonel Stuart gueſſed that

1783. the general ſignal had been made. Our troops waited no longer for ſignals, but ſtood to their arms, and moved on to the attack, through a deep ſand, with too eager rapidity. But the movements of our different battalions were found to want due ſyſtem and connection. Before the grenadiers and the 73d regiment came up, the intended aſſault againſt the enemy's left wing had miſcarried, and that which was made on their centre, had given way to their heavy fire. The enemy, eager to complete the rout, quitted their works to purſue, and thus fully committed the buſineſs of the day to the deciſion of valour and of fortune. In the mean time, the troops under Colonel Stuart moved forward into the ſecond works, which the enemy had abandoned. This movement threw the French into confuſion, forced them to retire in their turn, and fixed the reſult of this disjointed ſcene in favour of the Engliſh. The honour of this day would have been greater, had the battalions of the right of our line rallied, and returned to the charge. The grenadiers

of

of the 73d regiment continuing to advance, carried the Choultry, which they called Brickmir's Poſt. Behind this Choultry, the French formed themſelves in order of battle, and, having nothing ſerious to contend with elſewhere, they came on, and poured in upon this party ſevere ſhowers of all kinds of ſhot. The poſt was maintained by our men for a conſiderable time. The fire growing heavier and heavier on the grenadiers, Colonel Stuart ordered them to fall back. Major Lamont, the ſenior officer of the 73d, on ſeeing their ground occupied by the enemy, alſo retired, in tolerable order, after having loſt thirteen officers, and half the number of the common ſoldiers. Seven field-pieces, that lay about Brickmi'rs Poſt, after they had fallen into the hands of our men, were left, and recovered by the enemy. It was agreed, on all hands, that if it had not been for the exertions of the 73d regiment, under Major Lamont, and the grenadiers under Colonel Cathcart, our army muſt have been captured, or cut to pieces. 1783.

1783. The memorable 13th of June 1783, presented a battle in fragments. The evening broke it off, leaving the Engliſh army in poſſeſſion of the Vandy-Pollam Hills, the enemy's ſecond works, and about twenty guns. Praiſe, a little tinged with cenſure, is due to both ſides: to the French, for ſo well defending ſuch extended and unfiniſhed trenches, after being ſurprized from their moſt advantageous ſituation, and loſing, without reſiſtance, a number of guns, and the only work they had completed: to our men, for maintaining the ground which gained the day, after encountering him where he was ſtrongeſt, inſtead of making their attack, and purſuing their advantage, where he was moſt vulnerable. For the time that this action laſted, and for the ſmall number of troops that were actually engaged, nothing more hot and bloody had happened during the courſe of this war. Nine hundred and twenty-one of our ſoldiers, and ſixty-two Officers, moſt of them Europeans, and of the King's troops, were left dead, or mortally wounded, in the field of battle

battle. Among the gallant individuals loſt to their friends, and the Company's ſervice, on that day, were Captain Walter Douglas and Captain Peter Campbell. 1783.

During the night of the 13th, the Engliſh lay upon their arms in a poſture of defence, expecting that the enemy, who knew the fatigued ſtate of our troops, would attempt to recover, by an attack in the night, the ground they had loſt in the action of the day. This meaſure was in fact ſtrongly recommended in a Council of War, by almoſt all their officers: but the old and infirm Marquis de Buſſy, who began now to contemplate objects through the miſt of age, and ſaw only the hazards againſt himſelf, cautiouſly carried off every thing, while it was dark, within the walls of Cuddalore. Nothing more material than the common operations of breaking ground, came to paſs for three days.

But the ſea, on the 17th, preſented a moſt intereſting ſpectacle, both to the enemy and our army. It was Sir Edward

1783. Hughes and Monſ. Suffrein manœuvring with the Engliſh and French fleets. Suffrein, with fifteen ſail of ſhips, half of them in very bad condition, made a ſhew of an intention to attack Sir Edward, who, with eighteen ſail of coppered ſhips, (but their crews greatly debilitated by ſickneſs) lay at anchor, covering the operations of the army. The next day, Hughes was out of ſight, and before night, Suffrein rode at anchor in the place Sir Edward had left. On the 19th, both fleets were in view of the camp. On the 20th, Suffrein, being to windward, bore down on the Engliſh fleet. Sir Edward waited for him; and, between four and five in the afternoon, a heavy cannonade commenced on both ſides, which was kept up without intermiſſion. The enemy then, who had kept at a prudent diſtance during the whole of the engagement, hawling their wind, ſheered off, and were diſcovered next day at anchor, in the Road of Pondicherry. Here the Engliſh Admiral, for a whole day, offered battle. He then ſailed for Madraſs, for a neceſſary ſupply of water.

Monſ.

Monſ. de Suffrein, with his crazy fleet, 1783.
beat up againſt the wind, and, on the 23d, ſtationed his ſhips, at anchor, in a line covering Cuddalore. The French forces, at ſea and land, harmonious, and conſiſtent in their operations, now threatened our army, weakened by battle and ſevere duty, inſomuch that they had not reliefs for the trenches, and the neceſſary guards. Sallies were therefore expected, and our men were not unprepared for that which was made on the 25th. On the morning of that day, while it was yet dark, the enemy came on, in ſo looſe and undiſciplined a manner, that they were beat back with loſs and diſgrace. Colonel Gordon commanded in the trenches, aſſiſted by Colonel Cathcart, who, with his grenadiers, ſupported and repelled every alarm. We loſt Major Cotgrave, with about ſeventy men. The French about 300, with their Commandant, a Colonel, who was taken priſoner. Colonel Stuart and every Field-Officer received the General's animated thanks for the ſucceſs of our arms. The whole army on this, as on other occaſions,

1783. admired the blooming virtues of Colonel Cathcart, who united martial courage with military ſkill, and the proper pride of family with that modeſty which becomes a fellow-citizen of a free country.

The French General and Admiral, who knew the ſtate of our army, determined to make a new and more vigorous ſally. It was to conſiſt of 5,000 Europeans, and to be made on the 4th of July: but, on the 3d, the Medea frigate arrived with a flag of truce from the Government of Madraſs, requiring a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, as a general peace had taken place in Europe. The application they made was in theſe words, "That they, on their part, had "ordered a ſuſpenſion unconditionally, "and independently of any reſolution that "might be taken by the Marquis de "Buſſy." The Marquis having agreed to the ſuſpenſion, above half the army marched to reinforce that which was commanded by Colonel Fullarton, in Tanjore: the remaining part encamped on the 17th of July at the Mount.

A ne-

A negotiation for peace was now car- 1783.
ried on with Tippoo-Saib, who, flushed with the retreat of one English army on the coast of Malabar, and the capture of another, was by this time employed in the siege of Mangalore; the desperate defence of which, conducted by the gallant Colonel Campbell, will probably be considered by future historians, for whom it is our object to transmit these notes, as the most brilliant scene in the whole course of this war. The successes of Colonel Campbell sprung wholly from the resources of his own manly and persevering spirit. Though from a combination of mismanagement and misfortune, this intrepid Officer was left to his fate, he did not capitulate before his faithful garrison were reduced to their last pint of rice; or before they had fed on the putrid carcases of animals held in aversion and horror; or before a large force, sent to their aid from Bombay, had anchored before Mangalore, tantalizing the garrison for three days with the delusive hope of relief. But these are matters which deserve to be more minutely related.

It

1783. It will therefore be proper to reſume our narrative of what paſſed on the Coaſt of Malabar, from the reduction of Calicut by Major Abingdon: and for this end, it will be neceſſary to go back to that military and naval force, originally intended for the reduction of the Cape of Good-Hope, which ſailed from England in 1781.

In the beginning of 1780, a ſecret expedition was planned by his Majeſty and Privy Council, the object of which was generally ſuppoſed to be ſome of the Spaniſh Settlements in South America. The new regiments of 1,000 men each, named the 98th and the 100th, were completed in January, 1781, and put under the command of Mr. Mackenzie Humberſtone, a young gentleman of the family of Seaforth, and Mr. William Fullarton, who had ſignalized both his ability and his zeal in the ſervice of Lord North's Adminiſtration, in a civil capacity.* To theſe troops, quickly diſciplined, were added, the

* Theſe Gentlemen, who had been at great expence in raiſing and diſciplining the troops, were allowed the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel during the time of the war only. A like condition was granted to the Laird of Macleod.

the 2d battalion of the 42d regiment, under the command of Mr. Norman Mackeod, a Gentleman of the Iſle of Sky, one of the Iſlands on the Weſtern Coaſt of Scotland; four companies from other regiments, commanded by Major Robert Douglas, with a detachment of royal artillery, under Lieutenant Hiſlop. The whole of this force was to be headed by Major-General William Meadows, an Officer of approved abilities. The fleet which carried it from Spithead in March, 1781, was commanded by Commodore Johnſtone, an Officer who poſſeſſed the reputation of great activity and intrepid courage. It conſiſted of two ſhips of the line, three of 50 guns, three frigates of 32 guns, two ſloops of war, two cutters, the *Infernal* fire-ſhip, and *Terror* bomb-ketch, two ordnance ſtore-ſhips, ſeven armed tranſports, with coppered bottoms, four hired uncoppered tranſports, five victuallers, and thirteen Indiamen: the whole making forty-five ſail, replete with troops, and ſtores of every kind for a long voyage, and 1,000 1783.

ſtand

1783 ſtand of arms. This fleet anchored in Praya Bay, in the Iſland of St. Jago, one of the Cape de Verds, on the 10th of April. On the 16th, at eight in the morning, the Iſis, being the ſhip that was ſtationed the furtheſt out at ſea, made a ſignal that there was a ſtrange fleet in ſight. All Officers were immediately ordered to repair on board; and about nine, a fleet of fifteen ſail being now in view, a ſignal was made to clear the ſhips for action. The ſtrange fleet now ſeparated into two diviſions; one of ten, the other of five ſhips. The firſt was a convoy; the laſt, ſhips of war. At half paſt nine, the headmoſt of theſe entered the Bay, under French colours, the other four following in a line a-head. It was the French fleet under the command of the celebrated Suffrein. He loſt not a moment to begin a furious attack on the Engliſh, who reſerved their fire, from a notion that the French Admiral would not, by committing hoſtilities in a neutral port, violate the laws of nations. The Britiſh fleet, though ſcarcely yet clear for action, and with ſeven hundred of their

beſt

beſt ſeamen on ſhore, opened on the ene- 1783.
my, and returned their fire with equal vigour. The action was continued with great heat about an hour, when the French Commander gave the ſignal for his fleet to bear away, and purſue their deſtination. It was paſt three o'clock afternoon, before our ſquadron ſlipt their cables to go in purſuit of them, though they had ſeized and carried off the Infernal fire-ſhip, and the Hinchinbrook Indiaman, as well as taken one of their own diſabled ſhips in tow, and given orders to one of our victuallers, that they had manned, to follow, which ſhe was doing. They came abreaſt with the enemy, by the time the ſun was going down, about ſix o'clock. Though our Commodore was to the windward of the French, he did not bring them to an action. He kept abreaſt of them till midnight; but in the morning not one of them was to be ſeen. The three ſhips ſeized by the French found means to make their eſcape; and came ſafely into the Bay of Praya ſome days after.

On

1783. On the 1st day of May, our fleet, being now nearly refitted, was ordered to unmoor, and, the next morning, to weigh anchor. About four o'clock afternoon the whole fleet was under ſail. The north-eaſt trade-wind carried them within thirty degrees of the line; after which another trade-wind brought them to the Iſland of Trinidada, a romantic but deſolate iſland, claimed by the Portugueze as the firſt diſcoverers, oppoſite to the coaſt of South America. They lay in ſight of that iſland for two days. Hitherto, both our Officers and men were ignorant of their deſtination: but now, the fleet proceeded in a ſouth-eaſterly courſe, avowedly for the Cape of Good Hope. The troops being removed, on the 19th of June, out of eight Indiamen, and crouded into the other ſhips of the fleet, thoſe Indiamen purſued their voyage: and one Indiaman having parted from our ſquadron on the 25th of May, for St. Helen's, there remained now only four out of the thirteen which ſailed from Spithead, namely, the Oſterley, Latham, Locko, and Valentine. A Dutch prize was brought

brought into our fleet on the 1ſt of July, by 1783
ſome of our frigates. The Dutchman being outward-bound, had on board 60,000l. in bullion: but, what was of greater conſequence to our fleet, now within ſixty-five miles of the Cape, the packet which it carried, contained information of conſiderable importance to the attainment of their chief object. Suffrein, with his ſhips of war, a frigate, and one or two of his tranſports, had arrived in Falſe Bay. The guns and men of the diſabled ſhip of war, called the Hannibal, which he had dragged along with the reſt of his ſquadron under jury maſts, were landed, and placed in ſtrong batteries erected on purpoſe for receiving them. In the Bay of Saldannah, from twenty to twenty-five leagues diſtant, five homeward-bound Dutch Indiamen had taken ſhelter, and, as ſoon as they ſhould be informed that the Engliſh were arrived off the Cape, they were to ſlip out, and ſail directly for Europe. In conſequence of this intelligence, the fleet lay to, the night of the 9th, and all the 10th, in order to deliberate

1783. rate what was beſt to be done. On the 21ſt, about ten in the forenoon, they entered Saldannah Bay, where they took, almoſt without reſiſtance, the five ſhips of which they had received ſuch exact intelligence, with two of ſmaller value. The whole were eſtimated conſiderably above 800,000l. but one of them was burnt by her crew, and two of them unfortunately loſt in their paſſage to England. On the 26th, the prizes, with ſome tranſports, and on the 28th, Commodore Johnſtone, with all the ſhips of war, excepting four, having previouſly conducted what remained of the fleet, paſſed Table Land and Falſe Bay. The General, while our fleet lay yet in Saldannah Bay, demanded of the Commodore in public, becauſe he found it a very difficult matter to obtain an official anſwer from that impracticable man on any ſubject, whether he would land him and his ſoldiers in Table Bay. The Commodore replied in the affirmative; but added, that he would not ſtay a moment to aid him, in caſe of diſcomfiture.

The

The ſame packet which fortunately di- 1783
rected Commodore Johnſtone to Saldannah Bay, determined General Meadows to go onward to India. For he had gleaned from ſundry Dutch letters, ſome intelligence, though imperfect, of the war with Hyder-Ally, the capture of Colonel Baillie's army, and the diſtreſs of the Engliſh ſettlements in that part of the world. Our reduced fleet now conſiſted of the Hero, Monmouth, and Iſis ſhips of war, the coppered tranſports, the four hired tranſports, the two ordnance ſtore-ſhips, and four Indiamen: the whole now under the command of Captain James Alms of the Monmouth. The Active frigate had been ſent forward to India with diſpatches. The Prince of Ternate, with his three ſons, and the Prince of Tidore, with his only ſon, who were relieved from bondage with the Dutch at Saldannah, were taken on board the Hero, to be reſtored to their friends and the poſſeſſion of their territories. The firſt of theſe unfortunate families had been brought priſoners to the Cape ſix years before, and the laſt had been there three years. It was the inten-

1783. tion of the Dutch to have ſent thoſe captives, whoſe only crime was their oppoſition to the tyranny of their oppreſſors, to Europe in the ſame ſhips that were ſeized by our ſquadron at Saldannah.

Comodore Alms, with all the ſhips under his command, anchored ſafely in the bay of *Zamooda*, off the watering-place in Johanna, the chief of the Comorrah iſlands, ſituated between Madagaſcar and the coaſt of Africa, on Sunday the 2d of September. Here he landed all his ſick men, conſiſting in one third of the fleet and army. They were afflicted chiefly with the ſcurvy: but not a few with dyſenteries and ulcers. The greateſt part of all our invalids recovered during the twenty-two days they remained in that delightful place.

The ſland of Johanna is moſt romantically beautiful, being very mountainous, yet exceedingly fertile. It produces excellent black cattle, from four to ſix dollars each, goats at one dollar, a great deal of wild game, and a great variety of delicious fruits and herbs:

herbs; pine-apples, guavas, pappas, mam- 1783.
mas, bananas, oranges, limes, cocoa-nuts, pompkins, melons, ſugar-canes, rice, yams, potatoes, purſlain, and wild creſſes. And, to crown the whole, the water is excellent. Strangers are ſurpriſed to find almoſt every black inhabitant of this ſequeſtered iſland ſpeak tolerably good Engliſh. The grandees, here, are a ſet of Arabian Muſſulmen, who have aſſumed authority over the ſimple natives. The Arabian Lords of Johanna have, every one of them, aſſumed the name of ſome noble Engliſh family. The Prince's firſt ſon is familiarly called the Prince of Wales: and there are Dukes, and Marquiſſes, and Earls amongſt them by ſcores. It is very common to find a Duke or Marquis waiting for your getting up in the morning to ſolicit your cloaths to waſh, which is done by their ſlaves. They are exceedingly covetous of money; nor would a Johanna nobleman ſcruple much to ſteal, if he had a tempting opportunity. The natives are of the African race. They are very rude, though by no means ſavage, and have ſcarcely any ideas of religion.

1783. They nurſe a ſpecies of duck upon a ſacred lake in the centre of the iſland, to which they do not admit ſtrangers without great reluctance. They pay thoſe birds a kind of adoration. The animals are ſo familiar as to come to their worſhippers and eat out of their hands. The iſland of Johanna being the largeſt, aſſumes authority over the other Comorrah iſlands. But at this time that authority was vigorouſly diſputed by the inhabitants of Mayotta, who, having heard of the revolt of our tranſatlantic colonies, ſaid, "Mayotta like America."

On the 24th of September, our fleet ſailed from Johanna, and purſued their deſtination. A moſt alarming fever attacked ſuch of thoſe as had, when on ſhore at Johanna, ſlept on the banks of two rivulets at the watering-place, whilſt thoſe who had pitched their tents at a diſtance from them remained well. This malady carried off great numbers of officers and men, of both the navy and army. The 42d regiment ſuffered moſt, having been encamped on the banks of one of the rivulets. After a calm,

a calm, which laſted from the 11th of October to the 5th of November, the ſhifting of the Monſoon obliged them, though only two hundred and ſixty leagues from Bombay, to ſteer in a north-eaſterly courſe, which brought them within ſight of the land of Arabia Felix on the 15th. They beat off and on the Arabian coaſt, endeavouring to work to the eaſtward, but without ſucceſs till the 26th, when they ſtood in, and anchored in Morabat Bay. The Indiamen, having taken the 42d regiment on board out of the tranſports, fell to leeward, and went to Kiſſin Bay, in expectation of joining Admiral Hughes's fleet at Bombay. 1783.

At Morabat there was nothing to be had but a few half-ſtarved goats, and very ſmall lean bullocks with caravanſeras, and ſome dried graſs from the mountains for fodder. Fowls are very ſcarce and conſequently dear. There is hardly any fruit or grain of any kind, except a little caravanſeras. What rice the Arabians have, is brought from the coaſt of Malabar. They produced ſome

1783. preſerved dates, and ſome bad limes. Their water is brought from mountains five miles diſtant, either by their women, or on the backs of camels. Our men ſunk a great number of caſks in the ſand, from whence they obtained abundance of brakiſh water, which was found not unwholeſome during the remainder of the voyage.

The poor inhabitants were aſtoniſhed at this, and the Sheik, or Chief Perſonage in that part of the coaſt, requeſted as a mighty favour, that four or five caſks might be left as a common bleſſing to him and his people: which was readily granted. There is, however, plenty of game, ſuch as antelopes, roes, hares, pheaſants, and partridges of a very large ſize. The chief food of the inhabitants is fiſh, of which they have great variety and abundance. Though this diviſion of Arabia cannot in general boaſt of a fertile ſoil, yet it is not improperly denominated happy, ſince kind nature, guarding againſt the evils of luxury on the one hand, and of want on the other, holds out to her children ſalutary and even delicious

cious food, if they will but ſeek after it. 1733.
The men here, ſtrung by their hardy manner of life, in a country that gives nothing without exertion, are a well-formed race of people, with ſleek black hair, piercing black eyes, and of a martial appearance. Each man carries a ſpear and a target; and ſome two ſwords with a target, wearing a ſword on each ſide. Not a few of them, in addition to theſe weapons, have matchlock-guns, in the uſe of which they are very expert.—The Arabian women ſeem very ill made. They live, like all the women of the Eaſt, in a very recluſe manner, and all of them wear veils.—The character of the Arabians will be beſt underſtood by viewing it in contradiſtinction to that of other neighbouring nations: and this compariſon every man has an opportunity of making who has reſided any time at Bombay. Here, beſides Europeans of all countries, you meet with Turks, Perſians, Arabians, and Armenians. The Turks are ſtately, grave, and honeſt in their dealings. The Perſians are more gay, lively, and converſible, but leſs to be truſted in matters of

1783. trade than the ſaturnine Turks. The Arabians are all life and fire, and when they treat on any ſubject, whether of buſineſs or converſation, will make you a fine oration in flowing numbers, and with a muſical cadence: but in their commercial dealings, they will take every advantage in their power. The Armenians, compared with the Arabians, ſcarcely appear to be of the ſame gender: they are handſome and ſoft in their features, mild in their tempers, and in their nature, kind and beneficent. The Turks and Perſians are, for the moſt part, ſtout-bodied men: the Arabians, though of a ſmaller ſtature and ſlender, are accounted the beſt ſoldiers, poſſeſſing great agility, and courage equal to their activity.

A war-pantomime is ſometimes to be ſeen at Bombay, between a number of Perſians on the one ſide, and Arabs on the other. The Perſians keep their ground, and ward off the blows that are aimed as them in the beſt manner they can: the Arabs, on the contrary, when a ſtroke is aimed at them, ſpring up in the air to an incredible height,

and

and inſtantly make an attack on their anta- 1783
goniſts. On the whole, the preſent Arabians are ſuch as we might expect that ancient and unconquered people to be, who, at one period of their hiſtory, extended their arms over the greateſt part of the civilized world. Nature, by granting them but little without induſtry, in a climate that ſubjects them not to the enervation of fixed habitations, has qualified them to conquer the poſſeſſions of their effeminate neighbours: and were ſuch a ſpark of enthuſiaſtic excitement to fall among them now, as called them forth into ſplendid, though ſanguinary action in the ſixth century, the materials being ſtill the ſame, it would raiſe an equal flame.

The ſhips of war, the Monmouth, Hero, Iſis, and the Manilla, with the Royal Charlotte and Raikes, having on board the 98th regiment, proceeded, on the 6th of December, to join Admiral Huges, leaving the 100th regiment in the coppered tranſports, and the conduct of the convoy to Captain Smith of the San Carlos; but the Charlotte,

1783. Charlotte and Raikes, having each ſprung a top-maſt, were obliged to put back and join the reſt of the convoy in Morabat Bay. Here Major Rooke, of the 100th regiment, left the army to return by Suez to England. General Meadows and Colonel Fullarton were on board the ſhips of war; and Colonel Mackenzie Humberſton was left to command the troops in the tranſports, with thoſe that had joined them in the Raikes and Royal Charlotte. Colonel Humberſton's ſquadron, then conſiſting of thirteen ſail, incluſive of a Portugueze ſhip which furniſhed them with wines, left Morabat on the 9th of December, 1781, and arrived at Bombay on the morning of the 22d of January, 1782.

The Colonel landed the ſoldiers on Old Woman's Iſland, for refreſhment; re-embarked them on the 27th; on the 8th ſet ſail for Madras; on the 4th of February anchored in the road of Tellicherry; and on the 9th of the ſame month, off Anjengo, in the dominions of the King of Travancore. Here intelligence was received that Hyder-Ally

Ally had over-run the whole of the Carna- 1783.
tic; that he threatened the kingdom of Tanjore, and the ſtates of the Marawas, of Madura, and Trinivelly, with utter deſtruction; that he had circumvented and cut off two Britiſh armies, and, in conſequence of the improvidence, puſillanimity, and diſſenſions of the Government of Madras, inſulted the diſpirited and aſtoniſhed garriſon of Fort St. George itſelf. Colonel Humberſton was now impatient to go round by Cape Comorin and join the army at Madras, but, on receiving undoubted intelligence that the French fleet were at that time to aſſemble off Point de Galle, and that commiſſaries had been ſent ſome time ago to Columbo and other ports in Ceylon, to lay up magazines for their fleet and army, he called a council of war, and laid the ſituation of affairs before them. Some propoſed, after a paſſage of near twelve months, to return for the refreſhment of the ſeamen and ſoldiers to Bombay, and there to wait a favourable opportunity of going round to Madras: and others to march ſuch of the ſoldiers as were able acroſs the Peninſula, from

1783. from Anjengo to the Carnatic, and to ſend the ſhips with the ſick and lame back to Bombay. But Colonel Mackenzie Humberſton, their commander, was ſtruck with the delays of the former plan, and the dangers of the latter. He therefore propoſed, that with his own troops, which did not amount to one thouſand, and what Sepoys could be ſpared from Tellicherry, the ſiege of which had been lately raiſed with ſo much military ſkill and perſeverance by Major Abington, to make a diverſion on the coaſt of Malabar, in favour of our army in the Carnatic: a meaſure which was readily approved by the council. In purſuance of this plan, it was determined that the little army ſhould land at Callicut; which had fallen into the hands of the Tellicherry troops, of which Humberſton could claim the command as an officer of ſuperior rank to that of Major Abington. Here, accordingly, the army debarked, and encamped in a cocoa-nut grove on the 18th of February.

On

On the 27th of March, the flank com- 1781
panies of the army, with four companies of grenadier Sepoys, took the field under Major Robert Douglas, ſecond in command, but accompanied by the commander in chief. The reſt of the army, under the conduct of Major John Campbell, were ordered to follow. Proceeding ſouthward by ſhort marches, they determined, on the 7th of April, to attack the fort of Trincolore. The flank corps, accordingly, marched at the dawn, and after paſſing ſome difficult ground, came up with the enemy about eleven o'clock forenoon, drawn up in a field behind a hedge, and betwixt our army and the fort. An attack was opened upon our men by ſurprize. The enemy, however, ſoon gave way, and were purſued with great ſlaughter, for about three miles, to the other ſide of Trinigardo. They continued to retreat with precipitation till they reached Ramgurree, twenty miles from Trincolore plains: their ſtrength was about one thouſand five hundred horſe, and three thouſand foot. Their commander, Mugdum-Ally-Khan, was a near relation of Hyder's, who was killed

1783. killed in the action. The loſs ſuſtained by the enemy muſt have exceeded four hundred men, and ſeveral hundred horſes. Ours was very trifling. The army reſted three days at Vangally-cottah. In their march to Ternavey, on the 13th of April, which was very ſultry, fourteen of the ſoldiers, unſeaſoned to the climate, dropped down at the ſame inſtant, and ſuddenly died. It is remarkable that theſe men were, every one of them, the ſtouteſt that day in the line.

On the approach of the rainy ſeaſon our troops retired to cantonements at Calicut, where they arrived by the 27th of May, 1782. They again took the field on the 2d of September, with their eye fixed on Pallacottah, a ſtrong fort ſituated about one mile from Pallacatcherry, which commands the great ſouthern paſs between the coaſts of Malabar and Coromandel. The ſecond battalion of the 42d regiment having now joined them, our army conſiſted of above nine hundred Britiſh, and two thouſand Bombay Sepoys.

Colonel

Colonel Humberſtone, in order to make 1783.
the diverſion he had in view the more reſpectable, ſolicited aid from our good ally and friend the King of Travancore, and obtained twelve hundred Sepoys with European officers and Serjeants, maintained at the King's expence. Our little army was accompanied by a train of artillery of ſix eighteen pounders, two twelve pounders, eight ſix pounders, and four amuzettes: the whole managed by above eighty European, and one hundred and fifty black or native artillery-men. But, for want of draught bullocks, they were obliged to leave the half of their eighteen pounders, and both their twelve pounders, at Pananah. For the ſame reaſon they were obliged to leave all their mortars and howitzers at Ramguree. They came before this place on the 20th of September, and were preparing to open mortar batteries againſt it, as its lofty ſituation did not admit of any other mode of attack, when it was deſerted on the night of the 6th of October. Ramguree is ſituated thirty miles inland from Pananah, exactly midway between that place and Pallacottah. They therefore

1783. therefore garriſoned it with convaleſcents, and ſome men that had been ſlightly wounded, and made it the centre link of a chain of communication.

On the 14th they took Mungara-cottah, with about ninety foot priſoners. Here they left all their women and heavy baggage, and on the 18th marched to Pallacatcherry, about ten miles diſtant. About three miles from the fort they encountered the enemy, who gave way almoſt without reſiſtance. Our troops purſued them till they reached their camp, which they had burned to the ground. The Engliſh formed their encampment near it, as the enemy were either diſperſed or had fled into Pallacottah; and the inhabitants of Pallacottah into the country. On the 19th, they marched and encamped within gun-ſhot of the fort. An ineffectual cannonade was kept up by the enemy, and various movements were made by our army, one of which encouraged a vain attempt on our camp, from the 19th to the 21ſt of October, when the Commander, convinced that he could not reduce

Palla-

Pallacottah without heavy artillery, gave orders, late at night, for the troops to be under arms, at four o'clock next morning, in order to retire to the ground which they had occupied on the night of the 18th. 1783.

Unfortunately the Brigade-Major, who directed the retreat, inſtead of putting the line to the right about, ordered them to counter-march, which threw the ſtores and baggage into the rear, and expoſed them to the enemy, who had early intelligence, which they did not fail to improve, of this movement. The Engliſh, in entering the town of Pallacatcherry, were obliged to paſs though a narrow defile. Near the farther end of the town, a ſmall party of the enemy, called a *videt*, was poſted on an eminence, with a ſmall light. When the van of our army approached this light, the *videt* extinguiſhed it; and this was the ſignal for an aſſault. They juſtly concluded, that when our van reached ſo far, not above one third of our line would remain on their ſide of the defile, and that with them only they would have to com-

1783. bat. The event exceeded their moſt ſanguine wiſhes, for, by the time that our van had reached the light, ſcarcely any thing remained to enter the defile but the rear-guard and the baggage. On theſe the enemy made a furious attack: whilſt our van faced to the right about, and went to their aſſiſtance. The rear-guard, and a ſmall part of the baggage were ſaved by a movement of the flank companies: but the whole proviſion of the army was loſt, and almoſt all their ammunition, beſides private baggage. Several of our men were mortally wounded; and among theſe Major G. Hutchinſon of the 98th regiment. His death was deeply regretted by the whole army. Even the black troops ſhed tears at his interment. The little Engliſh army had taken poſt on the ground they had intended to occupy, when orders were given to retreat. Colonel Humberſton intended to have remained in camp, on this ground, for ſome time, and to ſend back all the bullocks he could collect, to bring up ſome battering guns from Ramgurree. But, after the late diſaſter, ſcarcely any bullocks were

to

to be found: and there was now no reſource 1783.
but in retiring to the coaſt. But they were ſcarcely on the line of march, when they were attacked from every thicket, and exceedingly harraſſed both in their flanks and rear. About ſunſet they reached the river Caveri, which the late falls of rain had rendered impaſſable. They therefore reſted upon their arms all night, while the engineer's people were employed in conſtructing rafts of wood to float them over in the morning. This day they had not taſted any food. Lieutenant Wheeler, with ſixteen ſoldiers was wounded, and ſeveral Sepoys killed.

The ſwelling of the river having ſubſided in the night, they paſſed through in the morning undiſturbed, and, at night, reached the banks of the river near Mungarah-cottah, which was impaſſable. This, too, was a day of faſting. With ſome difficulty a few rice cakes were conveyed in the evening, acroſs the river, from Mungarah-cottah; from whence alſo plentiful ſupplies of bullocks and rice were ſent, and convey-

1783. ed with greater eaſe, next morning. During theſe three laſt days, a prodigious deſertion took place among the Sepoys, one of whom, caught in the act of deſerting, was blown from the mouth of a cannon. Colonel Humberſton, on the 2d of November, removed his camp to the Mungarah-cottah ſide of the river, and covered his right flank with the fort. Having previouſly ſent off the ſick and wounded, the women, and the baggage to Pananah, he ſprung mines under the four baſtions of of Mungarah-cottah Fort. Two of the mines blew the baſtions above them to deſtruction: the other two miſgave. At night they reached Cunitery, and, the night after, they regained their old ground at Ramgurree, which they blew up on the evening of the 18th.

Here they received repeated and certain information, that Tippoo Saib, during the inaction of our army in conſequence of the civil diſputes at Madras, had left the Carnatic, and was advancing towards them at the head of an army of twenty thouſand men,

men, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. 1783.
Orders were immediately given for the line to be ready to march by four in the morning. A picquet of about one hundred and fifty men were ſtationed at the diſtance of near three miles from Ramgurree, the preſent ſtation of the army. This picquet the Major of Brigade accidentally neglected to call in, in the evening of the 18th, and, in the morning of the 19th, it was with difficulty that a meſſenger could be found who would venture to go to their poſt, as it was ſaid that the enemy had been ſeen in the interval. Lieutenant Halliday, at laſt, brought them in, after the line had been under arms four hours waiting their return. It was about nine o'clock, before noon, when our ſmall army began to march: but ſcarcely had they advanced three miles from their ground, when Tippoo Saib, who had previouſly ſent forward detachments, to be poſted in advantageous ſituations for galling them as they paſſed, opened a cannonade on their rear. They at firſt attempted to reach Pananah by a ſhort route, through a flat country of rice grounds, without paſſing the river at all. But they were obliged,

1783. after marching ſome miles, to return to their former courſe. They were obliged to fight their way all day long, both with muſketry and cannon. It was nearly dark when they reached that curve, or concave, where there is a ford of the Pananah river: but it was ſo ſwoln with the late rains, that it was deeemd both by the enemy and our men, impaſſable.

In this perilous ſituation they halted for two hours in the utmoſt incertitude.—People were ſent above and below the ford, to find, if poſſible, a practicable paſs. It was determined, if theſe ſhould return unſucceſsful, as the only deſperate reſource that remained in a deſperate caſe, to beat up the enemy's camp before the approach of morning, and either conquer or die.—A ford, however, was found; and though it was ſo deep as to take ordinary men to the chin, and the ſtrength of the current lifted many off the ground, yet, by clinging to one another, and aſſiſting each other, not a man was loſt. A few men of ſhort ſtature were obliged to let go their muſkets and ammunition, which they carried on their

their head, in order to ſave themſelves; 1783.
and only two black women were loſt out of the whole army. This was done in the dark, and happily unperceived by the enemy. The 100th regiment covered the paſſage of the river, for fear of interruption.—After having paſſed, they proceeded with as little noiſe as poſſible to the high ground at Ternavey, about five miles diſtant, and there halted near two hours, kindled large fires, and dried their clothes. Before dawn they moved off, and two miles forward they paſſed Pananah river, at the ſecond ford, eight miles above the town of that name, without moleſtation. The enemy imagining them to be ſtill in the concave of the river, did not ſtir all night, expecting them to become an eaſy prey in the morning. This Tippoo afterwards acknowledged at Mangalore.

They were much ſurpriſed, therefore, to find, on the morning, that our men had eſcaped them, and had alſo repaſſed the river at the other ford, before even their cavalry came in view of them. Thus the

1783. Engliſh proceeded on their march without moleſtation till they came within two miles of the town of Pananah, when ſome of the enemy attempted to harraſs their rear, but without almoſt any execution. They entered Pananah about four o'clock after noon, and the army was divided into three diviſions, and properly poſted to defend the town, which continued to be blockaded to the 5th of December, when Hyder-Ally's death called Tippoo to affairs of greater importance.

Thus Colonel Mackenzie Humberſton, with his little army, at laſt effectuated his original deſign, of creating a diverſion on this coaſt, in order to relieve the Carnatic: for, till this æra, the Carnatic armies could do little more than march in ſight of the enemy *once* a month, and then return to the Preſidency, or the Mount, for proviſions. The frequent ſupplies neceſſary to be thrown into the fortreſs of Vellore exhauſted half the exertions of our army in eſcorting them; but now that Tippoo had withdrawn himſelf,

ſelf, the Carnatic armies began to act with greater effect, as well as freedom. 1783.

No ſooner had Humberſton drawn Tippoo Saib to the coaſt, than the arrival of Colonel Macleod, a ſenior officer, ſuperſeded him in the command on the very day of his arrival in Pananah. When Colonel Humberſton firſt landed his little army on the Malabar coaſt, he had painted the advantages of his intended plan in ſuch ſtrong colours to the Bombay government, that it was immediately adopted; and this being communicated to the other Preſidencies and the India-Houſe, it was reſolved that reinforcements ſhould be ſent both from Madras and Bombay, to his little army. Had this plan of Humberſton's been left to his execution, in all probability it would not only have proved the ſalvation of the Carnatic, which it ultimately proved, in ſpite of the weakneſs and miſguided meaſures of the ſucceeding commanders, but might have terminated in a total diſmemberment of the riſing empire of Myſore, and prevented the calamities which afterwards befel the chief officers

1783. officers in particular, and the inferior officers and men in general of that army, and thoſe who afterwards joined them.

Our army being cloſely blockaded, were employed in raiſing lines of defence, when, on the morning of the 28th of November, before dawn, a general aſſault was made by the enemy on the centre poſt, commanded by Major Campbell. The enemy were headed by Mr. Lally and a party, if not all his men, on foot; they came on in columns, took a ſmall mud fort without our lines, and diſlodged our Sepoys without reſiſtance. The alarm was immediately given, and the blockaded were inſtantly in arms: the enemy, however, had already reached our lines, and were in poſſeſſion of our guns. The 42d regiment attacked them vigorouſly with the bayonet, and ſoon turned their front back upon thoſe who ſupported them. Theſe, attempting to flee, put their followers in confuſion. A general rout took place, though they repeatedly endeavoured to rally. The conteſt laſted ſeveral hours, when the enemy retreated, leaving about one hundred and fifty

fifty killed and wounded upon the field. 1783.
Captain de L'Iſle, and a young enſign, were made priſoners; the firſt mortally wounded.

In January, 1783, Brigadier-General Mathews landed with an army under his command at Margee, about three hundred miles north of Pananah, and ſent orders for the ſouthern army to join him without loſs of time. Tippoo having raiſed the blockade of Pananah, on the 5th of December, left our army there, wholly unembarraſſed, and they forthwith embarked, about Chriſtmas, for Margee; but the Sepoy corps and all the black artillery and baggage, draft and pack bullocks and horſes, went by land, coaſtways, to our ſettlement of Tillicherry. The firſt diviſion, conſiſting of the Europeans, left Tillicherry on the 1ſt of January, and five days afterwards, boats having been provided for the black troops, they alſo embarked and proceeded immediately. Before the ſouthern army could join that under Brigadier-General Mathews, he had made a deſcent upon the coaſt, and with ſeveral ſmall forts of little conſequence had taken the fortreſs of

Onore

1783. Onore, which was eſteemed a place of ſome ſtrength and importance. This fort, after a vain ſummons to the Keeladar to ſurrender, in order to prevent the effuſion of blood, was taken by ſtorm on the 5th of January. The enemy had about four hundred killed and wounded. We took above two thouſand priſoners; and here, according to the uſual cuſtom of our little army, they ſet all the priſoners at liberty, after diſarming them, excepting three or four men of ſome rank, from whom ranſoms were expected.

The firſt diviſion of the ſouthern army landed at Rajamondroog on the 2d and 3d of January, and ſoon after marched to form a junction with General Mathews, which they effected on the 17th at Cundapore, a place alſo upon the coaſt, which had juſt fallen into his hands without much aſſiſtance. The army, conſiſting of about twelve hundred Europeans, and eight battalions of Sepoys, with a proportionate number of artillery and Laſcars, moved forward, directing their line of march towards the great paſs, which leads to the table-land of Hindoſtan,

over

over that vaſt chain of mountains which run from Cape Comorin northward into Perſia. 1783.

This paſs is called Huſſain-gurry Ghaut. From the bottom to the top of this Ghaut, or Paſs, a ſpace of about five miles, the road winds in various directions, as the natural ſteepneſs and ruggedneſs of the aſcent could be eaſieſt overcome by art, and made practicable to the human foot. At every turning there was a battery of guns or a well-manned redoubt. The army reached the foot of the Ghauts on the 24th, and early on the morning of the 25th made the attack. The Britiſh troops carried every thing before them, and chiefly with the bayonet. One ſtrong redoubt at the top of the Ghauts they almoſt deſpaired of being able to reduce. But a detachment found means to clamber up the rocks, and by making a detour came round upon the back of it. Here all who made reſiſtance were put to the ſword, and the Ghauts were now their own. Next day they proceeded for Hyder-nagur, or Bednore, the capital of the country which bears its name,

1783. name, and diſtant from the top of the Ghauts about nine miles. Upon their approach to that great capital, with only ſix rounds of ammunition each man, Hyat Saheb, the Jemmadaur, who was the higheſt military, as well as civil officer in Canara and the Bednore countries, ſent out a Captain Campbell, an Engliſh priſoner, to offer terms of ſurrender.—He ſtipulated that his own private property ſhould be ſecured, that he ſhould be continued by the Engliſh in his former ſtation and dignity, and that he would ſurrender all public monies and property to the captors, and would give inſtant orders for all the dependencies on Bednore, to open their gates to the Engliſh troops. Theſe terms were promiſed, and our troops took quiet poſſeſſion of Bednore and all its immenſe treaſures, without a ſingle blow; orders were accordingly iſſued by the Zemindar, to forts Mangalore, Ananpore, Deckull, Cowlydroog, Sujapore, Siccapore, Samſatcha Ghautt, Caricall, and Mont Bidrure, with other places, to ſurrender to the Engliſh arms. Some of theſe obeyed the ſummons, others of them obſtinately

ſinately refuſed, and breathed defiance.— 1783.
Theſe were Mangalore, Deckull, and Ananpore. This laſt fortreſs, after violating the rules of war, by detaining our flags of truce and ſending them off priſoners, ſtood the ſtorm on the 14th of February, after a practicable breach was made. It was, however, aſſaulted and carried, and all who reſiſted were ſacrificed to the rules of war ſubſiſting among civilized nations, to the amount of about three hundred men. Two hundred and eleven of theſe were buried in one grave, which was a draw-well, the ſame day. From Ananpore our troops appeared before Siccapore, but made no ſerious attack upon it. Mangalore was next attacked. After a practicable breach was made, and our men prepared to ſtorm it on the 9th of March, Ruſtan-Ally-Beg, the Commandant, endeavoured to rouſe his people to defend the breach, but in vain. They refuſed to obey him, and he was obliged to ſurrender. They were permitted to depart without arms, but with their private property untouched. About one hundred and fifty Frenchmen of Lally's corps were made priſoners.

1783. priſoners, who ſolicited employment as artillery-men in ours, with the ſame rank that they had held in their former ſervice. They were told that this could not be done by the General; but that if the government of Bombay approved of it, they would entertain them accordingly, to which they all conſented.

The unfortunate Keeladar, Ruſtan-Ally, for giving up this fortreſs, although he compounded for his head and paid part of the ranſom, was executed on the hill, in ſight of Mangalore, on the 22d of November, 1783. After Mangalore fell into our hands, General Mathews, with four companies of the 102d regiment, and part of the black troops, returned to Bednore.—A prodigious treaſure was found here, by all accounts not leſs than one million of pounds, beſides jewels and other precious ſtones, the moſt of which was public property. But, notwithſtanding the reaſonable requeſt of the army to have part of that ſpoil divided, their leader poſitively refuſed their requeſt, though they were then in great diſtreſs from want of money, having received

received no pay for almoſt twelve months, 1783.
and ſome of them in arrears ſixteen and eighteen months. On ſuch an unjuſt and impolitic refuſal, loud complaints enſued. Remonſtrance upon remonſtrance, ſigned by the whole army, was preſented to no purpoſe. The moſt arbitrary meaſures were purſued; and, though no confuſion aroſe, yet the diſcontents ran ſo high, that Colonels Macleod and Humberſton, and Major Shaw, left the army, and went ſtraight to Bombay, to lay the matter before the Governor and Council. Their repreſentations were ſo well ſupported, and the conduct of General Matthews ſo flagrant and unjuſt, that the Governor and Council immediately ſuperſeded him, and appointed Colonel Macleod, the next in command, Brigadier-General and Commander in Chief. But this unfortunately happened too late: for in the mean time, it is confidently aſſerted, that General Matthews ſent off about the ſum of 300,000l. including what Hyat-Saheb ſent for him to Cundapore, as if for himſelf: and this treaſure was all delivered to Cap-

1783. tain Matthews, brother of the General, who conveyed it to Goa, to be remitted to Europe. Some circumſtances have ſince occurred, which confirm this ſuppoſition. The 4th and 8th grenadier battalions of ſepoys, and ſome ſmall detachments, were left at Mangalore, and directed to reduce Deckull, a fort on the coaſt, thirty-ſix miles ſouth of Mangalore. Theſe troops, commanded by Captain Brown, after ſummoning it to ſurrender in vain, battered and ſtormed it on the 3d of April. The enemy made a brave reſiſtance, repulſed our ſepoys, with the loſs of Captain Brown, Lieutenant Scott, and fifty-three men: and our ſepoys refuſed again to attempt the breach. An eſcort of fifty Europeans, of the 42d and 100th regiments, under Lieutenant Dunbar, arriving at Mangalore, was ordered to march to Deckull to lead the ſtorm, which again took place on the 7th, where it was carried, and conſiderable havock made among thoſe who reſiſted. In this bloody action we had only four Britons killed and wounded.

Colonel

Colonel Macleod, now Brigadier-General and Commander in Chief, with Colonel Humberſton and Major Shaw, on their return in the Ranger ſnow to join the army, on the 7th of April, off Geriah, fell in with the Maratta fleet of five ſail of ſquare-rigged veſſels. Peace had been agreed on with that people, and proclaimed at Bombay before the departure of the Ranger, though the Marattas did not know of it. The new General, rather than come to an eclairciſſement, or be taken into Geriah for a day, impatient to puſh on and to ſignalize himſelf, madly recommended fighting the whole fleet. The battle was moſt obſtinate: nor did it ceaſe till almoſt every man in the Engliſh ſhip was killed or wounded. Among the former was Major Shaw, of the 100th regiment; and among the latter, Brigadier-General Macleod, and Colonel Humberſton. The Captain of the ſhip, Pruin, and Lieutenant J. Taylor, were carried priſoners into Geriah, a port of the Marattas, where they remained for ſeveral weeks. Here Colonel Mackenzie Humberſton died of his wounds, in the 1783.

1783. twenty-eighth year of his age. An early and habitual converſancy with the heroes of antient, as well as modern times, nouriſhed in his mind a paſſion for military glory, and ſupported him under unremitting application to all thoſe ſtudies by which he might improve his mind, riſe to honourable diſtinction, and render his name immortal. His untimely and lamented death ſeverely arraigned the conduct of him who had occaſioned it: to whom he formed in many important reſpects a contraſt; being not only acute, but profound and ſteady in his views, gallant without oſtentation, and ſpirited without temerity and imprudence. Soon after theſe gentlemen left the army for Bombay, Major Campbell, with the 42d regiment, was ordered from Bednore to Monbiddry and Carical, two ſmall forts below the Ghautts. Detachments from the army were ſent every where to occupy every village, and every town and mud fort; ſo that the army became exceedingly diſperſed, and theſe detachments not having been made by detail, or in any regular manner,

ner, the Officers could not even account for their men. 1783.

In this ſtate of affairs, the army, dreaming of nothing but riches, inattentive to all intelligence, and neglecting to repair the defences or the fort, Tippoo's army came upon them on the 9th of April, drove in a detachment ſtationed at Fattiput, four miles diſtant, and having taken the town of Bednore, with a conſiderable quantity of ammunition, which no precaution had been taken to lay up in the magazines, cloſely beſieged the fort. As nothing very remarkable happened during the ſiege of this place, unleſs it be two *ſorties* made upon the enemy, which were ill conducted, and which produced no conſequences of any importance, let us leave it beſieged for a moment, and juſt notice an occurrence or two which were the natural effects of that extreme improvidence, with which almoſt the whole army ſeem to have been infatuated.

1783. The Ghautts of Hyder-Ghur and Samſhatſah were attacked and carried on the 9th of April. Cundapore was evacuated on the 10th. Major Campbell thought it proper to make a prudent retreat from the forts of Monbiddry and Carical, and retired with the 42d regiment, and ſome convaleſcents and ſepoys, to Gurpore, ſeven miles from Mangalore and the Coaſt, where he encamped. On the 20th of April, Major Campbell, conceiving it neceſſary, from the intelligence he had of the ſituation of affairs, came to *Mangalore*, and took the command from Captain Sartorius, who was chief Engineer. On the 26th, the 42d regiment, and the 8th battalion of ſepoys, (who had no guns) were driven in by the enemy from Gurpore, and preſently after, a conſiderable body of the enemy encamped on the Coodry Hills, about three miles diſtant, and in view of Mangalore fort. While theſe things were paſſing, Tippoo was carrying on the ſiege of Bednore, with effect, againſt a garriſon unprovided with ſhelter or caſemâts, their proviſions exhauſted, their ammunition ex-

expended, no hope of ſuccour, and ſtill leſs of effecting a retreat to the Coaſt, before ſuch a numerous and well provided army, already in poſſeſſion of all the paſſes and the country around them. 1783.

The number of the Engliſh, diminiſhed by diſeaſe as well as the ſword, now found themſelves (on the 30th of April) obliged to capitulate. Honourable terms were *promiſed* them, and on the 2d of May they marched out with the honours of war, grounded their arms at a conſiderable diſtance from the fort, and began to think of preparing for to-morrow's march for Sadaſhagur, upon the Malabar Coaſt, where, the articles ſtipulated, they ſhould embark for Bombay or Tellicherry. But they were ſoon awakened from that agreeable reverie, by a large body of troops who came to ſurround them. Tippoo ſaid, that the army had forfeited their claim to be ſet at liberty, by a breach of the articles of capitulation, in embezzling and ſecreting the public money, which was all, in good faith, to be delivered up. And in this, there was

1783. but too much truth: for it is ſaid, that even the bamboo of the General's palanquin was, by his own deſire, pierced and filled with pagodas; and even after he had agreed and ſigned the capitulation, he took the public money, and iſſued to the troops two months pay, which came to a conſiderable ſum, but which was all pillaged from them by the enemy's ſepoys. Thus, avarice, the ruling paſſion of this unfortunate man, not only reduced himſelf to ruin and diſgrace, but was the cauſe of miſery and deſtruction to many gallant Officers and ſoldiers. The ſufferings of theſe gentlemen have been impiouſly conſidered by fanatical ſpirits, as viſitations of Providence: while others of undoubted liberality of ſentiment, for who will not allow the conductors of the New Annual Regiſter to be ſuch? miſled by erroneous accounts from India, have repreſented them as the natural, if not the judicial conſequences of their own enormities.---Fired with indignation at theſe reproaches, the ſurviving Officers of the army commanded by Brigadier General Matthews,

to

to the number of 53 gentlemen, publiſhed in concert, a ſatisfactory vindication of their conduct. But, in this apology, they are obliged to encounter and arraign the exaggerations, abſurdities, and lies of certain young men of their own order: and thus they make, at once, their own defence, and that of the publication of which they complain. It is a maxim, that the corruption of the beſt things, renders them the worſt. The preſs is accordingly, a powerful engine of good or evil; but fortunately, it poſſeſſes in itſelf an antidote to the evils to which it may give birth: ſince no man needs to be long injured by calumny, where he is at liberty to inveſtigate and diſcover the truth. 1783.

The unfortunate garriſon of Bednore, (or Hydernagur), were put in irons, and marched like felons to the different priſons of Seringapatam, Shittledroog, Capaldroog, Gutty, Bangalore, and other places; and on their march, and during their impriſonment, they who *ſurvived* it, ſuffered treatment, the idea of which fills the

1783. the mind with horror. Intelligence of theſe untoward circumſtances, cauſed a conſiderable deſertion among the ſepoys, and of *one* caught going off to the enemy, it was deemed neceſſary to make an example. He was, therefore, blown from the mouth of a cannon at Mangalore, on the 2d of May.

The enemy having aſſembled in force upon the heights of Coodry, to the number of 7,000, which put our foraging parties in danger, it was thought neceſſary to try to diſlodge them. On the 6th of May, therefore, before dawn, all the troops in garriſon, (the 4th company of grenadier ſepoys excepted) marched out together, with the 1ſt battalion of ſepoys arrived yeſterday from Bombay, about 1400 men in all, came upon the enemy before they were aware, juſt at the dawn, put them immediately into confuſion, killed a conſiderable number of them, and took 2 braſs and 2 iron ordnance, 3 tumbrils, 185 bullocks, and ſome horſes.---They had two Officers wounded, and two ſoldiers

ſoldiers killed, and one wounded in this affair. 1783.

Intelligence was now brought, that a large army was approaching, and confirmed the melancholy account of the fall of Bednore. Every thing now boded an approaching ſiege, and every exertion became now neceſſary, in order to be prepared for ſuſtaining it. Rice was laid up for four months, but rather with a *ſparing hand*; and other things, (even ſuch as could be got) with the ſame parſimony. On the 16th, a ſcout of about 20 horſemen appeared; next day, a greater body reconnoitred the heights of Coodry, the field of action of the 6th inſtant. Next day, part of their army encamped there, and were augmented daily till the 20th; when they drove in our picquets, and made themſelves maſters of part of the town, while our troops defended the other part of it with 4 guns, and a part of the 100th regiment, &c.—The 1ſt and 8th battalions of ſepoys, ſtationed upon a hill 1200 yards diſtant, and eſteemed a poſt of conſequence, were, on the

1783. the morning of the 23d, attacked, nearly ſurrounded, and hard purſued to the gates of Mangalore. We, from that moment, were cloſely inveſted.

In this purſuit we had a Captain and Enſign killed, and two ſubalterns wounded, with three ſepoys and about three hundred black troops killed and miſſing. The whole coaſt now acknowledged its former maſter, Mangalore, with its dependencies, Onore and the ſmall fort of Carivar, only excepted.

Mangalore is the chief place of ſtrength, and commands the beſt harbour in Canara. It is ſituated in the thirteenth degree of north latitude, at the conflux of two rivers, which diſembogue themſelves into the ſea under the muzzles of its guns, at which place it is about half a mile wide, and within the bar forms a ſpacious harbour for ſhips of 500 tons. The fort is nearly ſquare, and is built of ſtone. It has three towers, with very thin and weak battlements: and artillery is mounted on each

each of its ſides, which face the four car- 1783.
dinal points. On the weſt ſide, next the ſea, there is an oblong addition to the fort, on very low ground, reaching the whole length of that ſide, with four circular turrets and guns The fort of Mangalore has a pretty good ditch, except to the eaſtward, where about ſixty feet of the rock was not cut through: and round the covered way there are eight towers, with artillery mounted on each of them. The ditch is not wet towards the north-eaſt and ſouth-eaſt quarters; and in ſummer even the weſtern part of the ditch becomes very dry. It would exceed the limits within which it has been thought proper to confine theſe Memoirs, to enter into a detail of the ſiege of this fortreſs. Let it ſuffice, for the preſent, if we ſtate the force that was brought againſt it, that by which it was defended, and ſome of the principal actions and occurrences, which may ſerve to convey an idea of the reſources, both of the beſieged and the aſſailants.

The

1783. The force that now inveſted Mangalore, conſiſted in 60,000 horſe; 30,000 diſciplined ſepoys; 600 French infantry, under the command of Colonel Coſſigny; Monſ. Lally's corps, compoſed of Europeans and natives; a French troop of European diſmounted cavalry, under the command of Monſ. Boodena; an Officer in the French ſervice; many thouſands of irregulars, and near 100 pieces of artillery. The whole of this vaſt army amounted to 140,000 fighting men. The front of their encampment extended, from right to left, three miles: and parties were ſtationed upon and behind the adjacent hills. They were commanded by Tipppoo-Sultan in perſon. His brother Kirrum-Saib, and Mahomed-Ally Khan, one of his father's moſt truſted commanders and confidential friends, were alſo preſent.

The ſtrength of our garriſon was compoſed of 696 Europeans, including ninety-one Officers, and 2,850 black troops, amounting in all to 3,546 fighting men, beſides pioneers and camp followers.

The

The enemy broke ground on the north 1783.
ſide of the fort, and by the 27th of May completed eleven embraſures. A party of our men went out to deſtroy this work, and to ſpike their guns, but were repulſed. On the 29th, the garriſon was aſtoniſhed with vollies of large ſtones, ſome of them weighing 150 pounds. The ſtones were affixed to wooden plugs or ſtoppers; and theſe fitted, and by means of a ſledge, forced tightly into the calibres or chaſes of mortars. They generally fell within the fort, being directed with great preciſion. When they met not with any reſiſtance, their velocity, accelerated by the height from which they fell, buried them in the earth. Where they were oppoſed by any body harder than themſelves, they were daſhed into a thouſand pieces. There was no ſhelter for our troops from theſe terrible annoyances. Their noiſe in the night was dreadful, and their effects often horrid, and always fatal. They who were ſtruck by them in the body were cut off by a ſudden, and of courſe, an eaſy death: but the unfortunate ſufferers who were

cruſhed

1783. cruſhed by them in their extremities, often lingered in excruciating pain for ſeveral days. Some amputations were performed: but there was not ſo much as one inſtance of recovery. The ſtones alſo deſtroyed the roofs of huts and houſes, which materials were wanting to repair: a circumſtance, in the height of a monſoon, truly deplorable. A conſtant and heavy cannonade was kept up from batteries erected on the north, on the eaſt, and on the ſouth. On the evening of the 4th of June, the whole north face of the fort, with its towers, was entirely diſmantled. A few days after, a practicable breach was effected in the wall, which, it was expected, the enemy would ſtorm; eſpecially as they had rejected with diſdain a flag of truce. In vain did the Engliſh repel with the bayonet, repeated attacks on batteries conſtructed on commanding ground, without, but near the fortreſs: in vain they ſilenced the batteries of the enemy, and ſpiked their braſs mortars and guns. New touch-holes were drilled with incredible expedition. Thoſe deſtructive machines were opened

played anew, in triumph: maſked batte- 1783.
ries were opened: the approaches of the enemy were brought ſo near, that they threw faſcines on our covered way and the edge of the glacis: and at length, repeated ſummonſes of ſurrender being treated by the Colonel with contempt and defiance, they determined, on the 4th of July, to ſtorm the breach which had been practicable ever ſince the 7th of June. A body of their troops, armed with couteaus, two feet long, of the ſhape of pruning hooks, and with ſpears mounted on light bamboos, 147 feet in length, ſallied from their trenches, and ruſhed into the tower on the left of the outer eaſtern gate, while the guns that had played againſt that tower, were directed elſewhere, but ſtill kept up their firing. Their whole line was now in motion, preſſing on to ſupport the party that had penetrated into the tower, and gained an adjacent rampart. But, after a ſhort ſtruggle, in which Captain Bowles of the artillery was killed by a random ſhot, they were forced to retreat. This attempt on the part of the enemy, was re-

1783. turned on the 6th of July, by a ſally of thirty men, into a lodgement they had made in our works, oppoſite to the gate and tower juſt mentioned, and diſlodged them. This drew out the enemy from their camp, to a general attack on our northern covered way, which was reſolutely and gallantly aſſaulted, but with ſuperior gallantry and reſolution defended againſt freſh troops and ſuperior numbers. In this action, one of the hotteſt during the ſiege, we loſt ſome of our beſt officers; Enſign Macintyre, and the Lieutenants Gordon, Boyce, Fireworker, and Macgregor. About forty of our men were killed, and one hundred wounded. The enemy, by the 15th of July, had wrought themſelves along the whole of our northern covered way, and begun to fill up the ditch oppoſite to the breach. The gates of the fort, being much damaged, were ſhut up, and two ſally ports cut, to ſupply their place. New batteries were raiſed by the aſſailants: and in one of their aſſaults, which were now very frequent, they ſcaled the walls of a fort ſituated at the

the junction of the river with the ſea, called, from its figure, the Octagon, which had hitherto remained undiſturbed, and deſtroyed an hoſpital with ſome men. In the mean time, our men, while they were thus aſſailed by Tippoo Sultan without the fortreſs, were forced to contend, with want of neceſſary ſubſiſtence, and with other inconveniencies, within. Their ſtock of cattle did not at firſt exceed 500, and near a third part of theſe, from diſtreſs of weather, and ſundry neglects, died in the great ditch. The weather being wet, and the air cloſe, the ſtench that aroſe from the putrid carcaſes of the animals was inſufferable. From the 13th of June, the Europeans were put on half allowance of beef. The hoſpital was now exceſſively crowded with ſick and wounded, and totally unprovided with beds, medicines, and proper nouriſhment: no tea, ſugar, ſago, wine, or any thing elſe that could alleviate diſtreſs. The ſick men became averſe from going into the hoſpital, which they conſidered as their grave, and gave themſelves up to deſpair. 1783.

1783. In the midſt of theſe diſcouraging circumſtances, two boats arrived from Mr. Sibbald, Preſident at Tellicherry, with the agreeable information that three or four battalions would certainly join the garriſon, from Bombay, by the 10th of Auguſt; that 1500 Britiſh and Hanoverians, deſtined for Mangalore, had actually left Madraſs under Colonel Gordon, ſo early as the 20th of May; and that Colonel Fullarton, at the head of an army of 500 European ſoldiers, and 16,000 ſepoys, with 22 pieces of cannon, managed by a good train of artillery, having reduced ſeveral ſmall forts, had advanced, in his march to the coaſt of Malabar, near to Pallacatcherry; that an army had gone againſt Arcott, and that hopes were entertained of the reduction of Seringapatam, and of the diſmemberment of the Myſorean empire. The garriſon, animated by this intelligence, gave a *feu-de-joy*, with three cheers, from the ramparts. Tippoo Sultan, as well as the French Reſident at his Court, had been informed, ſome days before this, of the general pacification

tion in Europe, in which Tippoo was included as an ally of France, though they had concealed it from our men, in the hopes that, from the extremities to which they were reduced, they would be induced to capitulate. But the *feu-de-joy* having led them rightly to conclude, that the Engliſh too, had received intelligence of the peace, the French troops refuſed to co-operate any longer with Tippoo in reducing Mangalore. A letter was received, under a flag of truce, by Colonel Campbell, from Monſ. Piveron de Morlay, Envoy at the Durbar of Myſore, from France, with very particular news from the coaſt of Coromandel, where there was now a ceſſation of arms, reſpecting a peace in Europe. Theſe he wiſhed to communicate to Colonel Campbell in perſon, without being blindfolded, as is cuſtomary during hoſtilities, when he ſhould come within the Engliſh works. Monſ. de Piveron, with his retinue, was very politely received by the Commander of Mangalore, with whom he had a long conference. But, in the mean time, even while a flag of 1783.

1783. truce was flying, Tippoo perſevered in carrying on war againſt the fort above mentioned, which commands the entrance of the river, and which being without a ditch, and incapable of a long defence, ſurrendered on terms, after a practicable breach was made in its walls. During the progreſs of hoſtilities, but eſpecially after it was underſtood that there was ſome proſpect of peace, there are not a few inſtances of the enemy's centinels, when they perceived our people off their guard, beckoning to them to get under cover, leſt they ſhould be obliged to fire at them. Our men were not behind them in this act of humanity; but, it is only juſtice to ſay, that they ſet the example. The French Envoy came a ſecond time into the fort, on the 22d of July, and in order to favour a negotiation for peace, a ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities was agreed on for two days. In this interval, and even while ſome of Tippoo's principal people were in the fort, a mine was ſprung under the outer eaſtern gate, which almoſt ſmothered the whole of the guard with rubbiſh, but wounded

ſeveral

ſeveral ſoldiers and ſepoys, and buried others in the ruins. Of this diſaſter, which was repreſented as flowing accidentally from the aſhes of a tobacco-pipe thrown careleſsly on the line of powder laid before the ſuſpenſion, Tippoo-Sultan declared his entire ignorance, and offered to deliver up the perſon ſuppoſed to be in fault, to be puniſhed at the Engliſh Commander's diſcretion: a ſacrifice which Colonel Campbell did not require. The Engliſh Engineer loſt not a moment to fill up the opening that was made in the wall. During this ſhort ſuſpenſion of hoſtilities, the enemy erected, towards the ſouth-eaſt quarter of the fort, a battery of 10 guns: upon which our men, exaſperated at this appearance of treachery, brought all the guns they could, to bear with uncommon fury. After frequent, though ſhort ſuſpenſions of hoſtilities, and a great deal of correſpondence between the French Envoy, the Sultan, and our Commandant, a ceſſation of hoſtilities was ratified on the 2d of Auguſt, in which the garriſons of Onore and Carwar were included. The enemy allowed, at this juncture, that by diſeaſe and the ſword, they had loſt 7,000 men. 1783.

1783. Our loſs was alſo great. The troops were worn down with conſtant fighting in the day, and hard duty at night. Their ſhort intervals of repoſe were interrupted by the noiſe of thoſe tremendous ſtones that were thrown from mortars, which impreſſed their minds, even amidſt their ſlumbers, with dread and horror. Nor did there ever paſs a day, in which ſeveral of our men were not cut off by a large and heavy kind of muſket, called a *jingall*. It is very long in the barrel, larger than a common muſket in the bore, and it is ſledged on a reſt, for the purpoſe of taking a ſteady and ſure aim. At different intervals, very thick planks were poſted, muſket proof, and pierced with ſeveral eyelet-holes, through which the enemy ſhot at every one of our people they could ſet their eyes on. But a truce having now taken place, the garriſon enjoyed a degree of liberty, and walked out occaſionally, and converſed with the French Officers under Colonel Coſſigny. This gentleman, who had refuſed to co-operate with Tippoo, from the moment he knew of the peace in Europe, now demanded a paſsport for his detachment to Maheé, with pro-

proviſions, draught cattle, and boats for croſſing certain unfordable rivers, all which the Myſorean, provoked at his forbearance to act any longer againſt the Engliſh, haughtily refuſed. But Coſſigny, having privately received hatchets and cordage for making rafts, from Colonel Campbell, ſuddenly marched off one morning before dawn. Tippoo ſent 600 horſemen after him, not to *requeſt*, but to *command* him to return. Coſſigny formed his men, in order to receive them, and bid them come on at their peril: on which, after a ſhort parley, they returned to their camp. 1783.

Though it is education and example chiefly that form the characters of nations and men, yet among the human race there are ſtrong marks of diſtinction, originally impreſſed on the frame of the body and mind by the hand of Nature. In the very boſom of luxury, and before the very throne of barbarian bigotry, a family has ariſen in our times, who, uniting the greateſt valour with the moſt profound ſagacity, and the loftieſt ambition, have laboured with ſucceſs to learn the European arts, that they might thereby be enabled

to

1783. to oppoſe and overturn European, and particularly the Engliſh dominion in Aſia. Nor were the hoſtile intentions of Hyder-Ally-Khan confined to that quarter of the world: he formed the magnificent plan of raiſing by degrees ſuch a fleet as might diſpute with England the ſovereignty of the ſea, and even retort, it is ſaid, the invaſions that had harraſſed India, on the Iſland of Great Britain. He poſſeſſed all the materials for ſhip-building in ſuperior abundance, and ſome of theſe of ſuperior excellence to any to be found in Europe.* He allured artificers into his ſervice from foreign countries, and trained up workmen in his own. For ſeveral years he had been employed in building, and in the year 1781, had nearly finiſhed ſix ſhips of the line of battle, ſome of which were a-float, together with ſeveral frigates and ſloops of war. All theſe were exceedingly ſtrong and thick in the planks, being intended to encounter the European ſeas, the water of which, he had heard, was very *ſtrong* and *thick*: a confuſed idea of ice. The ſhips of Hyder were deſtroyed in

* There is a ſpecies of wood in India, called teak-wood, which is almoſt impenetrable by cannon-ſhot.

in 1782 and the beginning of 1783, by 1783.
our fleet; nor did he live to repair their loſs. But his ſon Tippoo, the heir of his dominions, his genius, and his vaſt deſigns, neglected not any means, or the purſuit of any accompliſhment or art, by which theſe might be carried into execution. He was inſtructed in the Perſian and French languages, and he alſo knew a little of the Engliſh, in which the word of command was given to his ſoldiers.—He learned the Elements of Mathematics, and was familiarly converſant with the principles of gunnery, and military architecture and tacticks. With the baggage of the Officers that fell into his hands on the 23d of May, there was found, Sime's Military Guide, a book belonging to Enſign Spottiſwood. This book was carried to Tippoo by ſome of his people, who, according to their ſuperſtitious notions, ſuppoſed that the draughts which it contained, related in ſome myſterious manner to arts of incantation. The Sultan, who inſtantly diſcovered its nature, began to ſhew great civility to Mr. Spottiſwood, by ſending cloth to him and other preſents. At laſt a perſon from the Sultan re-

1783. requeſted him to tranſlate the Treatiſe into the Moor's language, which he ſpoke fluently. But Mr. Spottiſwood politely excuſed himſelf, ſaying, that he could not anſwer for tranſlating a military book, without orders from his Commander.---- They who take delight in tracing reſemblances between antient and modern characters, will be able to find many points of compariſon between Tippoo and Hannibal: both at once ſubtle and brave; ſtudious of the knowledge of their times; trained up by their fathers in hoſtility to the firſt power of the age; exciting the vengeance of all nations againſt that power; and in this career, taking a wider range than that which uſually bounded their views: Hannibal extending his intrigues to the nations on the Red Sea; Tippoo Saib to Conſtantinople, and other ſeats of power on the Mediterranean.

No ſooner was the cauſe of Tippoo Sultan abandoned by the French, than he ſought to connect himſelf with all other powers whom he conſidered as the natural enemies of England, and endeavoured to convert the Mahomedan religion into a band

band of union among different nations, 1783.
for the purpoſe of expelling the Europeans from Hindoſtan. He broke through almoſt every article of the ceſſation of arms. It was an article in the Armiſtice, that the Nabob ſhould furniſh for the garriſon, three times a week, a buzar ſtored with all ſorts of proviſions, at the rate of his own markets. A buzar was accordingly furniſhed; but every article was ſo exhorbitantly dear, that there was ſcarcely any thing which the men could purchaſe. The prices were daily raiſed, till a fowl ſold from nine to twelve rupees, a ſeer of rice for four, a ſeer of ſalt for three, and a frog for ſixpence. Seven boats laden with proviſions from Bombay, were ſeized by Tippoo, and the articles they contained were ſold by his people in the buzar, at the dreadful rate juſt ſtated. This plan of the Sultan's, for reducing the fort of Mangalore by famine, was carried to the utmoſt height within his power, by a total ſtoppage of the buzar. Horſes fleſh was now delicious food. Frogs, ſnakes, ravenous birds, kites, rats, and mice were ſought after, and eaten with voracity. For the laſt two months of the

ſiege,

1783. ſiege, from ſeven to fifteen men died every day for want of the neceſſaries of life. A deep melancholy, ariſing from weakneſs of body, and nouriſhed by every ſurrounding object, rendered the men who ſurvived their fellow-ſoldiers indifferent how they interred them, ſo that they often became the food of the jackall and the pariar dog. The famiſhed ſoldier lay in wait with his muſket and a ſtollen cartridge, to kill thoſe horrid animals in the act of tearing up the dead: and when he ſucceeded, the animal was carried in with triumph. G. Macleod, who came on ſhore by permiſſion from the Nabob, on the 28th of Auguſt, witneſſed this ſcene of ſorrow, and remonſtrated with the Sultan in vain. A reinforcement of 300 Hanoverians appeared off Mangalore in two ſhips of war, with other ſhips in company: but, as the troops could not land according to the terms of the Armiſtice, they were ordered to ſail to Tellicherry. Gen. Macleod alſo appeared on the 28th of Nov. with 10 ſhips and 11 ſmaller veſſels, having on board the long-promiſed relief for the garriſon, with 1,000 Europeans, 3,000 ſepoys, and 350 marines, ſeamen, and artillery-men. The General had made ſignals to the garriſon, and was ad-

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